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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
IN the early 1980's, a new phenomenon emerged in federal reg-
ulatory practice: private environmental organizations mounted
a large-scale litigation campaign to seize the initiative for enforc-
ing several major regulatory statutes against polluters. The statu-
tory authorities that enabled them to step into the shoes of gov-
ernment enforcement staffs, commonly described as "citizen suit"
provisions, had been written into most of the major environmen-
tal laws during the 1970's, but had remained relatively dormant
until they were discovered by the private enforcers. By 1985,
more than 350 private enforcement actions had been initiated,'
and the leaders of the plaintiff organizations were devising plans
to extend their activities to additional violators, other parts of the
country and different statutes. Some of them believed, or hoped,
that this first wave of litigation would lead to a permanent realign-
ment of regulatory law enforcement in the environmental
field-and perhaps in other fields as well. This Article is a prelim-
inary attempt to assess some of the potential effects of this priva-
tization of regulatory enforcement, and to speculate on what such
a realignment might portend for the regulatory process.
Few legal phenomena are totally new, and the citizen suit is
no exception. It has a variety of contemporary and historical ante-
cedents. Statutes giving private parties the right to seek judicial
sanctions for violations of health and safety standards have been
used for at least 600 years in Anglo-American law,2 and at times
private actions have provided virtually the only form of regulatory
enforcement.3 Modern regulatory statutes also try to harness pri-
vate litigiousness in pursuit of the public good, through devices
such as the treble damage action,4 the express or implied right of
private action 5 and the provision of attorneys' fees for successful
litigants in judicial review actions.' What distinguishes the current
1. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 278-80.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 292-301.
4. See, e.g., Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv.
1319 (1973).
5. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1193 (1982).
6. E.g., Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 47
LAW & CoNTEgip. PRoBs. 233 (1984); Zemans, Fee Shjfting and the Implementation of Public
Policy, id. at 187.
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citizen environmental suit, however, is the way in which it is being
used, and the timing of its emergence as a significant force in the
regulatory system.
Certain forms of private action under regulatory statutes,
such as antitrust treble damages or tort suits based on regulatory
standards, are relatively minor extensions of traditional damage
actions between private disputants. The existence of the regula-
tory program may increase the incentive to sue, and prospects for
recovery may be enhanced, but the basis for judicial action is still
a single dispute among particular parties. Typically, the goal of
these ctions is to make damaged parties whole; any resulting
change of incentives for future action is generally a by-product of
this primary quest for corrective justice. The citizen suit, by con-
trast, inverts these priorities. Deterrence and determining the ef-
fective content of enforcement policy are the primary purposes of
the current citizen suits; in many instances, there is no attempt to
define or remedy private wrongs.
In this respect, citizen suits resemble familiar forms of judicial
review of administrative action. Especially in the situation where
the private litigant has an ongoing relationship with a regulatory
agency, as many trade associations and national conservation orga-
nizations do in the environmental field, judicial review can be
viewed as part of a continuing dialogue between the agency and
its constituencies over the content of regulatory policy. Judicial
review, by defining the substantive and procedural boundaries of
an agency's discretion, can determine whose vision of public pol-
icy will prevail in a particular field of regulation. In the traditional
judicial review action, however, the private litigants do not hope
or expect to take over administration of the regulatory program.
In the private enforcement suit, by contrast, some of the pri-
vate litigants hope to step into the shoes of government in a
rather literal sense. As they see it, government agencies are often
unable or unwilling to enforce regulatory laws as they should be
enforced. Private parties, armed with citizen suit authority, are
fully capable of taking over routine enforcement cases. They are
also free of some of the bureaucratic and. political constraints that
hobble government enforcers. Thus, the citizen suit is not a mere
occasional prod used to goad reluctant agencies into action, nor is
836 [Vol. 34
1985] PR!VATIZING REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
it an extraordinary remedy for unusual administrative failures.
Rather, it is the means of seeking a major-perhaps perma-
nent-realignment of roles and powers in important areas of reg-
ulation: the creation of "private attorneys general" with responsi-
bilities comparable to those of the public attorney general.
In an era when disenchantment with the effectiveness of gov-
ernment agencies is widespread, it is not surprising that proposals
to deregulate enforcement are taken seriously.7 The conventional
wisdom casts doubt on both the quantity and quality of regulatory
action. Regulatory agencies rarely seem able to act quickly and
comprehensively enough to resolve the social problems committed
to them. Hobbled by inadequate staff and information, agencies
may be trapped in a losing race to catch up with changing circum-
stances. When they do act, agencies often appear to be neither
neutral nor expert; they seem to be captured by constituent
groups, preoccupied with trivia, or perpetually ensnarled in proce-
dural red tape. As the perception spreads that the quality of
agency decision making is unacceptable, it is natural to consider
whether decision making power should be shifted from the public
to the private sector. Complete deregulation, the outright aboli-
tion of regulatory programs and agencies, dominates current dis-
cussions of privatization. In areas such as environmental protec-
tion, however, full deregulation seems intellectually indefensible
and politically unacceptable. In such settings partial deregulation
of particular functions may emerge as a promising compromise
solution.
The attractiveness of privatizing regulatory functions is en-
hanced in fields such as environmental regulation where the quan-
titative gap between resources and mandates is large and probably
growing. During the "environmental decade" of the 197 0's, legis-
latures were more adept at giving new responsibilities to
overburdened agencies than they were at finding the resources
7. The perception of ineffectiveness underlying moves to deregulate is based on differ-
ing visions of the regulatory state. At one extreme, agencies are faulted for overregulation;
critics emphasize the ways in which government's regulatory initiatives create more
problems than they solve. At the other extreme, agencies are faulted for achieving too
little because they address only a limited range of social problems, and because they lack
the will or the capacity to regulate vigorously. See, e.g., G. EADS & M. Fix, RELIEF OR RE-
FORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA 87-105 (1984). Regardless of the underlying vision,
a perception that regulatory agencies have been and are likely to remain ineffective makes
alternatives to regulation more attractive.
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necessary to enable administrators to discharge those responsibili-
ties effectively. The resulting gap between promise and perform-
ance was an obvious source of tension, even when agency budgets
were growing steadily. Moreover, the federal budget deficits of
the 1980's have made it clear that the gap between promise and
performance is not a temporary phenomenon. The prospect for
environmental agencies in the foreseeable future is shrinking re-
sources and declining regulatory capacity. If the agencies remain
unable to carry out all of their responsibilities, then it will be im-
portant for supportive constituencies to find structural alternatives
that will accomplish the statutory objectives without dependence
on agency resources. The citizen suit, which can be self-support-
ing through fee recoveries from violators, thus emerges as a par-
tial solution to the resource gap.
While the citizen suit is thus theoretically attractive, it none-
theless will have to surmount some formidable obstacles if it is to
become an accepted and effective part of regulatory enforcement.
This study, which looks primarily at the first wave of suits brought
by environmental organizations under the federal Clean Air Acte
and Clean Water Act?, has identified four problems that can un-
dermine the citizen suit as a device for regulatory enforcement.
At this early stage in the evolution of private enforcement, it is
not clear whether these problems will be solved; however, as we
suggest later in this Article, there is some reason to believe that
they can be, if the legal and political systems respond
appropriately.
At the threshold, citizen suits must surmount a series of doc-
trinal barriers that could make it difficult or impossible to mount
an effective private enforcement campaign. These issues of statu-
tory interpretation and judicial law making are the familiar ones
that arise whenever a novel regulatory enactment becomes the
subject of frequent litigation: the precise meaning of vague and
untested statutory terms must be worked out, and the citizen suit
must be fitted into a complex framework of existing private reme-
dies and judicial review provisions. There has been a substantial
volume of litigation under citizen suit provisions during the fif-
8. Clean Air Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
9. Clean Water (Federal Water Pollution Control) Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1345, 1361-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
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teen years that they have been in existence, first as a supplement
to the traditional judicial review proceeding to force administra-
tors to take or refrain from particular actions, and then more re-
cently as a means of imposing penalties on violators. With few ex-
ceptions, this transitional litigation has reinforced the power of
the citizen suit. Courts have generally been able to control inven-
tive litigants' attempts to use citizen suits for purposes not in-
tended by Congress, and they have upheld private enforcers' ar-
guments that citizen suits should be easy to bring and to prove.
Issues remain to be resolved, particularly in the area of remedies,
but a reasonably consistent and workable body of law has devel-
oped to govern the bringing of private enforcement actions.
A second problem area, one which involves both legal and
managerial issues, is the coordination of public and private en-
forcement. With both public and private enforcers active in a reg-
ulatory field, there is a very real possibility that they will be work-
ing at cross purposes. If regulated parties who are similarly
situated receive different treatment depending on whether public
or private enforcers win the race to the courthouse, then the fair-
ness of the regulatory program is open to question. Moreover, if
public and private enforcers follow radically different priorities or
interpretations of law, confusion and resentment are likely to re-
sult in the regulated community. It may also encourage undesir-
able behavior by enforcers, such as bringing collusive suits or ac-
cepting inadequate settlements. These coordination problems
could undermine the rationality and acceptability of the regula-
tory program if carried to extremes; but most of the problems
seem relatively easy to solve. The Administrative Conference of
the United States has recommended several measures to achieve
better coordination of environmental enforcement,10 and addi-
tional coordinating devices may be developed as agencies and
courts become familiar with dual systems of enforcement.
A third basic problem is whether citizen suit provisions are
creating the proper incentives for the regulators, the regulated,
and the groups bringing enforcement actions. The incentive prob-
lem is somewhat different for each of the three primary actors
involved in the enforcement process. The statutes provide finan-
cial incentives for plaintiffs to bring private enforcement actions,
10. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,363 (1985) (to be codified at I C.F.R. §§ 305.85-1 to .85-3).
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by authorizing the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs for suc-
cessful litigants. If a case is settled, the defendant may agree to
provide another form of financial incentive, an "environmental
fund" dedicated to particular conservation uses. In addition,
plaintiff groups may have principled incentives arising from their
commitment to environmental values, as well as organizational in-
centives to bring suits for the purpose of attracting or retaining
members. The strength of these incentives remains unclear, and
as a result it is uncertain whether private enforcement will evolve
in fact and in perception as an ethical enterprise motivated by a
widely shared vision of the public good, or whether it will be dom-
inated by bounty hunters who will discredit the idea of citizen
suits. Thus far, principled motivations are predominant, but it is
possible that plaintiff incentives will shift if the courts continue to
remove barriers to citizen suits and make fee recovery easier.
Among the regulated, the incentive issues center around the
questions of how well and in what circumstances deterrence
works. Many plaintiff organizations feel that enhanced deterrence
is both necessary and sufficient. That is, many of them believe en-
vironmental enforcement has become so lax that most of its deter-
rence value has been lost. They also believe, however, that this
collapse in compliance can be reversed if they can win a high pro-
portion of their citizen suits and obtain substantial penalties.
This may be a plausible projection of industry response to in-
centives created by the citizen suit, but it is definitely not the only
possible reaction. Punitive measures that are regarded as unrea-
sonable can provoke massive resistance, not only in the court-
room, but also in the political arena and in everyday life. Prohibi-
tion and the civil rights struggle provide historic examples of the
difficulties that the legal system can have in trying to force signifi-
cant behavioral change on a resistant portion of the population.
Antipollution enforcement may not have the broad, immediate
impact on the citizenry that laws governing racial discrimination
and consumption of alcohol did; but it seems clear that environ-
mental regulation affects major sectors of American industry, and
that private enforcement has provoked considerable resentment
among target firms. Moreover, environmental enforcers, like most
other regulators, operate in a relationship of mutual dependence
with the regulated industry, at least to the extent that the industry
controls some of the data needed to make the regulatory program
840 [Vol. 34
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function effectively. Consequently, the possibility of industry back-
lash and protracted conflict should not be ruled out.
Citizen suits also may affect the incentives of the government
regulators who are caught between the private enforcers and their
industry targets. In principle, and to some extent in practice,
agency responses to citizen enforcement may vary considerably.
At one extreme, affected agencies may welcome citizen enforcers
as a supplement to their own resources. At the other, they may
resist private enforcement in the belief that the plaintiff groups
are intruding on bureaucratic turf or interfering with established
policies. Agencies may exercise their discretion in a variety of
ways to help or hinder the bringing of citizen suits. Regardless of
how they react to private enforcement, agencies are likely to find
that their relationships with the regulated industry and other con-
stituencies are significantly altered. What those changed relation-
ships will be, and whether they should be regarded as a cost or a
benefit of private enforcement, is not yet clear. As the citizen en-
forcement action emerges from its current transitional stage and
becomes a more familiar feature of the regulatory landscape, the
patterns of changed relationships should become clearer. For the
present, the effects of citizen suits on relationships and incentives
remain largely speculative.
Even if it were possible to trace out the changes in incentive
structures resulting from the rise of private enforcement, there
still would remain a fourth problem in defining the true value of
citizen suits. This question concerns the fundamental legitimacy of
private regulatory enforcement. As used here,i" the legitimacy of
citizen suits is a function not only of their pragmatic effectiveness,
but also of their relationship to established visions of public order,
which sharply conflict over the appropriate boundaries between
public and private fields of action. When assessing the practical
effects of citizen suits, even observers who are working from a
11. The major theorist on the role of legitimacy in compliance with legal directives is
Max Weber. His discussion of the issues still merits study. See, e.g., M. WElER, ECONOMY AND
SocIErY 21 (1968). Recent noteworthy studies which give the legitimacy-producing aspects
of law a central role include Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) and Hay, Property Author-
ity, and Criminal Law in ALBION'S FATAL TREE. CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND 17 (D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J. Rule, E. Thompson & K. Winslow, eds. 1975). But




common data base and a common set of inferences about the ef-
fects of citizen suits on compliance may differ sharply with respect
to the desirability of the reported outcomes. These differences
concern both the substantive efficacy of the regulatory program
and the means by which it is implemented.
In the environmental area, there seems to be little consensus
among constituency groups and commentators on the underlying
value of regulatory programs. Without such a consensus, it is not
possible to develop a generally accepted set of measures to assess
the desirability of different levels of enforcement. Those who be-
lieve that the relevant laws and rules are wrong-headed or ineffec-
tive will think that any additional enforcement is likely to make
matters worse, while those who have faith in the purposes and
methods of the laws will tend to favor any and all additional en-
forcement. In the short run, at least, these kinds of beliefs do not
seem very responsive to empirical data. Instead, they function as
ideologies of regulatory enforcement. The question of which ide-
ology will gain dominance seems open.
In addition to the conflicting ideologies that color attitudes
toward the pragmatic effectiveness of private enforcement, there
is an equally strong division in beliefs about the appropriate divid-
ing lines between private and public spheres of conduct. From the
regulated industry's point of view, private enforcement of regula-
tory laws is an anomalous, if not dangerous, deviation from estab-
lished divisions of responsibility and power. Private delegations of
enforcement power may be as suspect as private delegations of
rulemaking authority because they bypass the existing structure of
limited authority and political accountability that confines the
powers of the regulatory state. In this vision of public regulation,
administrative agencies should have defined spheres of authority,
carefully detailed mandates from the political branches, and multi-
ple structures of accountability and oversight to assure that their
powers are exercised in accord with the dictates of elected offi-
cials. When regulatory powers break these confining
bounds-especially when they are turned over to private par-
ties-they may lose their legitimacy, for it is only by acting in ac-
cordance with accepted norms of accountability and control that
regulation can become legitimate.
Plaintiff organizations and their lawyers typically come from a
different tradition which holds as its preeminent value that gov-
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ernment enforcement of social regulation should be responsive to
the needs and desires of those whom the regulatory program is
supposed to protect. To the extent that regulation serves "the
people" rather than "the industry" or "the bureaucrats," it gains
legitimacy. Conversely, it forfeits that legitimacy when it becomes
captive to the will of the industries or bureaucrats. From this per-
spective, private enforcement may be viewed as the ultimate legiti-
mating device, since it gives the effective power to initiate regula-
tion back to the people themselves. Neither of these views,
presented here in oversimplified form, is wholly satisfactory, and
neither has been totally dominant in the past. Historically, the le-
gitimate boundary between public and private activity has been
shifting and contingent. The power of private parties to invoke
regulatory sanctions has been highly variable over time, waxing
and waning periodically as different social problems have arisen
and found solutions.
The modern citizen suit provisions were first enacted at a
time when "capture" theories dominated scholarly and popular
thought about regulation.1 2 Agencies were regarded as unduly
sympathetic to the interests of the regulated industries for a vari-
ety of reasons,13 including the belief that there was often a serious
imbalance of the interests represented in agency decision making.
Regulated industries dominated the process because they had the
resources to hire the lawyers, experts and lobbyists to make their
voices heard. Other interests, lacking resources, remained mute.
As a result, they typically lost out in the adversarial struggles that
constitute the regulatory process. The general answer to this im-
balance of representation was the creation of greater rights and
opportunities for public participation in administrative decisions,
backed by funding devices to close the resource gap between in-
12. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955);
G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); Huntington, The Maras-
mus of the l.C.C.: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467
(1952).
13. Other causes frequently cited as reasons for capture included the "revolving
door" that brought a succession of industry people into positions of power in the regula-
tory agencies, then back to the industry where they could use their inside knowledge to
advantage. Another common diagnosis of the cause of agency capture was the "iron trian-
gle" of industry groups, agencies, and congressional committee chairmen who coopera-




dustry and public interest groups. 14 The citizen suit, which gives
the public a right to be heard in enforcement decisions and pro-
vides for expense reimbursement, is a logical outgrowth of this
public participation movement.
Today, capture theories of regulation still have a strong fol-
lowing, but they no longer dominate the field. A variety of eco-
nomic and behavioral analyses of regulatory enforcement have
emerged to challenge the assumptions on which the citizen suit
was originally based. These alternative views of regulation provide
different ways of asking the question, what are the strengths and
weaknesses of the citizen suit? And, as might be expected, they
imply somewhat different answers.
II. OVERVIEW OF CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
The two citizen suit provisions most frequently used today
were both enacted during the environmental awakening of the
early 1970's, in response to a history of perceived failures in gov-
ernment enforcement. The first private enforcement provision,
section 304 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, was passed a few
months after the first Earth Day was organized" and the Nader
report Vanishing Air was published."" Nader's introduction to that
14. See, e.g., Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade
Commission Experience, 70 GEo. LJ. 51, 52-55 (1981).
15. On April 22, 1970, the first Earth Day was observed across the nation. Parades,
demonstrations, and rallies were organized for the purpose of fostering "increased envi-
ronmental awareness" to help combat the growing threat of pollution. N.Y. Times, April
22, 1970 at 1, col. 1.
16. J. Esposrro, VANISHING AIR (1970). Professor Richard Tobin notes that the Clean
Air Act of 1970 was heavily influenced by political maneuvering between President Nixon
and Senator Edmund Muskie, who then appeared to be the leading candidate for the Dem-
ocratic presidential nomination in 1972. Both had proposed clean air legislation, but Mus-
kie's original bill would have made only minor changes in the existing regulatory structure
by comparison to the more substantial changes in the administration proposal. According
to Tobin, the Nader report "clobbered" Muskie:
This scathing critique . . . blamed Muskie for nearly every problem that ex-
isted. The senator was accused of providing inadequate support for NAPCA
[the federal agency then responsible for air pollution], of ignoring the deficien-
cies of the Air Quality Act, and of failing to hold oversight hearings of
NAPCA's activities. The Nader Report even suggested that Muskie resign his
subcommittee chairmanship because of his alleged incapacity to operate in
favor of the environment.
These events pressured Muskie to recoup his reputation. A dramatic move
was in order, and such a move came in mid-August when the Subcommittee on
Air and Water Pollution reported its proposal for a new clean air law to the full
844 [Vol. 34
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report reflects the militant atmosphere in which the private en-
forcement suit was born:
Air pollution (and its fallout on soil and water) is a form of domestic chemi-
cal and biological warfare. . . . This damage, perpetuated increasingly in di-
rect violation of local, state, and federal law, shatters people's health and
safety but still escapes inclusion in the crime statistics. . . . In testament to
the power of corporations and their retained attorneys, enforcement
scarcely exists. Violators are openly flouting the laws, and an Administration
allegedly dedicated to law and order sits on its duties."'
Although not always as forcefully stated, the belief was wide-
spread that neither the federal government nor the states had
done an effective job of enforcing antipollution laws. The Senate
Report on the Clean Air Act of 1970 euphemistically described
prior federal enforcement efforts as "restrained," and expressed
the hope that citizen suits would "motivate governmental agencies
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abate-
ment proceedings." ' Two years later, the Senate Report on the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments was more ex-
Committee on Public Works.
K. TOBIN, THE SOCIAL GAMBLE 78-79 (1979). See also Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J. L. EcoN. & ORG.
313, 326-28 (1985).
17. Nader, Introduction to J. Esposrro, supra note 16, at vii. The body of the Nader
report did not, however, provide a very explicit blueprint for citizen enforcement. As an
exception to its general criticism of the Muskie bill, see supra note 16, the report grudg-
ingly acknowledged that "[a]mong the bill's better features is a provision allowing both
federal government and private citizens to enforce state-established emission standards in
federal court." Id. at 306. The Nader group also argued that the responsible federal
agency should actively encourage citizen groups to exercise this authority:
Nothing will be achieved in air pollution control until citizens can move past
their generalized concerns with the problem, and exert action against specific
sources.... NAPCA's Office of Education and Information (OEI) should be
permitted, if not indeed required, to go public. An inconsequential budget...
does not begin to match the needs that OEI should be serving: to establish
citizen action groups around the country, to render professional guidance and
technical expertise to such groups, to gather and publish detailed information
about specific sources of pollution, to supply expert witnesses for testimony at
state and local hearings and in lawsuits against polluters. This would be creative
federal leadership.
Id. at 307-08. During the early implementation of the Clean Air Act, the EPA did take
some steps in this direction; see Ayres & Miller, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Air Act of
1970 (undated pamphlet published by USEPA; SUNYAB library accession stamp dated
June 1974) (available in the Charles B. Sears Law Library, State University of New York at
Buffalo).
18. S. REm. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970).
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plicit, noting that "[t]he record shows an almost total lack of en-
forcement."19 Despite repeated amendments to the original 1948
federal water pollution statute,2" the law required multiple confer-
ences and hearings before any coercive action could be taken.
This process was so slow and cumbersome, the Senate report
noted, that "only one case has reached the courts in more than
two decades."
21
Thus, the legislative histories of the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts reflect considerable skepticism, if not despair, over the
prospect of effective government enforcement. Nevertheless, the
legislative histories also indicate some congressional caution about
giving private parties the power to enforce regulatory statutes.
Proposals for broader forms of citizen suit legislation were under
consideration in the early 1970's, and in many respects the private
enforcement provisions of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
can be viewed as a less radical alternative. 22 Several types of con-
straints are mentioned in the legislative reports and incorporated
into the legislation establishing these private enforcement actions.
Private parties may sue only to enforce precise limits established
by the responsible agencies; they may not ask courts to create
standards under common law principles or ambiguous statutory
delegations.23 Suits against the Environmental Protection Agency
19. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD,
NEWS 3668, 3672. The primary federal statute governing water pollution has undergone a
number of popular name changes during its nearly four decades of existence. Through
most of the early years it was known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).
After the 1965 amendment, it was sometimes referred to as the Water Quality Improve-
ments Act; but in 1972 it reverted to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The 1977
amendments brought the popular name Clean Water Act, but the FWPCA label is still
found frequently in later usage. In the interest of clarity, this article will generally use the
name Clean Water Act.
20. See generally Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MicH. L.
REV. 1103 (1970).
21. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3668, 3672.
22. See, e.g., Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?,
2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407 (1972).
23. The Senate Report on the Clean Air Act notes that the citizen suit provision
"would not substitute a 'common law' or court-developed definition of air quality" for ad-
ministrative standards, but would, instead, establish "an objective evidentiary standard
[that] would have to be met by the citizen who brings an action under this section." S. REP.
No. 1196, supra note 18, at 36. Similarly, the Senate Report on the Clean Water Act states
that the citizen suit provision would not give courts common-law power to define unaccept-
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(EPA) Administrator are allowed only when s/he has failed to
perform a nondiscretionary duty.24 Even when a private enforce-
ment action meets these requirements, the party bringing it must
give the agency sixty days' notice prior to filing the complaint.
The agency may then elect to take control of the controversy and
bar the citizen suit by bringing its own action.25 Finally, Congress
rejected the possibility of class actions to recover damages for pol-
lution incidents, and included language in the legislative history
reflecting that intent.2"
The resulting provisions have a few significant differences,
but the major features are substantially the same. Since virtually
all clauses of these principal citizen suit provisions have been the
subject of litigation, they should be briefly described at this point.
A. Parties
The Clean Air Act citizen suit provision, like most other pri-
vate enforcement statutes,27 authorizes "any person" to bring a
suit against "any person"-including the United States and other
government instrumentalities to the extent allowed by the elev-
enth amendment-alleged to be violating an emission standard,
limit or order. 8 The Clean Water Act is somewhat more detailed.
Its citizen suit provision, section 505, defines the citizen eligible to
bring suit as "a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected. ' 29 Its legislative history makes clear
able levels of pollution, but would, instead, limit citizen initiatives to the enforcement of
precise rules. S. REP'. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3745. The only significant exception is the citizen suit provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1972, which allows suits against persons whose
actions regarding solid or hazardous wastes "may present an imminent or substantial en-
dangerment to health or the environment," 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), regardless of
whether such actions violate an explicit permit standard or regulation, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(A).
24. E.g., CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5374, 5388.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 45-174.
26. E.g., S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3746-47.
27. See infra statutes cited at note 31.
28. Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1270 (1982), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1982), have similar provisions authorizing suit by any person having an interest actu-
ally or potentially adversely affected.
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that the Act's drafters were incorporating the liberal test for
standing articulated by the Supreme Court in its then-recent Si-
erra Club v. Morton decision;30 but as noted below, this greater
precision has not prevented a considerable amount of litigation
over plaintiffs' standing.
B. Types of Actions
The Clean Air and Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions
explicitly authorize two types of court actions: a suit for penalty or
injunction against an entity violating some kind of antipollution
requirement (described here as a private enforcement action); and an
action against the EPA for failure to perform some nondiscretion-
ary duty (hereafter referred to as an action-forcing suit).3 1 The stat-
utes do not, however, preclude other types of actions. On the con-
trary, they contain a savings clause stating the legislative intent to
preserve other common law and statutory rights to enforce emis-
sions limits and to seek other forms of relief against polluters or
agencies. Thus, there is some potential for overlap and confusion
among different forms of action to abate pollution.
C. Jurisdiction
Citizen suit provisions uniformly provide that both action-
forcing and private enforcement actions are to be brought in the
federal district courts. Major environmental laws such as the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts also provide for limited statutory
review of major agency decisions in the federal courts of appeals,
often under strict time constraints. Beyond these primary forms of
court action, there are also possibilities for nonstatutory review in
the federal courts, and various forms of judicial review and pri-
30. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3776, 3823.
31. Some citizen suit provisions significantly vary in this respect. For example, the
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982), and
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1982), do not au-
thorize action-forcing suits by private parties. On the other hand, citizen suit statutes such
as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981), the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §
4911 (1982), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982), exclude
various aspects of information production, record keeping, and reporting from citizen en-
forcement. Finally, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a) (1982), allows citizens to enforce the entire Act, while the EPA is limited to enforc-
ing some but not all of its requirements.
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vate remedies in the state courts. Thus, in many environmental
disputes there may be honest confusion as to whether the citizen
suit is the appropriate avenue for invoking federal jurisdiction. In
addition, the difficulty of defining nondiscretionary duties creates
some opportunity for forum shopping or similar strategic
behavior.
D. Notice
As previously noted, citizen suit provisions generally require
that a private enforcer give sixty days' notice before bringing an
action in court. This grace period is designed to give the EPA a
chance to assess and respond to the allegations. If it concludes
that the proposed action is meritorious, the EPA may bring its
own suit against the polluter, and thereby bar the citizen action.32
If the suit is a private enforcement action, notice generally must
be given to the EPA, the responsible state agency, and the alleged
violator. For suits seeking to force the Administrator to perform
some action, notice need only be given to the EPA. 3 While the
statutes are quite explicit in defining these requirements, they do
not address the consequences of a failure to give the proper no-
tice. Depending upon how one reads the statutes, notice problems
can be regarded as jurisdictional defects mandating dismissal of
the action or as pleading technicalities which can be waived or
excused.
E. Diligent Prosecution Exemption
The Clean Air and Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions
bar private enforcement and action-forcing suits when the respon-
sible government agency is "diligently prosecuting a civil action
[relating to the alleged violation] in a court of the United States
or a State."'34 These clauses were evidently drafted to assure that
citizen plaintiffs would serve as a supplement to, rather than a
substitute for, government enforcers; but the language of these
32. If the EPA brings such an enforcement action in Federal Court, the citizen suit
provisions generally give private enforcers the right to intervene. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(l)(B) (1982) (Clean Water Act).
33. Clean Air Act § 304(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. Clean Air Act § 304(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. 11 1983);
Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. 11 1983).
849
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sections poses at least two problems of interpretation. The most
apparent is the definition of "diligence." There are few statutory
time requirements on the management of an enforcement case.
Without any workable standards, how can a court tell whether
prosecution of a given case is sufficiently diligent? Moreover, in
many instances of apparent violation, the EPA or the responsible
state agency will have the option of trying to secure compliance
through a variety of methods short of court litigation, ranging
from telephone calls to formal administrative hearings for the im-
position of civil penalties. May some or all of these administrative
actions be considered the equivalent of a "court action" for pur-
poses of the diligent prosecution exemption?
F. Intervention
The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water and Clean Air
Acts provide for two kinds of intervention. The citizen plaintiff
may intervene when the citizen suit is barred by the agency's dili-
gent prosecution of the violator. Conversely, the Administrator
may intervene in citizen suits if not already joined as a party.
G. Remedies
The two major citizen enforcement provisions differ substan-
tially in the remedies they make available to private plaintiffs. Sec-
tion 304 of the Clean Air Act sets the pattern for the great major-
ity of citizen suit provisions by authorizing only injunctive relief.
It directs the court either to enforce emissions standards, limits
and orders, or to order the Administrator to perform mandatory
duties. The Clean Water Act's citizen suit section has a similar
remedial provision, but it also stipulates that the court has power
"to apply any appropriate civil penalties" available under the
Act. 5 Thus, a private enforcer can seek civil penalties of up to
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). The 1984 amendments to The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act include a comparable authorization for the court in a civil penalty action
to "apply any appropriate civil penalties." Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 401, 98 Stat. 3269 (1984)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 6972). H. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1984).
Defining what constitutes a "violation" can also be a problem. Because the Clean Water
Act, for example, provides for private enforcement "against any person. . . who is alleged
to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation," 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982),
some polluters who have violated in the past but who are in compliance at the time suit is
filed have claimed that they are not liable for past violations. Also, polluters have argued
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$10,000 per day for each water pollution violation. Furthermore,
the Clean Water Act differs from the Clean Air Act and other
environmental statutes by failing to give the EPA the power to
impose civil penalties itself. If a discharger refuses to comply with
legal requirements, the agency can either issue an administrative
order, which carries no automatic penalties if the violator ignores
it, or it can go to court to seek the statutory penalties. As a practi-
cal matter, this makes it more difficult for the agency to assert the
diligent prosecution exemption and bar a citizen suit. Thus, the
private enforcer under the Clean Water Act stands more in the
shoes of the government enforcer than a plaintiff under the other
citizen suit provisions, and, correspondingly, has more leverage
over the target of the enforcement action.
H. Fees and Costs
The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act encourage citizen plaintiffs to bring actions by author-
izing the courts to award litigation costs, including reasonable at-
torneys' and expert witnesses' fees, "whenever the court deter-
mines such award is appropriate."3 The statutes provide little
guidance, however, for determining what fee levels are "reasona-
ble," and when it is "appropriate" to award them.
In sum, citizen suit provisions, first written into environmen-
tal regulatory statutes in the 1970's, left many of these issues open
for subsequent litigation. Over the intervening period of slightly
more than a decade, the two most frequently used statutes, the
Clean Air and Glean Water Acts, have provided enough experi-
ence to support some generalizations about the patterns of claims
and defenses asserted, the courts' reactions to them, and the
emerging role of the citizen suit in environmental regulation.
that the $10,000 per day limitation covers all violations of particular permit parameters
occurring in a given day, while private enforcers have argued that each permit parameter
defines a separate violation and that more than $10,000 in fines may accrue in any given
day. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542
(E.D. Va. 1985).
36. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982)
(Clean Air Act).
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III. PATTERNS OF USAGE
Citizen suit litigation under the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts can be divided into two distinct time periods. Before 1982,
these statutes were only rarely used for their express purpose of
seeking penalties or injunctions against violators. They were occa-
sionally used during this initial period for the other primary pur-
pose defined by the statute: forcing the Administrator of the EPA
to take regulatory action. Most frequently, however, the citizen
suit provisions were used as a supplement to other forms of action
for judicial review or damages. After 1982, when national envi-
ronmental organizations began to mount private enforcement
campaigns, the focus shifted dramatically, and private enforce-
ment actions quickly came to dominate the reported decisions.
This section summarizes the litigation patterns of all the reported
cases involving the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts. The classification system used to analyze pat-
terns of citizen suit litigation divides the reported cases into six
broad categories, depending upon the primary purpose of the ac-
tion:37 (a) jurisdictional maneuvering cases in which the parties are
attempting to use citizen suit provisions to expand or contract op-
portunities for federal court review; (b) dispute resolution actions
37. The catalogue of cases summarized here was developed from several sources.
First, all cases listed in American Law Reports and United States Code Annotated annota-
tions to the Clean Air and Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions were compiled. Second,
exhaustive searches of the Lexis and Westlaw data bases were performed. Search criteria
included all common references to the citizen suit provisions. Finally, case lists were ex-
changed with researchers at the Environmental Law Institute who were involved in a simi-
lar research effort at that time. The compiled cases were then examined to determine if, in
fact, they involved any claims potentially relying on citizen suit jurisdiction. Those that did
not were removed from the data base, and the rest were analyzed in terms of goals and
effects. The case list was current as of January 31, 1986. In all, the data base includes 106
cases based on the Clean Air Act and 163 based on the Clean Water Act. These totals
include a few cases based on both statutes.
Like any system of classification, the categories used here admittedly have some arbi-
trary dividing lines and debatable assumptions. Sorting the cases into these categories re-
quired a number of judgment calls, since the regulatory programs are quite complex and
counsel were frequently creative in trying to apply the citizen suit provisions to their claims
and defenses. Moreover, the decisions themselves were occasionally opaque, because courts
deciding complex environmental cases frequently omit from their opinions a detailed
description of the jurisdictional basis for the litigation. As a result, it is sometimes impossi-
ble to determine what bearing-if any-a citizen suit provision has on the various claims
and defenses. Notwithstanding these limitations, the picture that emerges from the tabula-
tions described in the text still seems reasonably accurate, and useful in understanding the
impact of the citizen suit.
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where parties are invoking private enforcement powers in an ef-
fort to resolve a two-party dispute over essentially private rights;
(c) impact litigation in which a plaintiff is trying to compel a policy
decision or stop a development project; (d) enforcement actions in
which the plaintiff seeks to abate pollution; and (e) fee litigation
over the recovery of costs and attorneys' fees provided in the stat-
utes. As described below, most of these general categories have
distinguishable subcategories as well. Decisions in which citizen
suit provisions were merely cited in passing or used by analogy in
a different context were excluded from the data base. For the
most part, opinions were categorized into the one classification in
which they best fit, but in a few instances the same decision will
appear in two categories. For example, if an environmental organ-
ization filed a citizen suit complaint with two counts, one seeking
sanctions against a discharger and the other trying to compel the
Administrator to act, the case would be recorded as both a private
enforcement and an action-forcing case.
A. Jurisdictional Maneuvering
When a new form of action such as the citizen suit is injected
into a complex system of statutory and nonstatutory review, par-
ties will often test the limits of the new grant of jurisdiction. The
jurisdictional cases that arose under the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts were subdivided into three categories: alternative judi-
cial review, citizen suit as a defense and intergovernmental con-
flict. Each of these topics requires separate explanation.
An alternative judicial review claim arises primarily from limi-
tations in the special statutory review provisions of the environ-
mental laws, and also from the system of "cooperative federalism"
used to implement the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. Section
509 of the Clean Water Act 8 provides for federal appeals court
review of EPA decisions granting discharge permits, issuing regu-
lations, and taking other major actions; but the petition must be
filed within ninety days of the decision. Review after that time is
precluded unless the application "is based solely on grounds which
arose after such ninetieth day."3 " A party who misses the ninety-
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982).
39. Id. § 1369(b)(1) -(2). The comparable limit for judicial review under the Clean Air
Act is 60 days. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982).
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day limit for challenging a discharge permit, or who prefers to
have the case considered by a district judge, might well invoke the
citizen suit provision, claiming that the Administrator failed to
perform some nondiscretionary duty in granting the permit.40
Since both the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts give state govern-
ments a major role to play in implementing the statutes, parties
dissatisfied with state actions may also try to use the citizen suit to
bring the controversy into federal court by claiming that the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA violated nondiscretionary duties to oversee
state enforcement.
41
On the whole, there have been relatively few alternative judi-
cial review actions litigated under these statutes, and even fewer
in which the plaintiffs have prevailed. Only eight reported deci-
sions were found under the Clean Water Act, and two pairs of
those involved different stages of the same controversy. The
courts rebuffed plaintiffs' claims in all but two cases, and the most
significant of these was decided on other grounds.42 There was
somewhat more litigation of this nature under the Clean Air Act,
with twenty-six reported decisions tabulated. Fourteen of these in-
volved attempts by industry plaintiffs to compel approval of vari-
ances or to challenge regulations. As in the Clean Water Act
cases, plaintiffs usually were not successful in using this route to
the federal courts; the defendant (which was typically a federal or
state agency) prevailed in nineteen of the twenty-six decisions
reviewed.
Citizen suit provisions can also be used as a jurisdictional de-
fense. For example, a defendant involved in some other form of
action may claim that the action is precluded because the plain-
40. See, e.g., Sun Enters., Ltd. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd, 532
F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976).
41. E.g., District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (EPA failure
to veto a state discharge permit under CWA not reviewable by citizen suit); Council of
Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 524 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd,
683 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1982) (seeking to compel implementation and enforcement of a
transportation control plan); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D.
Conn. 1979), modified, 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980), modified, 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981).
42. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1975), a coalition of environmental groups challenged the EPA's failure to list certain sub-
stances as toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act. The court avoided decision on the
applicability of the citizen suit provision, holding that the Administrative Procedure Act
and other statutes pleaded by the groups provided an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Id. at
291.
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tiff's only route to federal court on this type of claim is under the
citizen suit provision. This defense has been raised with some fre-
quency under the Clean Water Act, generating twelve reported
decisions. No comparable cases have been found under the Clean
Air Act. 3 Typically, a federal official such as the Administrator of
the EPA or an officer in the Army Corps of Engineers raises the
defense, perhaps in the hope that the citizen suit limitation to en-
forcement of nondiscretionary duties will result in a narrower
scope of review than the form of action chosen by plaintiff.
44
The outcomes in this subcategory of cases have been mixed.
Plaintiffs have withstood the citizen suit defense in eight out of
the twelve cases, and in two others the decision has turned more
on the discretionary nature of the administrator's substantive duty
than on the route of review chosen by the plaintiff.
45
The third group of jurisdictional cases is also small, totaling
ten decisions under both statutes, some involving different stages
of the same controversy. Though few in number, these decisions
are relatively important in the implementation of the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts. They involve jurisdictional conflicts be-'
tween the states and the federal government, typically centering
on whether the state environmental agencies may assert regula-
tory jurisdiction over federal instrumentalities within their bor-
43. The case of District of Columbia v. Train, 533 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in
which the District sued to prevent the EPA from entering into and approving a consent
decree with the General Services Administration imposing an air pollution compliance
schedule for a federal heating plant, may have involved the use of a citizen suit provision as
a defense; the opinion is not clear on this point.
44. In some instances, the challenged action was even brought in the district court
rather than the court of appeals, just as a citizen suit would have been, and it relied on a
similar claim of nondiscretionary duty. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974), modified, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a coalition
of environmental groups sought a judicial declaration that the EPA Administrator had vio-
lated the Act by failing to list certain substances as toxic pollutants within the time periods
prescribed in the statute. The EPA countered with the argument that such a claim to com-
pel performance of a nondiscretionary duty could only be brought under the citizen suit
provision, and since the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the 60-day notice requirement,
their action should be dismissed. On appeal, the court relied upon the savings clause in the
citizen suit provision to hold that the action could still be maintained under the general
federal question statute and the Administrative Procedure Act, reasoning that Congress
had intended to facilitate rather than limit public access to the courts in water pollution
matters.
45. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977); Good-
year v. LeCraw, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1189 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
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ders.4' After some initial skirmishing in the lower courts, this is-
sue reached the Supreme Court in 1976. In a pair of cases arising
under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, the Court ruled that
federal entities did not have to comply with state procedural re-
quirements.47 Congress responded by enacting clarifying amend-
ments specifying its intent to subject federal entities to state regu-
lation in the same manner as private dischargers.4a Thus, the
citizen suit played a minor role in helping to resolve this signifi-
cant issue of statutory construction.
B. Dispute Resolution
Citizen suits have often been invoked in support of plaintiffs'
attempts to recover money, property or other valuable rights, sim-
ilar to the way in which a common law action for tort or contract
is used to resolve disputes between private parties. Once again,
the cases within this general category can usefully be divided into
three subgroups. The first of the component groups includes
eight cases in which the plaintiff was trying to recover compensa-
tion for damages to persons or property suffered as a result of the
defendant's pollution. These claims relied primarily on a theory
that the regulatory statute gives the plaintiff an implied right of
private action. This type of damage claim was effectively fore-
closed by the Supreme Court in 1981 when it ruled in National
Sea Clammers" that there was no such cause of action for private
damages under the Clean Water Act. At about the same time, the
46. The cases arose in several different ways. In Massachusetts v. United States Veter-
ans Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976), the state brought a citizen suit against a federal
entity alleged to be polluting a stream in violation of applicable effluent limitations. Cali-
fornia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. EPA, 426 U.S. 578 (1976), the case that
brought the Clean Water Act issue to the Supreme Court, raised the citizen suit provision
in a more convoluted context. The State plaintiffs had brought statutory review actions
challenging the Administrator's limited approval of their proposed permit programs on the
ground that his exemption of federal dischargers from the permit programs violated the
Act. The EPA responded that this procedural exemption did not impair the states' interest
in pollution prevention, because the states could still enforce substantive requirements by
bringing citizen suits against federal violators.
47. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. EPA, 426 U.S. 578 (1976)
(Clean Water Act); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (Clean Air Act).
48. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982) (specifying that federal entities are subject to
..any requirement whether substantive or procedural," including "any requirement re-
specting permits," in the Clean Water Act).
49. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
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Court blocked another possible route to damage recovery by hold-
ing that the federal common law of nuisance applicable to water
pollution had been preempted by the statutory enactments of the
1970's.50 As a result of these two decisions, federal damage ac-
tions for private pollution injuries have been largely eliminated. 51
A second category of dispute resolution cases involves claims
arising out of grants and contracts, particularly the planning and
construction grants for sewage treatment works provided by the
Clean Water Act. Disappointed bidders have used the citizen suit
to try to obtain a judicial reversal of contracts awarded to some-
one else. Local governments and sewer authorities have also used
the citizen suit to contest what they believe are wrongful denials
of their grant applications.52 Of the seven separate disputes53 that
50. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Less than a decade before, the
Court had concluded that federal common law nuisance actions for water pollution could
be brought by private parties. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For an
example of a citizen suit damage action incorporating a common law nuisance claim, see
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. City of Evansville,
444 U.S. 1025 (1980). State common law nuisance claims have, for the most part, survived
preemption challenges based on the federal regulatory statutes. See Glicksman, Federal Pre-
emption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1985).
51. A possible exception is the action for response costs under the federal
"Superfund" legislation. Parties who incur cleanup costs "consistent with the national con-
tingency plan" may sue potentially responsible parties under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982) to
recover those costs; however, it is not clear whether they must obtain government approval
before incurring the response costs. For an example of a case combining Superfund cost
recovery with a Clean Water Act citizen suit, see Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto
Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (government must approve cleanup plan before
cost-recovery action can be commenced; no showing of violation under Clean Water Act
citizen suit provision).
Another basis for a federal claim that a private party may assert in an attempt to re-
cover damages for water pollution is the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(1982), which may apply when the government caused the pollution. In Davis v. United
States, 722 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984), the plaintiff had
brought a citizen suit relating to the same pollution and obtained a minimal settlement. He
then brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages to his clamming
business caused by the pollution. The court held that his claim was essentially an implied
right of private action, which was precluded by National Sea Clammers.
52. Local authorities must avoid a variety of jurisdictional problems when they bring
such actions. When a local authority sues the EPA for violation of a nondiscretionary duty
in denying its sewer funding application, it may be met with the defense that the action is
essentially a claim for money damages against the federal government which must be
brought in the Court of Claims under the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). See, e.g., Fairview Township v. EPA, 593 F. Supp. 1311
(M.D. Pa. 1984), modified, 773 F.2d 517 (3rd Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs in Fairview won
reversal of the Tucker Act dismissal on appeal, but had their citizen suit claim dismissed
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fell within this category, plaintiffs managed to survive motions to
dismiss or decisions on the merits in only two.5 One example of a
successful suit is an unusual case in which a private contractor ap-
parently catalyzed a solution to a longstanding environmental con-
troversy. In Michigan v. Allen Park,55 municipal authorities had
agreed in a consent settlemeni with the EPA and the state envi-
ronmental agency to build a sewage treatment system that would
abate a serious water pollution problem. When the bids on the
project came in higher than expected, the municipal authorities
reneged, and two disappointed contractors brought a citizen suit.
The state environmental agency and the EPA, initially joined as
defendants, were realigned as plaintiffs by the trial court, and the
original agreement was enforced under court order. In the dis-
trict court's opinion, the contractors' citizen suit had provided a
long-overdue spur to action: "[T]he system of justice has already
let these people down [who live in the affected drainage basin]. A
known health hazard has been permitted to exist for over 13 years
while various administrative and judicial proceedings interminably
ground along their way. Now we have at hand a solution to the
problem .... -56
The third subcategory, local disputes, includes cases that are
formally similar to the other kinds of citizen suits, but involve
matters of such triviality or purely local concern that they seem
inappropriate for the federal courts. Only four cases were placed
in this category, three based on the Clean Water Act and one
because they were unable to show that the EPA Administrator had violated a nondiscre-
tionary duty in denying their application. Fairview, 773 F.2d at 517; see also Atlantic City
Mun. Util. Auth. v. Regional Adm'r, EPA, 616 F. Supp. 722 (D.N.J. 1985). If the error in
processing the grant application was made by state officials, the municipality's claim may
also be rejected on the ground that the federal citizen suit provision does not create a
federal cause of action against state officials who may have violated nondiscretionary duties
under state law. Allegheny Cty. Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167 (3d Cir. 1984).
53. One of the disputes, the Allen Park litigation, generated two opinions by the dis-
trict court. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
54. Cases were dismissed for failure to provide the 60 days notice required by statute,
Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Township v. Costle, 468 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Ventnor v. Fri, 6 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2104 (D.N.J. 1974); failure to allege violation of a
nondiscretionary duty, J.E. Brenneman Co. v. Schramm, 473 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Township, 468 F. Supp. at 21; and lack of standing, J.E.
Brenneman Co., 473 F. Supp 1316.
55. 501 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1980), application for modification denied, 573 F.
Supp. 1481 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
56. 573 F. Supp. at 1486.
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based on both the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. They in-
volved such weighty matters of national interest as a fight between
two lakefront property owners in Wisconsin over a leaky septic
tank,57 a landlord-tenant dispute in rural Arkansas which some-
how got mixed up with alleged water pollution from a hog farm,58
and neighborhood opposition to a zoning decision in suburban
Long Island that would permit cluster housing developments to
be built among single-family residences. 59 Even if one strongly fa-
vors easy citizen access to the federal judicial system, it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that these disputes would be more appro-
priately heard by the local small claims court or zoning appeals
board than by the United States District Courts. The judges de-
ciding these cases evidently shared that view, since all of the plain-
tiffs' claims were summarily rejected.
Although local dispute cases do not pose a serious threat of
clogging the federal courts with inappropriate litigation,"0 they
may produce bad precedents because important issues may be re-
solved in unimportant cases, without any apparent awareness by
the court of the breadth and significance of its ruling. Hamker v.
Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. 1 illustrates this risk. The plaintiffs
in Hamker were riparian owners who sought recovery of damages
to their property caused by defendant's oil spill. The citizen suit
count was apparently included in the complaint as a way to bring
57. Biederman v. Scharbarth, 483 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Wisc. 1980).
58. Higbee v. Starr, 698 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1983) (denial of preliminary injunction
affirmed where tenant alleged landlords were attempting to evict her in retaliation for fil-
ing FWPCA complaint); Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (action alleg-
ing violations of FWPCA dismissed).
59. Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482 F. Supp. 900 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
60. The citizen suit is not the only jurisdictional "handle" that aggressive plaintiffs can
use to make a federal case out of their local dispute. In Biederman v. Scharbarth, 483 F.
Supp. 809 (E.D. Wisc. 1980), plaintiffs claimed that the noxious seepage from their neigh-
bors' septic tank infringed their rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and
thereby violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The plaintiff in Higbee v. Starr, 698 F.2d 945
(8th Cir. 1983), likewise saw a section 1983 violation in her allegedly retaliatory eviction.
In Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482 F. Supp. 900 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
plaintiffs relied on a variety of federal environmental laws, including the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); the Protection of Navigable Waters and of
Harbor and River Improvements Act (Refuse Act of 1899), 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982); the
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f- 300j (1982); and the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). As might be expected, the courts were no more im-
pressed with these claims than they had been with the citizen suit counts.
61. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
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state damage claims into federal court through pendent jurisdic-
tion. The Fifth Circuit, noting that the alleged discharges had
been confined to a two-week period two years earlier,62 dismissed
on the ground that the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision
requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant is in violation of
an applicable standard or limitation at the time the suit is
brought; past violations cannot be penalized or enjoined in a citi-
zen suit.
The reasoning employed by the court in reaching this conclu-
sion is superficial in several respects. Starting from the dubious
proposition that the legislative history need not be consulted be-
cause the statutory language is clear, the court asserts that its in-
terpretation is correct because Congress gave the Administrator
of the EPA "the central role in the enforcement of the Act."63
This is by no means as self-evident as the court suggests. On the
contrary, both the states and private parties are given a major role
in securing compliance. Indeed, it would be more accurate to
characterize the Clean Water Act as a system of shared responsi-
bility for enforcement.
Moreover, the Hamker opinion may serve to undermine the
EPA's enforcement program in at least two respects. By leaving
open the issue of whether the EPA itself can bring an enforce-
ment action solely for past violations, the decision invites polluters
to challenge that agency's efforts to impose penalties. In addition,
it ignores the fact that the EPA was openly encouraging citizen
suits at the time this case was decided.6 With a single exception,(
courts in other circuits that have considered this issue have re-
jected the argument that a continuing violation must be shown in
order to maintain a citizen suit.66 Nevertheless, the continuing vi-
62. Id. at 394. Later in its opinion, the court notes:
If Section 1365 were interpreted as permitting citizen suits for civil penalties
for past violations, all state damage claims which could be brought under pen-
dent jurisdiction could be litigated in a federal forum, thus undermining con-
gressional intent to limit the burden on the district courts. Since the Act pro-
vides for awards of attorney's fees and expenses, there would be a substantial
incentive to bring suit under the Act rather than in state court.
Id. at 396.
63. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
65. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1393
(D.R.I. 1984).
66. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. American Cyanamid, No. 84-1784,
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olation argument has now become a standard part of the defense
repertoire, and it will continue to take up the time of courts and
litigants until this conflict in statutory construction is authorita-
tively resolved.
C. Impact Litigation
At the opposite end of the spectrum from local disputes are
the environmental impact cases, which are important in several
respects. They commonly involve multiple parties (such as major
national environmental organizations and industry trade associa-
tions), multiple claims and defenses, and high stakes for all con-
cerned. They can be subdivided into two categories: the negative
stop development suits that have been a mainstay of environmental
litigation since the passage of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)67 in 1969 and the positive actionforcing claims that
can compel the Administrator to make some decision such as issu-
ing a rule or bringing a penalty action against a violator.
As the name implies, stop development actions involve efforts
by private parties to block proposed projects that require federal
support or approval. Public works construction projects such as
dams and highways are the most visible targets of stop develop-
ment actions, but any facility that requires a federal permit is fair
game. Often these controversies become wars of attrition, with
opponents struggling to delay action until the proposal becomes
unattractive, uneconomical or politically unpopular.
Slip op. (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. National Starch &
Chemical, No. 84-1119, Slip op. (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 1985); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617
F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Labo-
ratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Geor-
gia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group
v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617
F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Pa 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
611 F. Supp 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1050 (D. Mass. 1984); Student Pub. Interest Group v. Anchor Thread Co., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D.N.J. 1984). The court in AT&TBell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. at 1198-
99, found the Hamker court's interpretation of the violation requirement "rather odd" be-
cause "[p]enalties are necessarily imposed on past violations." Moreover, since the statute
made separate provision for injunctive relief, the court found that the Hamker requirement
of a continuing violation would make the statutory provision of penalties in citizen suits
"superfluous." Id.
67. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976)).
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Citizen suits were used fairly frequently to challenge develop-
ment."' Nineteen reported cases were found under the Clean
Water Act and twenty-four were found under the Clean Air Act,
with a few falling into both categories because the plaintiffs
claimed that the proposed development would pollute both air
and water. Cases with a half dozen or more claims for relief were
not uncommon, and in some of these the air or water claims were
peripheral causes of action in complaints that were really
grounded on NEPA or state law objections. On the other hand, a
few of the stop development cases touched upon important issues
of air and water resource policy, such as the South Carolina Wild-
life Federation's claim that dams should be regulated under the
Clean Water Act as point sources because of their effects on the
temperature and oxygen content of downstream waters.
6 9
While stop development cases were fairly common, successful
suits-at least in the legal sense-were rare. Only one of the
twenty-three Clean Air Act cases resulted in an injunction against
the developer." In the Clean Water Act citizen suits, only about
one-third of the reported case rulings on motions to dismiss or on
the merits were resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Of course, the
68. Since development projects have their greatest impact on local residents, it is not
surprising to find that local environmental and sportsmen's organizations are the most fre-
quent plaintiffs in these cases: six of the fifteen water cases, and ten of twenty-three air
suits, featured such groups as the "lead" or named plaintiff. Another three cases (two air,
one water) had local citizen groups or property owners as plaintiffs, and individuals
brought another half-dozen of the stop development actions. National environmental orga-
nizations brought only three of the air cases and two of the water actions, with the remain-
der (six air, two water) having state, regional, or local government plaintiffs. The defend-
ants in these cases were usually a combination of government agencies and developers.
Many of the cases have multiple plaintiffs, and so these counts of "lead" organizations
may not give a completely accurate picture of the scope of participation by different
groups. However, trying to count all organizations involved would also introduce some
distortions, because court opinions do not always identify all of the parties in a complex
action. Moreover, it seems clear that many of these parties are purely nominal plaintiffs or
defendants, who take no significant part in the management of the litigation; yet it is not
possible to make this kind of distinction from the case reports. Counts of lead plaintiffs
therefore appear to be the most useful (albeit rough) means of calculating participation by
different kinds of organizations.
69. South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978). This
issue was ultimately resolved adversely to the environmental plaintiffs in an action-forcing
citizen suit, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the EPA
does not have a nondiscretionary duty to regulate dams as point sources).
70. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Harrah's Corp., 509 F. Supp. 753
(D. Nev. 1981).
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judicial forum is not the only arena for these controversies, and
even within it the reported decisions do not reveal how often the
objectors were able to wrest design modifications from the devel-
opers, or force abandonment of projects altogether, as a result of
their litigation.
The other category of impact litigation, action forcing,
presents a more confused picture.7 The Clean Air Act produced
more citizen suits and more successful outcomes for the plaintiffs
than did the Clean Water Act. Ten of seventeen cases resulted in
total or partial victories for the plaintiffs. Some of these involved
important regional air quality issues, such as the New York City
transportation plan7 2 and the Pennsylvania auto inspection and
maintenance program. Others spurred the EPA to undertake
standard-setting proceedings as mandated by statute, including
rulemaking on national ambient air quality standards for lead and
emissions limits for toxic pollutants such as arsenic and ra-
dionuclides.74 Interviews with EPA officials confirmed that action-
forcing suits can sometimes serve a useful function in breaking bu-
reaucratic logjams and forcing the agency to make hard decisions.
As one official described the process:
[I]t is very hard to get [the program office] to move on a regulation unless
there is a court deadline. . . . [And] it is not just the program offices. There
are some other players in the whole regulatory game [that] these deadlines
affect. One, obviously, is the Office of Management and Budget. Frequently
they don't want to come out with certain types of regulations; they like to sit
on them and fiddle around with them.. . . [W]ithin the agency ... we have
our own little ... OMB here, the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation.
71. As the name suggests, action-forcing cases tend to be brought by private organiza-
tions against government defendants. National environmental organizations were plaintiffs
in three of five Clean Water Act cases, and eight of seventeen Clean Air Act suits. Local
environmental or citizen groups accounted for the remaining two Clean Air Act cases, and
another five Clean Water Act citizen suits. In addition, three state or lochl government
entities brought action-forcing cases under the Clean Air Act. All of the defendants in the
Clean Water Act cases were EPA administrators. In the Clean Air Act cases, there were
nine federal defendants, six state defendants, and two combinations of federal and state
defendants.
72. Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974); Friends of the Earth v.
Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
73. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869
(E.D. Pa. 1982), a~fd, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
74. NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (lead standard NAAQS); New York
v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (organic arsenic); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,
551 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (radionuclides).
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And they review regulations for cost impacts and things like that, and often
serve to slow things down. They want more study. They want more basis for
a regulation, they want you to consider all these options to cut the cost of
the regulation. . . . [I]t is very hard to get anybody to move on a particular
regulation and get it done. Everything is just sort of moving at a snail's pace.
It will all get done eventually, but we don't seem to be prioritizing .... I
have seen regulations just sit for no apparent reason .
Q: Just because there are too many things to do?
A: Too many things to do, you run into a bottleneck at the management
level sometimes. You have all these little workers down at [the operational]
level who are working on regulations, and the number of people they have
to go through gets smaller and smaller and smaller as you get to the top, and
the [high-level] people just don't have enough time ....
Of course, the citizen suit would be a rather mixed blessing if it
speeded up the administrative process at the expense of reduced
quality in the decisions made. However, this study did not uncover
any serious concerns that action-forcing suits have had this effect.
Rather, the suits seem to function as a partial antidote to the fa-
miliar bureaucratic inertia summarized in the maxim quoted
above: "It will all get done eventually."
Action forcing was less frequent under the Clean Water Act,
with twelve reported decisions in seven separate controversies.
Three of the controversies resulted in unequivocal losses for the
environmental plaintiffs. In the others, the plaintiffs' claims sur-
vived in whole or in part. Even when the plaintiffs did not prevail,
they raised significant issues relating to the EPA's authority to
regulate radioactive effluents"s and discharges from dams, 7  and
to the Administrator's duty to issue an abatement order when
s/he has reason to believe that a discharger is violating its
permit.77
D. Enforcement Actions
Suits to enforce environmental requirements against non-
complying dischargers theoretically are the heart of the citizen
suit provisions. This category comprises a substantial and growing
75. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission has primary authority over radioactive effluents).
76. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (EPA does not
have nondiscretionary duty to regulate dams as a point source under the CWA).
77. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977) (Administrator does not have
mandatory duty to issue an administrative order against violator, since this would be an
exercise in futility if the EPA does not plan to bring suit).
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body of cases. It is useful to distinguish among three subgroups of
enforcement actions: pollution abatement suits, private enforce-
ment actions and intervention cases. The first two are very simi-
lar, in that they generally feature a private party or nonfederal
official seeking relief against a regulated discharger. The distinc-
tion is that pollution abatement claims incorporate multiple
counts under diverse statutes-and typically have multiple parties
as well-while private enforcement actions are based solely on cit-
izen suit provisions. The intervention cases involve attempts by
outside parties to intervene in ongoing enforcement actions
brought by other parties.
Like the stop development cases, pollution abatement suits7 8
have featured a number of major environmental battles, including
decontamination of the damaged Three Mile Island nuclear reac-
tor, 7 discharge of naval weapons in the waters of Puerto Rico,8"
ocean dumping of sewage sludge in the New York Bight,8 and
the continuing controversies provoked by inadequate sewage
treatment capacity in metropolitan Washington, D.C. 2 These
suits have mostly been brought under the Clean Water Act, 83 per-
haps because there is more statutory overlap in the field of water
quality regulation than there is in air quality controls. The total
number of major pollution abatement cases is rather small, al-
though the volume of litigation seems to have picked up in recent
years. There is no clear trend in the outcome of the decisions.
The growing volume of litigation is more dramatic in the sub-
78. The difference between them is that the stop development case is an attack on a
proposed project, while the pollution abatement action is an attempt to terminate ongoing
pollution.
79. Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. General Pub. Util. Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley Alli-
ance, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
80. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
81. Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978).
82. Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 607
F.2d 378 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C.
1973); see also Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980); District of Colum-
bia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
83. Nineteen reported decisions under the Clean Water Act were classified as pollu-
tion abatement actions; however, five of those opinions were rendered at different stages of
continuing controversies. Thus, the actual number of controversies represented is 14. Only




category of private enforcement actions, at least under the Clean
Water Act.8 4 Only two reported private enforcement decisions
were found for the period from 1972 to 1979. Since that time,
however, at least twenty-eight decisions have been published, and
many more are working their way through the courts. Almost all
of these are suits by national or local environmental groups
against industrial dischargers. The more recent cases are domi-
nated by rulings on a variety of motions to dismiss, which have
usually gone in the plaintiffs' favor.
Cases involving the citizen's right to intervene in a govern-
ment enforcement action have mostly arisen under the Glean
Water Act, with seventeen decisions found under that statute as
opposed to only two under the Glean Air Act. As with private en-
forcement cases, there has been a dramatic increase recently in
reported decisions-only four of the seventeen Glean Water Act
opinions were written before 1980. State and local government
entities were frequently involved in intervention cases, as the fol-
lowing table indicates:
TABLE A
PARTIES IN CLEAN AIR AND CLEAN WATER ACT
INTERVENTION DECISIONS
(excludes multiple decisions in same case)
Plaintiff Defendant Intervenor
Federal Government 7 3 0
Federal & State Government 3 1 0
State/Provincial Government 2 1 7
Municipal Government 1 1 0
Industry 0 10 2
National Environmental Group 3 0 1
Local Environmental Group 0 0 5
Local Citizen Group 0 0 3
Individual 0 0 1
This table suggests that resources can be significant in determin-
ing who will bring cases, and who will intervene. The relatively
84. The number of reported private enforcement cases was comparable under the
Clean Air Act-14 in all-but the patterns were less clear. The number of decisions did
not dramatically increase over time as with the Clean Water Act cases, and the types of
plaintiffs and defendants were more mixed, with a scattering of state and federal agencies
appearing as both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs were successful in eight of the 14
cases, including some instances where they succeeded only in surviving a motion to dismiss.
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well funded entities-the federal government, some state agencies
and the national environmental organizations-usually litigate as
plaintiffs and defendants. Local groups and individuals, on the
other hand, often intervene. Perhaps the possibility of recovering
attorneys' fees is not a sufficient financial inducement for many
local interests to bring citizen suits on their own behalf.
In light of the statute's explicit grant of the right to inter-
vene, it is surprising to find that putative intervenors had a rela-
tively dismal success rate. In twelve out of the seventeen reported
decisions, the intervention petition was either rejected on some
technical ground or denied on the merits. In several of the cases
in which the government and the alleged violator had reached a
consent settlement, the courts seemed extremely reluctant to al-
low any third party to upset that agreement and force the matter
to trial.8 5 Intervention, therefore, has played an insignificant part
in the enforcement of these statutes.
E. Fee Cases
There has been a smattering of litigation under the fee
award sections of the citizen suit provisions: a total of twelve cases
under the Clean Air Act and seven under the Clean Water Act.
There is nothing remarkable in either the pattern or the content
of these decisions; they seem very similar to cases arising under
other fee award statutes. In the few instances when parties have
tried to stretch the citizen suit fee provision to cover other types
of claims and defenses, the courts have generally been
unsympathetic.
On the whole, then, the reported decisions reveal few
85. E.g., United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. Alaska 1977);
United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics, 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). In United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1986), the court described the
burden on an intervenor to show inadequate government representation in an enforce-
ment case:
It is not enough that the applicant would insist on more elaborate pre-trial or
pre-settlement procedures or press for more drastic relief, particularly where
the sovereign's interest is in securing preventive relief of the same general sort
as the applicant. While it would be going too far to require an applicant to
demonstrate collusion, there must be, at least in cases where the applicant has
no right to sue,. . . a strong affirmative showing that the sovereign is not fairly




problems with the citizen suit. The total number of cases reported
under these two statutes is modest, especially when viewed against
the aggregate volume of federal court litigation. Some of these
cases raise significant issues of law and policy. Others are less sig-
nificant but probably could have been brought under other fed-
eral statutes if there were no citizen suit provisions. In any event,
the courts seem to have little difficulty in disposing of inappropri-
ate cases. With the possible exception of intervention, the Glean
Air and Clean Water Acts' citizen suit provisions generally seem
to be working the way Congress intended, It must be
remembered, however, that the reported decisions are only the
tip of a large and growing iceberg of private enforcement actions.
IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN PRACTICE AND IN THEORY
A. The Scope and Objectives of the Private Enforcement Campaign
Behind the reported cases looms a large body of private en-
forcement activity. The precise dimensions of environmental
groups' enforcement campaigns remain obscure, however, be-
cause there is no comprehensive official source of descriptive
data."6 The best data source available was compiled by the Envi-
ronmental Law Institute (ELI) in 1984.7 It shows that more than
100 notices of violation were sent under the Clean Water Act
from January 1983 through April 1984, and that nearly ninety
private court actions were filed during that same period.88
86. The EPA's water program office in Washington maintains files on the notices it
receives. This data system is probably incomplete, however, due to the fact that regional
offices and other units at headquarters may receive the notice of citizen suit and fail to
forward it to the central data collection point. In addition, the EPA would not necessarily
receive notice of settlements in private enforcement actions, especially if the settlement was
not embodied in a court decree.
87. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIzEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCE-
MENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES (1984) (hereinafter cited as "ELI RE-
PORT"). For other general discussions of citizen suits under environmental statutes, see
Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 23 (1985);
Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60
DEN. LJ. 553 (1983); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Parts I-
III, 13 ENvrL L. REP. 10309 (1983), 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10063, 10407 (1984); Schwartz &
Hakett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCEs L.
327 (1984).
88. ELI's data base begins before the current wave of citizen suits began. The follow-
ing table, taken from ELI's data, ELI REPORT, supra note 87, at III-D, Fig. D, shows the
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ELI also developed data summarizing the outcomes of citizen
suits.8 9 The most significant suits are those brought by national
and regional environmental groups under the Clean Water Act.
These comprise a majority of all citizen suits in the ELI data base.
Of 349 citizen suits tabulated by ELI, 214 were brought under
the Clean Water Act, and nearly ninety percent of these were
generated during the environmental groups' current enforcement
campaign.90 The status of those cases at the end of April 1984 was
as follows:
pattern of activity under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts:
CLEAN WATER ACT CLEAN AIR ACT
Notices Suits Notices Suits
1978 0 1 0 4
1979 1 8 4 11
1980 2 4 13 7
1981 0 6 4 5
1982 3 16 1 4
1983 46 62 3 0
1984 (1st 4 mos.) 61 26 1 0
These figures may slightly overstate the increase in citizen suits, since anecdotal reports
suggest that plaintiff organizations are having difficulty finding sufficient resources to sus-
tain the 1983-84 rate of case generation.
89. For present purposes, a "suit" is any controversy that has progressed to the mail-
ing of a 60-day notice letter, which, as previously indicated, is a legal prerequisite to filing
an action in court.
90. ELI REPORT, supra note 87, at vi, 111-5. There is a slight discrepancy between
these two references: at vi, the report indicates that 162 Clean Water Act cases were
brought by national and regional environmental groups, while the table at 111-5 indicates
179 Clean Water Act notice letters from these organizations. For purposes of the figures
given in the text here, the latter table was used.
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TABLE B
OUTCOMES OF CLEAN WATER ACT CAMPAIGN CASES
Out of 179 total cases opened by sending notice letters to alleged
violators -
* 27 (15%) were dropped without filing a complaint
- 8 were preempted by government enforcement
- 1 was settled
- the remainder were dropped for "other" reasons
* 67 (48%) were pending with no complaint yet filed
- almost all of these (63) were in negotation
* 85 (37%) had progressed to the stage of filing a complaint in
court
- 10 had been settled
- 74 were pending before the court
- 1 had closed for other reasons
These percentages can be expected to change significantly over
time. For example, the percentage of cases in which complaints
are filed will almost certainly increase even if more parties are
willing to settle, because most plaintiff and defendant organiza-
tions will want to embody their agreements in enforceable court
decrees. Similarly, the percentage of cases pending will probably
decline, and the percentage of cases settled will probably increase,
as judicial decisions emerge which provide a framework for resolv-
ing various matters currently in contention. Overall, however,
these figures and our interviews suggest that both plaintiffs and
defendants regard private enforcement as a long-term phenome-
non. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to consider the
purposes of the plaintiff organizations that are bringing these ac-
tions, as well as the background of EPA enforcement that gave
rise to the current wave of citizen suits.
In part, the current wave of private enforcement suits grew
out of the perception among many environmental groups that the
first Reagan Administration was rapidly undermining compliance
with environmental laws. This perception was fed not only by the
managerial turmoil at the EPA, where demoralizing reorganiza-
tions were frequent and scandals forced high-level officials to re-
sign in disgrace, 91 but also by declines in the numerical indicators
used to measure compliance and enforcement. Case referrals from
91. See generally J. LASH, A S.ASON OF SPOILS (1984).
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the EPA to the Department of Justice for prosecution dropped
dramatically from the baseline of the Carter Administration."2
Commerce Department figures showed that investment in new
pollution control equipment, which probably should have been in-
creasing in response to new regulatory requirements, was actually
declining.93 The General Accounting Office, surveying a sample
of industrial dischargers subject to permits under the Clean Water
Act, found that more than eighty percent of them had violated
their permits at least once during an eighteen-month period." As
statistics like these began to emerge from regulatory programs ad-
ministered by the EPA, critics concluded that there had been a
"'collapse in compliance with the nation's toxics laws." 95 The citi-
92. The following figures are taken from the ELI REPORT, supra note 87, at 111-27:
CASE REFERRALS FROM EPA TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BY PROGRAM AND FISCAL YEAR
Fiscal Air Air Hazardous
Year Water (Stationary) (Mobile) Waste Totals
1977 93 12 38 0 143
1978 137 68 55 2 262
1979 81 103 46 9 239
1980 55 77 20 52 204
1981 36 51 14 14 115
1982 46 31 4 27 108
1983 56 61 7 31 155
Referrals within the agency from regional offices to headquarters experienced a compara-
ble decline. See id. at 111-24. As noted below, the figures returned to pre-Gorsuch levels
under the Ruckelshaus Administration, which put a high premium on raising them.
93. E.g., W. DRAYTON AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY's FACTs COMMrrrE, AMiERICA'S
Toxic PROTECTION GAP 6 (1984):
After remaining between 4.64 to 5.16 billion (constant 1972) dollars from 1972
through 1980, business's planned expenditures for 1983 dropped to between
3.27 and 3.40 billion dollars, according to the Commerce Department's Annual
Survey of Current Business. This sharp drop in control equipment investment im-
plies a sharper fall in operating compliance because (1) it is much easier to de-
termine whether control equipment is present than it is to ensure that it is op-
erated and maintained properly and (2) it generally costs much more to operate
than to purchase. Moreover, if America were in fact beginning to control toxics
in the early 1980s as the laws require, expenditures should have been increas-
ing sharply during this period.
94. Wastewater Dischargers Are Not Complying with EPA Pollution Control Permits GAO
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, R.C.E.D. 84-53 (Dec. 2, 1983).
95. This was the subtitle of the report by W. Drayton and Environmental Safety's
Facts Committee, supra note 93. The report further noted:
In the long run the massive loss of voluntary compliance is the most harmful
effect of this failure to implement the law in the 1980s. Once firms lose confi-
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zen suit, then, might be viewed as a stop-gap measure-a way for
environmentalist constituencies to put their fingers in the dike un-
til the agency recovers from its time of trouble and resumes its
responsibility for enforcement.
In reality, the story is more complicated than this. Although
the shifts in enforcement policy and practice inaugurated by the
Reagan appointees to the EPA may have precipitated the private
enforcement movement, there were forces already at work that
made large-scale private enforcement possible-forces that could
well have brought this movement into existence even if there had
not been such visible turmoil at the EPA. These forces include the
people who are organizing and staffing the citizen suit movement,
the learning process that had taken place in the field of environ-
mental enforcement, and the changes in beliefs relating to regula-
tory compliance and enforcement that were occurring in the early
1980's.
By the time that the Reagan Administration took office in
1981, the Environmental Protection Agency had been in exis-
tence for more than a decade. A generation of lawyers and techni-
cians had reached their professional maturity along with the
agency. 6 Regardless of whether they had worked inside the EPA,
or in one of the outside constituencies that dealt frequently with
it, these professionals had steadily developed their skills and con-
tacts. They understood how the various programs and offices at
the EPA worked - or failed to work - and how to influence the
process. At the same time, many of them still had the idealism and
commitment to environmental values that had originally attracted
them to this field of regulation. As they moved out-or were
forced out-into private-sector roles in law firms, environmental
groups and research organizations, they provided the foundation
dence that their competitors are complying, they too will stop. Regaining the
confidence of hundreds of thousands of business operators is an enormously
difficult, very expensive, and painfully slow undertaking. The nation's small
force of environmental safety officers, armed with the key fairness argument
that everyone should do their share, could deal effectively with a handful of
noncompliers. Asking them to deal with almost everyone, especially with the
fairness argument turned against them, is to ask the impossible and thereby
insure failure.
Id. at 6.
96. At this time, the data to support the analysis in this paragraph is more impression-
istic than systematic. The authors are engaged in ongoing research designed to explore
these issues more fully.
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of expertise and commitment needed to build the citizen suit
movement.
Like the EPA itself, many of these environmental profession-
als had learned a lot about regulatory enforcement during the
1970's. When it was created by Executive Order in 1970, the EPA
inherited a legacy of failed enforcement in federal antipollution
law, and a militant environmental constituency that wanted an im-
mediate turn around. Thus, the EPA's initial challenge was to es-
tablish its credibility as a tough enforcer. As John Quarles, the
EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement in its first years,
put it: "EPA responded to the pressures of the grassroots political
protest. The response was reflected most clearly in [Administrator
William Ruckelshaus'] approach to enforcement. ' '97 That ap-
proach was to bring a series of highly publicized court actions
against polluters, using the old Refuse Act and whatever other
statutes could be pressed into service.98
Serious pollution problems were widespread at that time, and
many violators were obvious, well-known targets for agency en-
forcement. 99 Implementing enforcement policy was a relatively
simple matter of selecting the most deserving from a large num-
ber of potential defendants and making an example of them. Even
during this initial period of active enforcement, however, it be-
came clear that merely bringing a series of highly publicized cases
was not enough. The cases had to be pushed and prodded
through the judicial system to a successful conclusion, 100 and then
the resulting decision had to be translated into the polluter's ac-
tual abatement of his discharge. 11 Furthermore, an effective ad-
97. J. QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA 36 (1976).
98. Id. at 36-57.
99. See generally J. QUARLES, supra note 97, at 37-57. See also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 119 (1972), noting that the Refuse Act "has been
increasingly used for water pollution control enforcement," with 81 criminal actions and
52 civil suits filed during the first six months of fiscal year 1972.
100. For example,the EPA was criticized during its early years for the "thirty-five pol-
luter episode" in which the agency held a press conference to announce that it was refer-
ring 35 cases against major industries to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.
Justice eventually concluded that only three of these cases were worthy of criminal prose-
cution. Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 3 A.C.U.S. 67, 87-89 (1973).
101. Quarles observes:
There was one curious feature of the early EPA enforcement program: almost
the entire emphasis was placed on beginning the actions.. . . It was almost as
though the mere fact of filing suit would end the problem once and for all, and
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ministrative infrastructure had to be built that could generate de-
tailed, readily enforceable standards,0 2  and the regulatory
bureaucracy had to be given incentives to produce the appropri-
ate number and mix of enforcement actions. 03 As one participant
in the EPA's early enforcement efforts put it: "[t]he public de-
mand for assertive action against polluters had made its first im-
pact through individual decisions by leaders in the top political
positions. Now the response to that public demand was being
institutionalized." 
104
By the mid-1970's, the EPA was ready to embark on a system-
if only we could sue all the polluters. . our environmental problems would be
over. The difficulties of pursuing an action through completion-achieving an
actual cleanup program-seemed scarcely to be noticed, especially at first.
J. QUARLES, supra note 97, at 50-51.
102.
The basic weakness of the early enforcement actions was that they were being
initiated in areas where effective standards and pollution control requirements
themselves had not yet been set. However aggressive the enforcement program,
it could not be effective if it tried to establish these basic requirements by suing
polluters one at a time.
Id. at 53. The passage in 1972 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act compelled EPA
to develop an elaborate infrastructure of permits, guidelines and standards as a predicate
for enforcement actions. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
rry 66-68 (1975) (reporting numbers and types of water enforcement actions brought from
1967-75, and noting that the 1972 amendments "created an enforcement hiatus-no pol-
luter who had applied for a permit under the FWPCA provisions could be prosecuted
before December 31, 1974").
103. See infra text accompanying note 120. Because it is strikingly similar to William
Ruckelshaus' description of his 1983 difficulties in arousing the EPA bureaucracy to more
vigorous enforcement, John Quarles' account of bureaucratic reluctance to prosecute dur-
ing the early days of the EPA is worth quoting at some length:
Three months after EPA was created, Ruckelshaus summoned the regional di-
rectors of the water pollution program to Washington and told them to push
ahead aggressively with enforcement cases. When the months that followed
produced little action, I was puzzled. Slowly I realized that the biggest factor in
the delay was simply the ingrained attitude of most employees in the agency.
Prior to EPA's creation the federal pollution control programs had focused
on research, planning, grants, and technical assistance, and few of the people
doing that work had any taste or training for the rough and tumble of enforce-
ment. They felt inhibited by the opposition of their state agency counterparts,
who resented the intrusion of federal officials.. . . Because he knew the action
would be attacked by the polluter and criticized by the state officials, he was
tempted to forget the whole business. ...
[U]ntil each regional office became experienced, the fear remained that po-
litical pressure would be used to block us and that the regional officer who had
taken the initiative would be left out on a limb.
J. QUARLES, supra note 97, at 47-48.
104. Id. at 50.
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atic program of relatively vigorous enforcement, using new man-
agement systems and economics-based enforcement policy. These
changes are generally associated with the Carter Administration,
but they actually began in 1975 with the creation of a separate
enforcement office at EPA headquarters."0 5 Regional enforcement
personnel reported directly to that office, and the agency began to
put emphasis on generating large numbers of penalty cases.106
Eventually, the enforcement office became heavily involved in
writing permits so that violations could be more easily
prosecuted.
10 7
The major substantive policy development in enforcement
during the Carter era was the systematic application of economic
concepts to enforcement penalty policy. This was not the standard
microeconomic approach of making overinclusive rules more effi-
cient by applying a cost-benefit calculus at the enforcement stage.
Rather, it was an attempt to use economic means for environmen-
tal ends by adjusting penalty levels to recapture the presumed eco-
nomic benefits of noncompliance. This concept was first applied
on a large scale in the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) in the early 1970's, and it was brought to the
EPA during the Carter Administration by William Drayton,
Douglas Costle, and other alumni of the Connecticut DEP.108
Complex rules and computer programs were generated to calcu-
late the expenditures saved and competitive advantages gained in
instances of noncompliance.10 9
While the late 1970's appear in retrospect to be the most ac-
tivist enforcement period in the EPA's history, there were still
some nagging problems. In 1978, the General Accounting Office
issued a report sharply criticizing EPA's enforcement of the
Water program-probably the agency's most fully developed en-
forcement effort.10 For some environmental organizations, this
105. Brown, EPA Enforcement-Past, Present, and Future, ENVTL F., May 1984, at 12,
13.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15.
108. See generally Drayton, Economic Law Enforcement, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1980).
109. Assessment and Collection of Noncompliance Penalties by EPA, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 66,
45 Fed. Reg. 50110 (July 28, 1980); EPA Approval of State Noncompliance Penalty Pro-
gram, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 67, 45 Fed. Reg. 50,117 (July 28, 1980).
110. More Effective Action by the Environmental Protection Agency Needed to Enforce Indus-
trial Compliance With Water Pollution Control Discharge Permits, GAO REPORT TO THE CON-
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report marked the beginning of a serious loss of faith in the EPA's
enforcement capability. A few, like the New Jersey Public Interest
Research Group, began taking a skeptical look at what was actu-
ally happening at the EPA enforcement offices in their areas. The
closer they looked, the more concerned and disenchanted they
became.
The 1981 appointment of Anne Gorsuch Burford as Admin-
istrator of the EPA brought a dramatic change in the agency's
enforcement philosophy, and accelerated the loss of faith in gov-
ernment enforcement. Voluntary compliance negotiations became
the dominant method of dealing with pollution violations. EPA
officials were told to pursue "every opportunity for settlement,"
and referrals of cases for prosecution were regarded as "black
marks" against the officials recommending penal action."' Amid
multiple reorganizations of the agency, the separate enforcement
offices were abolished and their personnel reassigned to the pro-
gram offices or the General Counsel's Office. 1
Agency morale, especially among personnel engaged in en-
forcement, reportedly declined as rapidly as the case referral sta-
tistics. The environmental community, which had not been wholly
satisfied with EPA enforcement during the Carter Administration,
when many of its own people were running the agency, was now
engaged in open political warfare against the EPA leadership. By
the time William Ruckelshaus was brought back as Administrator
in 1983, words like "chaos" and "shambles" were being used to
describe the EPA enforcement program. The basic task that
Ruckelshaus faced was very much like the one he had taken on
more than a decade before as the agency's first Administrator: es-
tablishing the EPA's credibility as a tough enforcer. This time,
however, success would prove somewhat more elusive.
Perhaps because budgetary and political constraints fore-
closed major policy initiatives, the second Ruckelshaus administra-
tion devoted much of its attention to rehabilitating the EPA's
GRESs, R.C.E.D. 78-182 (Oct. 12, 1978). Two years later, GAO issued some equally stinging
criticism of the EPA's management of the construction grant program that was intended to
clean up the effluents of municipal sewage treatment plants. Costly Wastewater Treatment
Plants Fail to Perform as Expected, GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, R.C.E.D. 81-89 (Nov. 14,
1980).
111. J. LASH, supra note 91, at 46-47.
112. Brown, supra note 105, at 16. See also Mintz, EPA Enforcement: Critical Assessment
Yields Mixed Review, ENVmr F., Nov. 1984, at 13.
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management systems. In rapid succession, numerous procedural
and substantive changes were put in place to revamp the enforce-
ment process. The Gorsuch reorganization of enforcement was
partially reversed, and a new Office of Enforcement and Compli-
ance Monitoring was created to oversee and coordinate the EPA's
enforcement efforts.113 Working groups were directed to systema-
tize and codify the definition of significant noncompliance to as-
sure some consistency across regulatory programs,11 4 and also to
review statutory penalty procedures and amounts with a view to-
ward unifying the formal legal structure of enforcement., 5 Case
tracking systems were upgraded so that enforcement officers
could follow the performance of significant violators until they
reached compliance, and also make sure that cases did not get
lost. 1 ' Attempts were made to clarify the allocation of authority
between the EPA and the state environmental agencies, and to
establish management oversight systems that would measure the
states' performance in their areas of responsibility." 7
Finally, the Ruckelshaus Administration tried to increase the
number of enforcement actions by setting quantitative targets for
the regional offices, and by exhorting the staff to get tough on
violators. In January 1984, Ruckelshaus gave a speech to agency
enforcement personnel that became known as "the gorilla
speech" because of the metaphor he used in urging his people to
crack down on lackadaisical state enforcement: "Our responsibil-
ity is not to get along with the states, it is to insure compliance.
...Unless [the states] have a gorilla in the closet, they can't do
the job. And the gorilla is EPA."" 8 While the gorilla quote set the
tone for most press coverage of the speech," 9 even more interest-
ing is the sense of frustration and impotence that Ruckelshaus
conveyed in describing his attempts to revitalize federal
113. ENVTL REP. (BNA) 644 (Aug. 19, 1983).
114. Aim, EPA's Management Approach to Enforcement, ENVTL F., Sept. 1984, at 7. See
infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
115. Changes in EPA Statutory Authorities Recommended in Draft Report on Enforcement,
ENvrl. REP. (BNA) 794-95 (Sept. 21, 1984); see also id. at 809-23.
116. Alm, supra note 114, at 10.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 179-202.
118. Transcript of William D. Ruckelshaus' Remarks, EPA National Compliance and En-
forcement Conference, ENVTL F., Apr. 1984, at 16 col.2, 17 col.1 [hereinafter cited as
Transcript].
119. See, e.g., Stanfield, Ruckelshaus Casts EPA as "Gorilla" in States' Enforcement Closet,




What I was concerned about, frankly, in coming back here was that we
had a bunch of tigers in the tank, and the minute we took the lid off...
and said "Go get theml" the problem might well be an overreaction-that
we might start treating people unfairly, just to show everybody how tough
we were.
Well, I think we opened the tank all right, but on the basis of what I see
here the last few months, there may be more pussy cats than tigers ...
* * * I sent a memo on October 7 to all the Assistant Administrators
and Regional Administrators. I repeated what I said in my confirmation
hearings, and I indicated in as clear a language as I could that in order to
achieve compliance with the laws and regulations, EPA must have an en-
forcement program that is credible and effective ...
Now these statistics [on case referrals] are terrible ...
* * * We can find 100 reasons not to do something in terms of organiza-
tional structure, guidance, you name it. There ought to be 100 reasons to do
something. We have to develop a certain controlled sense of outrage in this
agency if we are going to get these laws enforced. And some place along the
way, we have lost that.120
While the second Ruckelshaus administration at the EPA
achieved some improvement in the numerical indicators of en-
forcement activity, the rapid shifts in agency policy left a legacy of
skepticism among knowledgeable observers inside and outside of
the agency. Structurally, the Ruckelshaus reforms had only partly
undone the Gorsuch reorganizations: the operational people in
the enforcement process still reported to the program offices and
the General Counsel's Office rather than to the new Office of En-
forcement and Compliance Monitoring. In this realignment, en-
forcement duties are likely to have lower priority. As one agency
staffer described it:
Our biggest problem right now is that none of the old compliance people
are left. They all got moved out . . . to other jobs, or moved out to field
offices, pushed over to the Environmental Services Division. . . . There's
whole regions where there isn't one person left from compliance three years
ago. It's all construction grants people [now].. . . When you've been giving
out construction grants for ten years, you've basically been wearing a white
hat, and you're a good guy.. .. And while you're still a good guy on the
one hand, to turn around and put on the black hat and slap somebody [with
a penalty] . . . . [T]hese people just aren't going to do anything.
More fundamentally, the representatives of groups bringing citi-
zen suits had come to believe that improved management of the
120. Transcript, supra note 137, at 15 col.2, 16 col.l, 17 col.1 (emphasis in original).
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enforcement process was necessary, but not sufficient. Even good
management of inadequate resources would not produce compli-
ance, and the resources seemed likely to remain inadequate for
the foreseeable future. A citizen suit plaintiff's lawyer explained:
The weakest link in the entire federal regulatory scheme always has been
and always will be enforcement. Because you're just never going to have the
resources. No matter what the law is. . . the country is never going to be
able to put the resources into these [programs] to do what the law intended.
If this is true, it suggests that the EPA and its supportive constitu-
encies should move toward a specialized division of labor in which
the regulatory agency essentially cedes control over routine pen-
alty actions to private enforcers, and concentrates its efforts on
the novel, difficult and expensive areas of enforcement.
Another plaintiff's lawyer commented:
[O]f all the different cases around, these are the cases we [in the private
sector] do the best and it's [least necessary] for them to do it. [At] the meet-
ing we had with Ruckelshaus, he kept coming back: "Well, if you're doing
this, we must not be doing something we're supposed to." And I was trying
to say to him, "I don't want you to start spending your resources here. Go
after those damned [toxic waste] dumps. I mean, they're hard. They take
money, they take a million experts. Go do that, don't go taking your scarce
manpower and coming in with these middle-level water cases.. . . [W]e'll do
a good job with this.. . . I don't think you've done a good job on the things
that really were important, much more important than this. So don't go di-
verting your resources into this ...... . . They're not going to get a five
hundred percent increase in their enforcement personnel, and there are lots
of other things that are not being enforced.
In this vision of the citizen suit, private enforcers would essentially
enter a long-term partnership with their government counter-
parts,1 21 pooling their resources to achieve the common goal of
increased compliance. If this goal is to be realized, private enforc-
ers will have to overcome a series of obstacles. Perhaps the most
fundamental of these is altering the behavior of regulated indus-
tries. Contemporary deterrence theory raises several questions
121. Interview subjects varied in their estimations of how long private enforcers
would have to play this kind of role. One suggested that the program might be terminated
in ten years or so if the groups succeeded in altering the behavior of polluting industries,
while others saw a continuing process of permit revisions and subsequent enforcement ac-
tions for the indefinite future. All seemed to agree, however, that a long-term presence of
citizen enforcers was desirable, if not essential.
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about the likely responses of regulated firms, and the efficacy of
different enforcement strategies.
B. Three Contemporary Views of Regulatory Enforcement
In recent years, commentators from a wide variety of disci-
plinary perspectives have produced a substantial body of literature
on regulatory enforcement. These analyses are primarily con-
cerned with the effects of different enforcement strategies, but
they also imply divergent views regarding the legitimate use of au-
thority in the regulatory state.
1. An Economic View: Over-Inclusive Rules, Inefficient Enforce-
ment. The economic perspective, which is probably the most
widely used approach to analyzing regulatory enforcement, is
based on the premise that all regulation should be efficient. This
perspective holds that: (1) the benefits of regulation should always
exceed its costs; (2) the least costly means of achieving a given set
of benefits should be utilized; and (3) the benefits achieved by a
regulatory program should ideally approximate those that con-
sumers would purchase if a market in regulatory benefits existed.
Economists differ in the way that they apply efficiency analy-
ses to social regulation, but for the most part they begin with a
deep suspicion of rule-based "command-and-control" regulation
like that found in the major federal environmental statutes. Rules
are suspect because they may be addressed to phenomena that are
not, strictly speaking, market failures justifying regulatory inter-
vention; 122 or they may create inadequate or perverse incentives
among the regulated. 12 Even if the agency is willing and able (le-
122. The seminal article is Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & Ecos. 1
(1960). See also S. CHEUNG, THE MYTH Or SOCIAL COST (1980); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1980-81). By "command-and-con-
trol regulation" we mean regulation based on uniform rules applied to categories of
sources. In the environmental area, the key assumption is that all sources in a given cate-
gory must apply the same pollution control technology, even if the costs or benefits of
doing so vary significantly among sources. For a discussion of the background of command-
and-control regulation and efforts to change it, see Meidinger, On Explaining the Develop-
ment of "Emissions Trading" in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation, 7 LAW & PoL'y 447 (1985).
123. Economists generally favor taxes on harmful activities like pollution instead of
command-and-control regulation on the ground that taxes target the incentive structure of
regulated firms more directly and efficiently than general regulations. See, e.g., A KNEESE &
C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
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gaily, politically, and otherwise) 124 to take account of these
problems in its rule making, it will still face a difficult tradeoff
among social costs, rulemaking costs, 125 and compliance costs that
may compel it to issue broad, categorical rules:
In order for legal standards to be cost-effective, the standard-setting body
must possess considerable information on the technological and economic
conditions surrounding abatement and the degree of harm caused by
hazards. The cost of collecting and processing this information will tend to
limit the extent to which standards match the least-cost method of abate-
ment. . . . In addition, the standard-setting body will be involved in consul-
tation with . . . regulated and interested parties, . . giving rise to another
set of costs (negotiation and consultation costs) associated with the standard-
setting process itself and delay in the enactment of regulation. 126
Finally, the costs of compliance may differ significantly among
firms in any given regulatory category. Thus, command-and-con-
trol rules based on assumptions about average costs may impose
requirements that are too stringent for some firms and too lax for
others. For all of these reasons, the standards to be enforced are
likely to be overinclusive in forcing some regulated firms to un-
dertake compliance activities that are not cost justified.127
Whatever the cause, if a rule is overinclusive, then full en-
forcement will be socially counterproductive. Rather than
mechanically seeking to compel obedience to such rules, an eco-
nomically rational enforcer attempts first to identify situations in
which application of the rules serves the cause of efficiency and
then to induce compliance among regulated firms. The efficient
enforcer tries to cut back the scope of the rules at the enforce-
ment stage, in order to maximize "the value of the social utility
124. For a summary of statutory constraints on administrative cost-benefit analysis in
rule making, see L. LAvE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR
POLICY 8-28 (1981). Political constraints on the Environmental Protection Agency are dis-
cussed in J. LASH, supra note 91; Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in J. WILSON, THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 267 (1980).
125. As used here, "rulemaking costs" would include the information costs associated
with developing and evaluating alternative regulatory actions.
126. Veljanovski, The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, in K HAWKINS & J. THOMAS,
ENFORCING REGULATION (1984). For a more technical discussion, see Ehrlich & Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
127. For much the same reasons, the regulations may be underinclusive and fail to
prohibit conduct that imposes inefficiently high social costs; see Veljanovski, supra note 126.
However, few economists have devoted much consideration to this possibility in the recent
writings on regulatory enforcement. Judging from the amount of attention given to it,
overinclusiveness seems to be considered a more pressing threat to efficiency.
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produced, as measured by the harm prevented, less the enforce-
ment costs incurred.
1 28
The dominant assumption in the economic literature is that
achieving the level of compliance thus defined is largely a matter
of manipulating the costs and benefits of rule violation as per-
ceived by the regulated.1 9 Because they are rational actors, regu-
latory targets will respond according to the size of the potential
penalty, discounted by the probability that they will escape liabil-
ity. Hence, the regulators may generate the appropriate level of
compliance by adjusting either the likelihood of detection and
conviction or the size of the penalty.
There are major oversimplifications in this model of regula-
tory compliance, as most economists would be quick to admit. The
indeterminacy of marginal calculations of social cost and bene-
fit,1 " the variance among possible responses of regulated firms
(even if one assumes economic rationality),131 and the manifest so-
cial and legal constraints on rational maximizing 32 are all exam-
ples of problems that have been discussed in the regulatory en-
128. Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. POL'Y 257, 262 (1980). A
slightly different formulation is used in Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust
Enforcement, 68 GEO. LJ. 1075 (1980), paraphrasing Gary Becker: "In essence, three types
of cost must be minimized: The costs resulting from the harmful conduct subject to regula-
tion, the process costs associated with apprehending and determining the guilt of offend-
ers, and the punishment costs associated with imposing a sanction upon the offender." Id.
at 1076.
129. See, e.g., G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 39-40 (1976);
Diver, supra note 128.
130. E.g., Diver, supra note 128, at 264: "Both elements of that calcula-
tion-identifying the class of violators and measuring the social harm prevented-depend
on highly unreliable estimates and fragile causal assumptions." Cf. Schuck, Book Review,
90 YALE LJ. 702, 711 (1981).
131. For example, Viscusi and Zeckhauser argue that raising regulatory standards will
not necessarily raise quality (such as environmental quality) because firms confronted with a
more stringent standard will have different cost-benefit relationships to the new standard:
Standards influence the payoffs associated with different quality choices and
consequently affect the behavior of the firms. The exact nature of the outcome
in terms of the distribution of quality levels achieved hinges on the shape of
these payoff curves, the level of the standard, and the distribution of enterprise
characteristics. There is no general relationship beiween the stringency of the
standard and the degree of improvement in quality provided; thus raising the
standard may either raise or lower average quality.
Viscusi & Zeckhauser, Optimal Standards With Incomplete Enforcement, 27 PUB. PoL'Y 437,
444 (1979).
132. See, e.g., Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer
Now and Then?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1131 (1980).
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forcement literature. Still, the main thrust of the economic view
of the regulatory process has attracted widespread support: regu-
lation should be efficient in both its means and its ends. How,
then, will private enforcement measure up against the standard of
efficiency?
In his 1975 preliminary report to the Administrative Confer-
ence on Private Enforcement, 3 Professor Jerry Mashaw devel-
oped several interrelated hypotheses which support the conclusion
that private enforcers are more efficient than regulatory agencies:
citizen enforcement may be less costly than official enforcement,
the private enforcer may sometimes be in a better position to
judge the costs and benefits of a particular prosecution than gov-
ernment officials, the legislature has made a judgment that private
enforcement is necessary to increase the total amount of resources
available for prosecution, and the threat of competition will stimu-
late public enforcement efforts. These propositions find some sup-
port in the theoretical writings of economists like George Stig-
ler,134 but as Mashaw points out, they have not been empirically
validated in the context of citizen enforcement of regulatory laws,
and they seem suspect in several respects.
Later theoretical writings have concluded that, just as it is dif-
ficult to create incentives that will induce regulated firms to un-
dertake the appropriate amount of abatement activity, so also is it
difficult to provide the necessary incentives for private enforcers
to undertake the optimal level of enforcement-or something
close to it."'S While government prosecutors are on the public
payroll and are therefore expected to make some attempt to
weigh the overall public costs and benefits of enforcement activity,
private enforcers are-if one subscribes to the standard public
goods analysis-much more likely to give weight to matters of
purely private gains and losses, such as an estimation of whether
the enforcement action will produce an adequate bounty for the
enforcer. In a variety of ways, private enforcers may look to their
133. Mashaw, Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The 'Citizens Suit,' 4
Class Action Rep. 29 (1975) (Report to the Committee on Compliance and Enforcement
Proceedings of the Administrative Conference of the United States).
134. E.g., Regulation: The Confusion of Means and Ends, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE
ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975).
135. Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Polin-
sky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
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own short-term benefits rather than to the aggregate, long-term
effects of a particular penalty action. Thus, to answer the question
whether private enforcement is desirable, one must address a diffi-
cult second-order incentive question: Does the statutory grant of
powers and benefits to enforcers, plus whatever other incentives
might exist to induce private enforcers to bring suit, generate a
number and mix of prosecutions that (when added to the number
of cases brought by public enforcement authorities) is closer to
the social optimum than the number and selection of cases that
would be brought by public prosecutors in the absence of such
private enforcement authority?
Even in this relatively simple form, the economic analysis of
private enforcement quickly becomes very complicated. Unfortu-
nately, there is very little empirical information available to aid
analysis. Consequently, analysts are likely to fill this gap by re-
turning to their initial assumptions. If one's initial premise is that
many regulatory rules are overinclusive and that some form of
cost-benefit reasonableness is desirable at the enforcement stage,
then one is likely to run the presumption against private enforce-
ment and demand a showing that citizen prosecutors are more
able to approach -the social optimum for enforcement than their
government counterparts. Prosecutorial discretion, in this view of
the regulatory process, is an important safety valve against the in-
herent rigidities of command-and-control regulation. It should
not be lightly abrogated by deputizing private parties to override
a public prosecutor's considered decision to refrain from action.
2. An Activist View: Underinclusive Rules, Negligible Enforcement.
Where economists (and, to some extent, representatives of the
regulated industries) see the regulatory system caught up in rigid
rules and inefficient enforcement policies, observers who are more
sympathetic to the regulatory mission of the EPA instead see lax-
ity, indecision and drift. One lawyer representing plaintiffs in citi-
zen suits stated it forcefully:
The present system . . . [is] all mush. The company [subject to a permit
under the Clean Water Act] violates, has a hundred violations. Now what
does it do? It might do nothing.. . . [I]t might come down and talk to the
agency a little bit and say, "I'm having a . . . problem." Maybe they're a
little nervous so they say, "Well, we'll ask for a permit change [to authorize
the discharges]." Well, the agency looks at it, and you know the agency has
got a pile of permits around [awaiting action]. And nothing happen[s] for
years. Nobody pays any attention, the permit runs out, nobody cares, [no-
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body] is paying any attention.
In this view of the process, both the substantive standards embod-
ied in permits and regulations and the enforcement practices of
the responsible agencies fall far short of protecting society from
unacceptable harm from pollution.
To understand the sources of this perception, it may be help-
ful to take a brief look at the statute most used in private enforce-
ment, the Clean Water Act, as seen through the eyes of citizen
plaintiffs and those who share their beliefs. Like many environ-
mental laws, the Clean Water Act is a complex statute establishing
multiple agency decision points, each of which presents opportuni-
ties for the decision maker to be either "tough" or "lenient."
Since the 1972 legislative amendments, 136 the primary tool for
pollution abatement under the Act is the discharge permit for
point sources (industrial or municipal waste outfalls), and the pri-
mary means of giving content to the permits are "effluent limita-
tion guidelines"-rules promulgated by the EPA defining the ap-
propriate control technologies for each category of polluting
industry. 13 7 Despite a legislatively imposed one-year deadline for
the issuance of effluent guidelines, the EPA was unable to make
rapid progress. As a result, the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil won a judicial victory in 1975 compelling the agency to follow
a set schedule for promulgating effluent guidelines.13 8 Since that
time the EPA has managed to issue a number of new guidelines,
136. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816
(current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1345, 1361-1376 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)), replaced a
1948 federal statute which was widely regarded as ineffective. One of the principal short-
comings of the older statute was its primary reliance on stream quality standards rather
than discharge limits (which made it necessary to show that a particular discharger's efflu-
ent was adversely affecting water quality); in addition, its enforcement system was generally
cumbersome and ineffectual. See generally Barry, supra note 20.
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982) directs the Administrator to promulgate effluent limi-
tation guidelines. The guidelines are keyed to the Act's two-stage imposition of technologi-
cal controls. From the effective date of the Act's permit requirement until 1977, the desig-
nated control technology was "best practicable control technology currently available,"
which is usually shortened to "BPT." § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(1)(A) (1982). For
the second stage, which was to be achieved by 1984, dischargers were required to meet a
somewhat higher standard-"best available technology economically achievable," which is
variously abbreviated to "BATEA" or "BAT." § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)
(1982). As might be expected, there has been substantial slippage in this timetable over the
years, and most of the permits discussed in this study would have been issued under the
BPT guidelines-if indeed there were any guidelines applicable.
138. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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but the proceedings are usually controversial, protracted, and fol-
lowed by multiple petitions for judicial review."'
In the absence of effective effluent guidelines, the permitting
authority (which may be either the EPA or a state agency imple-
menting a control program approved by the Administrator) is
forced to rely on its "best professional judgment" when drafting
permit limits. "BPJ," as it is known in the trade, permits consider-
able administrative discretion. According to some of the knowl-
edgeable observers interviewed in this study, that discretion is
often tilted in the direction of leniency. One plaintiffs' lawyer
reported:
I've seen permits, for example, that have ten, fifteen thousand pounds BOD
[biological oxygen demand] limit, and fifteen thousand pounds COD [chemi-
cal oxygen demand] limit, together. And they still [violate their permits]. I
mean, I can't begin to tell you some of the permits I've seen.... [W]e're
talking Grand Canyon loopholes for some of these things.
An EPA official provided some corroboration:
You get some real good permits, and you get some trash. [One EPA Region]
is famous for writing bubble permits . . . . It's supposed to be illegal but
they average together all the outfalls. And then what are you going to do?
. . . You get a company with ten different processes, and they get to average
together everything for their organic loading, for some toxic organic, and
they just don't run two or three of the lines on any given day. You get to
average in the zeros. . . [I]t works out very well for the company's produc-
tion management. He doesn't ever have to worry about his permit limits.
• . . That gets rid of a lot of cases that might be good, but the permit's just
written so loosely that there's not much you can do with it.
Even when effluent guidelines govern the permit-writing pro-
cess, there may be some grounds to question their stringency. The
139. See, e.g., CPC Int'l v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
966 (1977) (corn wet milling); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1975) (iron and steel); American Meat Inst. v. EPA,
526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) (meat products); American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, 526
F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528
F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 933 (1977), rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112
(1977) (jurisdiction); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (1976), rev'd
in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (inorganic chemicals); Tanners' Council of Am. v. Train, 540
F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976) (leather tanning); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.
1976), rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (plastic and synthetic material); Hooker Chem. &
Plastics v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) (phosphorous manufacturing); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. EPA, 527 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976) American Frozen Food Inst.
v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (frozen potato products); Appalachian Power Co.
v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
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EPA generally has based the guidelines on a "ninety-nine percent
confidence interval"-the level of pollution control that the best
existing facilities have been capable of meeting ninety-nine per-
cent of the time. 40 Therefore, the specified technology may even
fall short of what could theoretically be accomplished with the lat-
est available technology, if that technology has not yet been
adopted by existing plants. The guidelines' stringency may be fur-
ther tempered by the economic considerations specified in the
Act.141 Moreover, industries have succeeded in building into the
system some slack for unexpected or unique situations. One im-
portant category of exceptions is upsets and bypasses. An "upset"
is a malfunction of waste treatment equipment for reasons beyond
the operator's control. A "bypass" is a routine shutdown of con-
trol equipment for maintenance. Several cases have held that the
EPA must make some allowance for upsets and bypasses, and its
regulations now have standard provisions forgiving some of these
violations of permit limits. 42
Variances are also available for plants whose production
processes exhibit "fundamentally different factors" when com-
pared to the facilities considered in developing the effluent guide-
lines.1 43 As the EPA official who was previously quoted described
the permit-writing process, application of the effluent guidelines
can produce an "amazingly lenient" permit:
If the effluent guidelines . . . [provide that] you [as a regulated discharger]
ought to be able to meet [a limit of] a hundred pounds [of a particular pollu-
tant] per whatever [volume of] production you've got, by the time that they
look at the variances in there, put in the ninety-nine percent, that limit may
go up to two hundred or three hundred pounds because you can . .. statis-
tically compute that maybe someday you'll get up there. And they may even
have two or three years of operating data at the facility [showing] that
140. American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340, 347 n.28 (5th Cir. 1981); see
also Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1977).
141. See supra note 137.
142. In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), the Court held
that the Clean Water Act empowered EPA to issue not only effluent limitation guidelines
for officials writing individual discharge permits, but also binding regulations directly limit-
ing discharges on a generic basis-"so long as some allowance is made for variations in
individual plants, as EPA has done by including a variance clause in its 1977 limitations."
Id. at 128. See also supra note 140.
143. The EPA's authority to issue "fundamentally different factor" variances was up-




they've never gotten up there, so [the permit] is higher than the highest
limit ever recorded; but yet statistically you can work it out where it says
that one time in God knows how many you're going to go above that limit
and therefore you have to write the [permit] limit to allow for that. . . . In
a lot of cases, it's debatable whether you even have to put in the treatment
technology.
In addition to any slack that might be built into the permit
itself, there may be considerable slippage at the enforcement
stage. As previously noted, the citizen suit plaintiffs and their law-
yers typically view government enforcement as a process hobbled
by inertia and frequently unable to take any action (much less any
vigorous action) to compel compliance. Interview respondents as-
signed various reasons to this lack of agency enforcement under
the Clean Water Act. One emphasized the inherent tendencies of
bureaucracies to avoid hard decisions, and of regulators to avoid
conflict with important constituency groups. Another felt that the
EPA regional office staffs "would like to enforce," but are handi-
capped by lack of resources and internal agency regulations.
Others pointed to the "enormous," '.unbelievable" amount of
paperwork required to process a referral for court action through
the EPA hierarchy and the Justice Department. Whatever the rea-
sons, they believed that government enforcement of the Act had
deteriorated to the point where its deterrent value was negligible:
There has been some enforcement, but not a lot of enforcement. And un-
derstand, when you start going through these permits, it's the rare company
that complies. It's not the other way around. The permits are regularly and
generally violated, and the only question is, what's the degree of violation?
... Most of these defendants will regularly say: "Well, we spent all of this
money to try to comply, and we only had a little bit of violation, and why are
you suing us ... because we're trying to work it out?" Or: "Our violation's
not really causing any harm, why are you bothering with us?" . . . There
certainly is a sense in the corporate community that when they have a per-
mit, they can violate that permit. . . . [T]hat's a truly felt, I think a sincerely
felt, opinion. Unless the violation's very significant, there's no problem; the
permits don't mean what the permits say.
Other plaintiffs' lawyers used analogies to define what they
considered the proper enforcement approach to Clean Water Act
violations. One cited the example of police enforcement of traffic
speed limits, arguing:
People now know that if they get caught at over fifty-five miles per hour -
if they get caught at fifty-seven-point-five - they've got to pay a penalty.
... [In the Water Act,] we've got to get out of that in-the-ballpark, the-
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permit-is-a-guideline concept. The permit is the law, and you will treat it like
the law, or you will pay the legal penalties.
Another respondent advocated
the Internal Revenue Service model. They don't tell me on April 15, try to
pay my taxes. They tell me I am to pay my tax bill. If I don't pay it, some-
thing bad happens to me. That's my model. That's what I think the Water
Act is supposed to do.
This straightforward deterrence model implies a very limited
role for prosecutorial discretion. One of the respondents quoted
above interpreted the legislative intent behind the Clean Water
Act's citizen suit provision as a congressional directive that
once you set the permit numbers there shouldn't be any discretion. Un-
doubtedly there is a little bit. Obviously if you violate the permit [just] once,
nobody wants anybody charging into court to do something about it. But
essentially Congress said: "We don't want a lot of discretion. .... We want it
to operate almost automatically."
In this view, a government monopoly over prosecution
would-and perhaps did, during the period when few private en-
forcement actions were brought-simply load more leniency into
the regulatory system and seriously undercut voluntary
compliance.
3. A Behavioral View: Contingent Power Complex Social Reality. A
third view of regulatory enforcement is more difficult to summa-
rize than the economic and activist perspectives, perhaps because
it emphasizes the complexities that the other two views tend to
suppress. This third approach, which might be described as a be-
havioral perspective, does not deny that the actors in regulatory
enforcement proceedings are, in some respects, rational analysts
who calculate the net present benefits of alternative courses of ac-
tion and respond to penal and financial incentives. However, the
behavioral perspective also acknowledges that the actors in regula-
tory enforcement settings, exist within complex social and political
structures which serve to create and distort incentives in their
own right. To assess the effects of a device like the citizen suit,
then, it is necessary to understand the social dynamics that sur-
round a particular field of regulation, as well as the ways in which
the entry of private enforcers is likely to alter those relationships.
A starting point for behavioral analysis of regulatory enforce-
ment is the assumption that neither the regulated firm nor the
889
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
regulating agency can be treated like a single, utility-maximizing
individual. On the agency side, there are a number of splits that
serve to divide different subgroups of officials and create the pos-
sibility of conflict or strategic behavior. One of the most fre-
quently described gaps is the tension between high-level policy-
makers and the "street-level" bureaucrats who actually carry out
the detailed work of the agency at an operational level-in this
case, writing permits, conducting inspections, recommending
prosecutions and negotiating with industry spokesmen. As previ-
ously discussed, the Ruckelshaus Administration at the EPA
sought to reverse the voluntary compliance philosophy advocated
by its predecessor and develop a more deterrence-oriented ap-
proach to enforcement."' One observer expressed skepticism that
this turnabout would produce major changes in behavior at the
regional office level, where, in effect, much enforcement policy is
made:
It's . . . similar to a lower staff in a bureaucracy, a lower staff autonomy.
They have to follow policy and everything else, but it's the way in which they
follow policy. You know, headquarters says: "We want the major cases." Re-
gion hands up all their shit and says, "Those are our major cases." And
who's going to challenge it? It's the same thing, you know, if the secretary
says: "I can't do it because the word processors are out," "the xerox ma-
chine is down." I mean you're stuck. It's not that they're not following what
you are saying, it's just that there are all kinds of guerrilla tactics. The re-
gions are great on guerrilla tactics. They've got this down to a fine art.
Even at a particular functional level within an agency, regula-
tors can vary in their approach to enforcement. James Q. Wilson
distinguished among three basic types of government officials
based on their dominant motivation: careerists who are concerned
primarily with the maintenance and survival of the agency, politi-
cians who are using their administrative position as a stepping
stone to other offices and professionals who are concerned pri-
marily with developing and displaying competence in a technical
discipline."45 In an agency like the EPA, which has traditionally
attracted substantial numbers of staffers committed to the
agency's mission of protecting the environment, a fourth cate-
gory-idealists-should probably be added.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 112-120; Ruckelshaus Worried Citizen Suits Will
Reveal Poor Enforcement Record, INSIDE EPA, May 11, 1984, at 1.
145. J. WiLsoN, THE PoLIcs or REGULATION 374-82 (1980).
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One interview subject noted that these kinds of career moti-
vations and disciplinary differences can have a real impact on EPA
enforcement activity:
[Typically in the regional offices] you've got a water division director who's
got ties to the community, he's got ties to the business community-you
know, they're basically engineers. . . who are going to get out in the engi-
neering field eventually, and . . . they're not going to do anything contro-
versial.. . . It used to be the enforcement divisions were all run by attor-
neys. . . . [Tiraditionally, you find that lawyers are not as worried about
their future. As a matter of fact, they may be helping their future the more
aggressive they are, whereas exactly the opposite is going to be true for any
water division director. . -. . It may be that [the lawyers] just don't under-
stand the issues as well, you know-the technical issues, so they don't have
as many doubts in the back of their minds about what will work and what
won't; whereas the water division director, being an engineer, usually has a
lot of experiences and is more willing to accept excuses. Like: "Oh, we had a
bad day," or "somebody dropped a wrench." Lawyers just didn't want to
hear it.
Another respondent familiar with the enforcement process
thought that disciplinary differences might be less significant than
personal experience and attitude: "I've seen good cases turned
back because the lawyer didn't want to do it because it was going
to be a tough case. Or because he had dealt with this attorney
before and had gotten clobbered. Or he had dealt with this attor-
ney before and he liked him."
As these excerpts suggest, there is evidently a good deal of
pulling and hauling within the agency over the shape of enforce-
ment policy, both in general and in individual cases. These con-
flicts are multiplied when state agencies are also involved in en-
forcing environmental standards. The sudden upsurge in private
enforcement actions might well disrupt or challenge the network
of norms, assumptions and understandings that have grown up
within the EPA and its counterpart state agencies. Because such
norms and understandings can serve negative as well as positive
functions, disrupting them is not necessarily bad. It is difficult,
however, to anticipate and understand all of the effects on this
complex system which will result from any change in practices. In
this way, widespread use of citizen suits raises the possibility of
unforeseen upheavals in established enforcement relationships.
Similar observations have been made about the behavior of
regulated firms. Legal sanctions may fail to penetrate to the ap-
propriate operational levels of the company because of interven-
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ing bureaucratic or social processes.148 For example, a former gov-
ernment attorney tells of an environmental enforcement
negotiation in which the company was unwilling to settle because
that would entail an admission of a very costly error by a high-
ranking corporate official:
The Senior VP for Engineering had no doubt designed the [treatment sys-
tem]. So they couldn't chuck the stuff they had out there. And the reason
they were having such problems was not that it was misdesigned in the sense
that, yeah, the concept was good, but because the wind blew across the top
of the great big lagoons and churned things up when they're supposed to be
settling ponds. .... They sized it right and everything, but they forgot the
indirect stuff.
An enforcer who fails to understand and deal with these dynamics
in the regulated firm is likely to be ineffective or possibly counter-
productive. Recent studies of regulatory enforcement have con-
cluded that the inspector who "goes by the book" and mechani-
cally cites all violations without regard to seriousness or
extenuating circumstances will likely be perceived as unreasona-
ble, and may therefore provoke resistance rather than coopera-
tion from the regulated. 47
A more effective strategy may be to tailor enforcement re-
sponses to the reasons for violation. Professors Kagan and
Scholz148 have suggested that regulators need to distinguish be-
tween at least three types of noncompliance. Some percentage of
violations-usually a relatively small percentage-will be commit-
ted by "amoral calculators" similar to the rational maximizers hy-
pothesized in economic analysis. Because these firms respond pri-
marily to the likelihood and severity of penalties, a deterrence
strategy, backed by vigorous policing, is the appropriate enforce-
ment technique. Another-probably larger-percentage of regu-
lated firms can be characterized as "political citizens" who will
generally comply with legal requirements so long as they believe
146. E.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAV-
IOR (1975); Stone, Large Organizations and the Law at the Pass: Toward a General Theory of
Compliance Strategy, 1981 Wsc. L. REV. 861.
147. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE Boox: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UN-
REASONABLENESS (1982); see also K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION
AND THE SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984).
148. Kagan & Scholz, The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement
Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (K. Hawkins & J. Thomas eds. 1984). See also infra
note 174.
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that those requirements are legitimate, reasonable and generally
enforced. For this category of firms, the regulator's task is two-
fold: he must persuade the recalcitrant that the rules in question
are sensible and necessary, and he must adapt the rules to meet
valid business problems that would be caused by literal-minded en-
forcement. Finally, some percentage of noncompliance will be
caused by organizational incompetence, such as lack of knowledge
of pollution control technologies or failure to hire the right kinds
of people to run a control program. In these situations, the regu-
lator is most effective in the role of a consultant who tries to edu-
cate the firm about better ways of dealing with pollution
problems.
Making these kinds of distinctions and selecting an appropri-
ate enforcement response can be difficult for an established gov-
ernment bureaucracy, as witnessed by the recent political troubles
of agencies like the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion and the Federal Trade Commission. The citizen enforcer la-
bors under additional handicaps. For one, they do not carry the
legitimacy of the public official which, though it may have dimin-
ished in recent years, still commands a degree of deference and
respect from the private sector. An environmental lawyer with ex-
perience in government described the difference in the following
terms:
The companies don't like it when EPA knocks on [their] door. They under-
stand that EPA's got the right to do it, but they grouse about it and they get
defensive. . . . And so it's difficult. It is more difficult by a hundred degrees
when you've got a private citizen client and you're involved in this, because
[they think]: "Who the hell are you to tell me how to run my plant?"
The citizen plaintiffs are confronted with the problem of estab-
lishing their credibility and legitimacy as enforcers, an issue that
often surfaces in the legal disputes over standing discussed below.
Another problem facing citizen enforcers is that they are gen-
erally following a much more vigorous enforcement policy than
the responsible government agencies in at least two respects: in
the number and kinds of cases brought, and in the level of penal-
ties sought. This discrepancy is obvious to the regulated firms,
and it can easily lead to a feeling that they are being whipsawed
between inconsistent requirements or treated arbitrarily. As a de-
fense lawyer asked:
[I]s it fair today-retroactively-to go back and do something to these dis-
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chargers which the agencies themselves did not and would not have done,
had they been in control and prosecuting? The point [of the citizen suit pro-
visions] is to get the citizens to do what the agencies would have done ....
To some degree, this may be a transitional problem that can be
solved by some of the procedural techniques described below,
such as greater elaboration of case selection criteria and penalty
policies. In the meantime, however, the discrepancy between
agency and citizen group enforcement policy seems likely to be a
continuing source of friction between private enforcers and the
regulated industries. From a behavioral perspective, then, one of
the most important questions about the current upsurge of citizen
suits is whether it will lead to a stable set of relationships among
the environmental organizations, regulated industries and regula-
tory agencies in which the private enforcement action is regarded
as an established, legitimate and reasonable feature of the regula-
tory process.
In the first wave of private enforcement litigation, the simple
deterrence model favored by the plaintiff organizations has
largely been accepted by the courts. This is most evident in the
unsympathetic treatment given to the various defenses asserted by
dischargers, which is described in more detail in the following sec-
tions. Courts adjudicating private enforcement actions have fre-
quently ignored technical defects in notice and have routinely up-
held standing based on a simple showing of harm to recreational
and aesthetic interests. They have also narrowed the "diligent
prosecution" bar, so that few government enforcement actions
will prevent private parties from bringing suit on the same viola-
tions. On the merits, they have treated the permittee's discharge
monitoring reports as admissions and have generally rejected the
defense argument that plaintiffs should be required to show con-
tinuing violations as a prerequisite for relief. Occasionally, the
courts have also expressed their irritation at the failure of dis-
chargers and government enforcement agencies to resolve long-
standing violations of law. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,149 one of the few private enforcement
suits that have reached the penalty stage, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that the fine should be reduced because its
compliance delays were caused by factors beyond its control:
149. 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985).
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Contrary to Gwaltney's contention, the Court believes that Gwaltney's
penalty ought to be increased, not reduced, because of willfulness.
Gwaltney's lackadaisical approach in correcting a problem that posed
risks-albeit not "imminent" ones-to both human health and aquatic life
should not be countenanced. One may speculate how long Gwaltney would
have taken to repair a machine the faulty operation of which would have
halted production. . . . [A]t the very least Gwaltney would have exerted
more effort to repair such a machine than it did to bring its discharge into
compliance with pollution standards.8 0
The court went on to impose a $1.3 million civil penalty on
Gwaltney, most of which was designed to deter possible future vio-
lations by Gwaltney or other similarly situated polluters.
While simple deterrence has generally prevailed in court, still
there are lingering problems that are partly doctrinal, partly man-
agerial and partly attitudinal. They relate to the coordination of
public and private enforcement, to the incentives that are created
by and for private enforcement actions, and to the legitimacy and
accountability of private enforcers.
V. COORDINATING ENFORCEMENT
A. Consistency in Enforcement Policy
The goal of coordination in regulatory enforcement policy
(that is, the notion that there should be a minimum degree of con-
sistency in enforcement policy, regardless of who is enforcing the
law) starts from a simple premise. As a matter of basic fairness,
like cases should be treated alike. If two permit violators are
equally deserving of punishment, and one receives a heavy fine
while the other is not penalized, the system has failed to achieve
150. Id. at 1561-62. See also United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, No. 85-
0489, slip op. at n.9 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 1985), involving consolidated public and private
enforcement actions, where the court expressed dismay at a sewer district's continuing fail-
ure to make progress toward compliance with simple sewage treatment requirements that
had been in effect for nearly a decade:
As I delve into the record in this case, it becomes more and more incom-
prehensible to me that the defendants have continually discharged the sludge
back into the Harbor daily. By doing so, they virtually eliminate any benefit the
initial treatment steps may have had. This simply amounts to separating water
from filth, and pumping both back into the Harbor.
The court rejected a request by the sewer district and the EPA for more time to negotiate
a settlement of the case, noting: "I simply do not have any adequate assurance that the
community's federally guaranteed right to a clean harbor will be protected if the parties
are left to their own devices."
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
fairness between the parties. 15 Inconsistencies of this kind can
also impair the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement. If the
perception of inequity becomes widespread, voluntary compliance
may be undermined. Inconsistency in enforcement policy invites
litigation rather than settlement, and litigation generates addi-
tional delays and costs, as well as the risk of adverse precedent. In
theory, then, enforcement should be consistent both at the level
of policy and at the level of implementation. "'Consistency may be
a frustratingly difficult goal to achieve, even without the compli-
cating presence of private enforcement. In a complex regulatory
structure like the Clean Air or Clean Water Act, consistency im-
plies codification and formal regularization of enforcement activ-
ity. However, enforcement policy is an intricate blend of moral
judgments about what the defendant deserves, technical evalua-
tions of the causes and consequences of particular violations, prag-
matic assessments of what can be accomplished with available re-
sources, legal opinions about the chances of winning and the
precedential significance of various outcomes, and managerial
judgments about the ways that various enforcement actions will
affect norms and relationships in the relevant bureaucracies. Codi-
fying enforcement policy in a way that reasonably accommodates
these potentially conflicting demands is not impossible, as evi-
denced by the EPA's preliminary success in codifying portions of
its enforcement policy. But codification is not achieved without
significant effort and cost.
The costs of codifying enforcement policy include the intel-
151. The classic statement of this equal treatment rationale is K. DAVIS, DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE (1969).
152. This seems to be the dominant theory today. Inconsistency might be defended on
deterrence grounds. If a few violators were arbitrarily selected for severe punishment, the
resulting uncertainty might increase general deterrence, at least if substantial numbers of
violators were risk-averse. Another theoretical justification for inconsistency, especially in a
national environmental program like air or water pollution, would be the desirability of
tailoring enforcement to local needs and desires. It might be argued that if New Jersey's
voters prefer job preservation over cleaning up the environment, and New York's voters
have the opposite preference, those preferences ought to be reflected in enforcement pol-
icy, even if this produces inconsistent outcomes. (This assumes that the legal structure has
not created formal consistency by including regional location as a variable in the penalty
calculus.) The federal environmental programs are mostly designed to establish uniform
national standards; however, there still may be some room to accomodate differing state
preferences, at least where those preferences are for more stringent controls than the fed-
eral programs require.
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lectual and personnel resources needed to think through, describe
and defend enforcement policy, as well as the loss of some flexibil-
ity and deterrent value. As with other rules, enforcement policies
may omit some relevant factors and become overinclusive or un-
derinclusive, thereby introducing a destructive element of rigidity
where flexible discretion is needed. Moreover, to the extent that
enforcement policies officially define some offenses as so low in
priority that they escape sanctions altogether, codification lessens
deterrence and undermines the applicable rules and standards.
Notwithstanding these costs, some areas of enforcement pol-
icy still seem worth codifying. When multiple entities inside and
outside government are enforcing regulatory laws, codification is
necessary to achieve fairness for the regulated and to improve the
quality and acceptability of enforcement policy. Moreover, as the
following section indicates, the coordination device provided in
the citizen suit statutes has largely failed to achieve its intended
purpose. As a result, codification of policy has become the pri-
mary method for achieving some consistency in the enforcement
process.
B. The Irrelevance of the Diligent Prosecution Exemption
The Clean Water Act, like most of the statutes containing
citizen suit provisions, has two related mechanisms for coordinat-
ing public and private enforcement. Potential plaintiffs are re-
quired to give sixty days' notice to the EPA, the discharger and
the state where the alleged violation took place before filing an
enforcement suit.1 53 In addition, the private action is barred if
one of the responsible government agencies is prosecuting a pen-
alty action against the violator."" In theory, this system permits
the government enforcers to take control of the matter by bring-
ing their own action during the sixty-day waiting period and rele-
gating the private enforcer to intervention in the government's
suit.155 As a practical matter, however, these provisions have been
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982).
154. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
155. The Senate Report on the Clean Water Act states: "The time between notice
and filing of the action should give the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to
act on the alleged violation." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1972 US.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3745. The Act provides that "any citizen may intervene as a
matter of right" in a government enforcement action, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
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largely ineffectual in coordinating public and private enforce-
ment. They have instead provided a context within which a vari-
ety of informal coordination mechanisms and activities have
evolved.
The principal reason why the notice-and-preclusion system
has not functioned as originally intended is that sixty days is not
sufficient time in most cases to process a referral package from the
EPA regional office, through EPA headquarters and the Justice
Department's Lands Division, and back to the local U.S. Attorney
who actually files the case. In response to the pressure of citizen
suits, the EPA has made some attempts to streamline this case re-
ferral process, but these changes do not affect the great majority
of private enforcement cases against major polluters.""6 Thus, un-
less the government is on the verge of filing an action when the
notice letter arrives, it is not likely to win the race to the court-
house if the plaintiff organization is intent on filing its complaint
as soon as possible. Usually, however, plaintiff organizations do
not rush to file complaints as soon as the waiting period runs out.
Instead, they engage in a variety of informal contacts with pro-
posed defendants and government enforcers. These contacts pro-
vide an opportunity for coordinating effort and policy.
Settlement talks between plaintiffs and defendants frequently
follow the mailing of a notice letter. 5' Since the notice letter is a
156. In 1985, the EPA negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the Justice
Department to permit "direct referrals" of certain kinds of enforcement cases from the
EPA regional offices to Justice Department's Lands and Natural Resources Division,
thereby cutting out the EPA headquarters review. However, the categories of Clean Water
Act cases thus exempted have not figured prominently in the current wave of citizen suits:
discharges without a permit, violations by minor industrial dischargers, collection of penal.
ties stipulated in consent decrees and collection of administrative spill penalties. All other
referrals have to be reviewed in EPA headquarters both by the Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring, and by the program office. The direct referral system was estab-
lished for a one year trial period; however, no information has been found about the termi-
nation or continuation of the program after September of 1984, when it was due to expire.
Letter from Alvin L. Aim, Deputy Administrator, USEPA, to F. Henry Habicht, II, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Lands and Natural Resources Division, USDOJ (Sept. 29,
1983).
157. In the current wave of citizen suits, which are largely the product of file searches
and review of agency documents, receipt of the notice letter is often the first direct contact
between plaintiff and defendant. By contrast, there has usually been substantial prior con-
tact in the long-running local controversies that one interviewee termed "blood feuds." In
the latter disputes, the issues in the debate are well known in the local area. When the case
is generated from a review of file documents, however, it is possible that local members of
the plaintiff organization have not had any contact with the discharger. Indeed, it may be
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formal document specifying the details of alleged violations and
explicitly threatening suit, it evidently serves as a powerful prod
to negotiations. In the course of these negotiations, the plaintiff,
the defendant or both may contact the EPA and the state agency
for information and opinion on the seriousness of-the violation,
the efficacy of the proposed remedies, the reasons why the dis-
charger has been unable to achieve compliance, and similar is-
sues.158 In some instances, plaintiff organizations may delay filing
a complaint with the expectation that government enforcers will
get approval to bring their own action within a reasonably short
period of time. Alternatively, the citizen groups may try to con-
vince the government to become a co-plaintiff or intervenor in the
enforcement action. If negotiation fails to produce a mutually sat-
isfactory result, the plaintiffs have the leverage to move the con-
troversy closer to a formal resolution by filing a complaint. The
diligent prosecution bar seems to have little effect in these infor-
mal negotiations, since the government usually cannot credibly
threaten to invoke it.
A second problem with the diligent prosecution exemption is
that the courts have not yet been able to generate a consistent and
workable body of doctrine applying it. At the threshold, the issue
occasionally arises as to whether notice requirements are jurisdic-
tional prerequisites for citizen suits that must be strictly observed
or are instead technicalities that may be waived by the court when
there is substantial compliance or actual notice. Court decisions
have split on this issue. The majority of opinions conclude that
technical defects may be overlooked, so long as the defendants
and the responsible government agencies had actual notice that a
citizen suit was being prepared. 159 One of the leading cases reach-
difficult to find local people who are willing and able to take on this responsibility. Some of
the lawyers of the plaintiff organizations feel that it would be improper for them to make
contact with the alleged violator at a time when the matter seems headed for litigation. In
addition, many of them probably have little time to do so, given the caseloads of citizen
suits and other matters pending in their offices.
158. Unfortunately, we have no good data on the frequency of these agency/party
contacts.
159. E.g., Proffit v. Comm'rs, Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985);
Pymatuning Watershed Citizens for a Hygienic Env't v. Eaton, 644 F.2d 995, 996 (3d Cir.
1981); Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231, 243 (3d Cir.
1980); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 175 (2d Cir. 1976). The cases in which
notice defects were held to be jurisdictional bars to a citizen suit were mostly actions in
which plaintiffs were trying to bring trivial or inappropriate claims under the private en-
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ing the opposite result, Walls v. Waste Resource Corp.,160 makes two
plausible, but empirically unsupported, policy arguments for strict
construction of the notice provisions. The first justification is the
court's belief that the notice period is necessary "to give EPA an
opportunity to resolve issues regarding the interpretation of com-
plex environmental standards. . . unhindered by the threat of an
impending private lawsuit. 1 1'  As previously noted, however, the
sixty-day period is far too short for the agency to even complete a
routine case referral, much less to resolve complex policy issues or
statutory interpretations.
The second reason that the Walls court insists on literal com-
pliance with the notice provision is congressional intent to foster
consent settlements during the sixty-day waiting period: "Con-
gress evidently believed that the filing of a private lawsuit hardens
bargaining positions and leaves the Administrator with less room
to maneuver."16 2 But if the sixty days is insufficient time for gov-
ernment enforcers to make a decision on whether to sue, it is even
less adequate to permit a decision on whether to settle the contro-
versy. Even if the time were adequate, the defendant would have
little incentive to settle with the government because the settle-
ment would not provide reliable protection against citizen suits.
Thus, if the drafters did have the intent ascribed to them by the
Walls court, they evidently did not foresee the ways that the no-
tice-and-preclusion system would work in practice. Given the slow
pace with which government makes and implements enforcement
decisions, and the technical issues that have arisen over trivial no-
tice defects, 6 3 it is clear that this requirement has made few sig-
forcement provision. Two were actions arising out of grants or contracts for the planning
or construction of sewage treatment plants, Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Twp. v. Costle,
468 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 592 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Ventnor City v. Fri, 6
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2104 (D.N.J. 1974); one was an attempt to recover damages
through an implied right of private action under the citizen suit provision, City of Evans-
ville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.,
Louisville &Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. City of Evansville, 444 U.S. 1025
(1980).
160. 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
161. Id. at 317.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440,
450-51 (D. Md. 1985) (defense claim that a second notice had to be given for violations
occurring after initial notice rejected because "[i]t would be incongruous with [the plain-
tiffs'] right to sue for a continuing violation to conclude that specific incidents of non-
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nificant contributions to the coordination of public and private
enforcement.
If the plaintiffs' notice is adequate, the next issue that fre-
quently arises in private enforcement litigation is whether the gov-
ernment's previous attempts to abate the pollution in question
constitute diligent prosecution, thereby barring the suit. Since vir-
tually every major pollution controversy comes to court with a
long history of enforcement (or nonenforcement), defendants rou-
tinely raise the diligent prosecution defense, claiming that federal
or state authorities have adequately dealt with the problems de-
scribed in the complaint. These enforcement histories are highly
variable, and the courts have little guidance from the statute or
legislative history in trying to determine what sorts of prior en-
forcement can trigger the bar.
To date, two issues have dominated litigation over the dili-
gent prosecution exemption. The first question is whether an ad-
ministrative sanctioning process can ever be considered the
equivalent of a court action for purposes of the diligent prosecu-
tion exemption. The citizen suit provisions generally state that
private actions are barred only when the responsible government
authorities are maintaining "a civil or criminal action in a court of
the United States or a State to require compliance."' " However,
the major environmental statutes create a system of enforcement
in which many government attempts to induce compliance take
place in administrative rather than judicial proceedings. The
EPA, for example, typically has the power to issue administrative
orders against violators. These orders may carry sanctions for vio-
lations, as they do under the Clean Air Act; or they may function
as voluntary compliance agreements that cannot be separately en-
forced, as under the Clean Water Act.6 5 In "delegated states,"
compliance within the sixty day notice period could not be sued upon because of a lack of
statutory notice"); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617
F. Supp. 1190 (D.NJ. 1985) (failure of one plaintiff organization to give notice does not
require that they be dismissed from the action when other plaintiff has given adequate
notice); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F. Supp. 1394,
1396 (D.N.J. 1985) (failure of one of three plaintiff organizations to give notice does not
require dismissal of that party from suit); Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., slip op. No. 84-
1785 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 1984) (notice sufficient when sent to defendant's president and
plant supervisor, but not to registered agent as provided in EPA regulations).
164. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982) (Clean Water Act).
165. In the situation where a discharger violates an EPA administrative order under
the Clean Water Act (for example, by failing to meet a compliance schedule for installing a
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where primary enforcement responsibility has been taken over by
state agencies, the range of possible sanctions and procedures is
even greater.
The courts have split on the question of whether an adminis-
trative enforcement process can ever trigger the diligent prosecu-
tion exemption. The Third Circuit considered this issue first in an
early Clean Air Act case, Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.""6 The
court concluded that an administrative tribunal could be consid-
ered the functional equivalent of a court, if it had decision making
procedures and remedial powers comparable to those possessed by
the federal courts. However, the Second Circuit recently reached
the opposite conclusion in Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp. by relying on the literal meaning of the statute. 67 In prac-
tice, these divergent approaches may make little difference, since
the courts applying the Baughman test have generally concluded
that administrative proceedings are deficient in either or both
their sanctions and their procedural rights (such as interven-
tion).,68 The Baughman approach does require more data and
treatment system), the agency would have the option of going to court for penalties on the
underlying violations. In this situation, the defendant may raise defenses of laches, waiver,
or estoppel against the government, citing the administrative order as government acquies-
cence in prior violations. Compare United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (no defense of laches or estoppel against the government) with United
States v. Del Monte de Puerto Rico, Inc., 586 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1978) (defendant's claim
that the EPA waived compliance by approving a schedule change held sufficient to prevent
summary judgment on penalty for Clean Water Act violations). In Heckler v. Community
Health Servs., 104 S. Ct. 2218 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the government gener-
ally cannot be estopped from enforcing the law, even though the regulated firm may have
relied to its detriment on erroneous government advice. See also infra note 175.
166. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
167. 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
168. E.g., Proffitt v. Comm'rs Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1985)
("Plainly, EPA's compliance order lacks the indicia of a 'court action' enunciated in Baugh-
man, particularly the right of citizens to intervene ...."); Student Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1135-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (lack of
public participation in administrative enforcement proceedings is a relevant but not deter-
minative factor; EPA administrative order under Clean Water Act not equivalent to court
action); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985) (state administra-
tive proceeding not equivalent to a court proceeding under Baughman because state agency
lacks "the full remedial powers inherent to traditional judicial courts"); Student Pub. Inter-
est Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985) (consent
settlement with the EPA and state agency no bar to citizen suit under Bradford test, even
though settlement was filed in court); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto
Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1482-83 (D.N.J. 1985) (EPA administrative order under Clean
Water Act does not meet Baughman test); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Ten-
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analysis, however, and as a result, it may increase costs and delays.
Even if the government enforcement action meets the court
proceeding test, it still must be diligent in order to bar a citizen
suit. This is a difficult standard for the courts to apply. Neither
the statutes, the legislative history nor analogous areas of law pro-
vide much guidance in determining when environmental enforce-
ment is sufficiently diligent. Apart from a few easy cases, like the
situation where a citizen group was able to show that a govern-
ment enforcement order violated the Clean Water Act,16 it is not
clear that the courts will be able to develop judicially manageable
standards for measuring diligence. 70 As the Supreme Court re-
cently noted in Heckler v. Chaney, prosecutorial discretion has gen-
neco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D.N.J. 1985) (EPA order under Clean
Water Act no bar to citizen suit because agency lacks sanctioning power, and citizens have
no opportunity to participate); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. American Cyana-
mid, No. 84-1784, slip op. (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 1985) (EPA administrative order under Clean
Water Act not equivalent to a court); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828
(W.D.N.Y. 1983); Love v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (state consent order held no bar to citizen suit, primarily because state
prosecution not considered diligent. The court also notes: "Furthermore, no hearings were
ever held and it does not appear that the plaintiff had the opportunity to intervene."). See
also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1979) (EPA may
bring penalty action against Clean Water Act violator who is already subject to administra-
tive order, without showing that order was violated).
169. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 1528, 1535-37 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
170. For example, in Love v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp.
832, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court brushed aside a diligent prosecution defense with the
conclusory statement: "It does not appear that [the state agency] enforced the environmen-
tal laws to the fullest extent possible." If the diligence test turned on whether the agency
had enforced against a particular violator "to the fullest extent possible," then the diligent
prosecution exemption would become a virtual nullity. An alternative holding in Student
Pub. Interest Research Group v. American Cyanamid, No. 83-2068, slip op. at 6 (D.N.J.
Nov. 6, 1985), looked to penalties and deterrence theory in determining diligence. It ac-
cepted plaintiffs' argument that state agency prosecution had not been diligent because the
agency had not imposed any penalties during an eight-year running despute over compli-
ance. In making this determination, the court cited the EPA's 1984 penalty policy for the
proposition that money penalties "are often necessary even if the underlying violation has
been corrected, to deter future violations, and to restore economic equity to other regu-
lated parties." It is not clear from the opinion how much latitude a state agency (or, for
that matter, the EPA itself) would have to move from a penal enforcement policy to a
voluntary compliance policy that emphasized cooperation and negotiation. Even under a
strict deterrence rationale, presumably an agency could "plea bargain" at least some cases
by forgiving some violations in exchange for a consent settlement. Apart from extreme
cases, it is difficult to see how a reviewing court could second-guess the agency decision to
accept a voluntary compliance agreement without venturing outside the bounds of its
competence.
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erally been immune from judicial review because "[t]he agency is
far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many vari-
ables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 1 71 The dili-
gence test effectively invites the courts to enter the thicket that
the Supreme Court was careful to avoid in Chaney.172
As presently applied, the statutory notice-and-preclusion sys-
tem accomplishes little in the way of coordination, with some cost
in terms of increased litigation and uncertainty of result. One pos-
sible response is to lengthen the waiting period. This would pro-
vide the government with a more realistic opportunity to make
and execute its own enforcement decisions after receiving a citi-
zen notice letter. The 1984 amendments to the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act take a step in this direction by extending
the waiting period between notice and suit to ninety days.173 From
the government's perspective, this longer period is probably still
inadequate in many cases. Moreover, simply extending the waiting
period does not address the problems of where the line between
diligent and dilatory should be drawn, and how the definition of
reasonable diligence might vary among defendants, regulatory
programs and types of violations. More fundamentally, it appears
that framing the issue in terms of the government's diligence may
ignore some of the most important factors defining the relation-
ship between public and private enforcement.
Diligence, at least in its common usage, seems premised on a
simple theory of deterrence. The diligent prosecutor will bring
the largest number of cases possible with the available resources
and seek the most stringent penalties against the most deserving
171. 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656 (1985).
172. It is true that the diligence determination in a citizen suit does not involve as
direct a challenge to agency priority setting as the kind of judicial review attempted in
Chaney. A court determination of nondiligence in a citizen suit would simply permit the
private action to go forward, leaving the agency otherwise free to set and execute its own
priorities. There remains the problem of how the court would find or develop standards to
assess the administrative decision. Once an agency says "this is the most we can do on this
particular case, given the resources we have and the other problems that require our atten-
tion," it seems difficult at best for a reviewing court to decide whether the resources in-
vested by the agency were enough. However, it may be possible to find judicially managea-
ble standards for cases of widespread or systematic failures to enforce. See generally
Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985).
173. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, § 401(d), 98 Stat. 3221, 3269-
70, amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act to bar suit for 90 days "after the plaintiff has
given notice of the endangerment" (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(a)).
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violators. Ideally, though, it is less important to know how hard
the prosecutor is trying than it is to know how effective s/he is.
The ultimate question is how particular citizen suits will affect
compliance among the regulated community. Deterrence may not
be the best route to that result. According to some behavioral the-
ories of regulatory enforcement, 17 4 private suits that contradict
prior governmental acceptance of a firm's pollution abatement ef-
forts could undermine the authority and credibility of a com-
pany's engineers and managers who are responsible for environ-
mental controls. In the long run, this could diminish a regulated
industry's willingness and ability to reduce environmental harm.
A different approach, one which might make it easier to ad-
dress these concerns, is suggested by the attempts of some defend-
ants in citizen suits to "put the whole picture" before the court.
This translates into presenting information showing that there
were excuses for the violations that did occur, that the govern-
ment took reasonable enforcement action in light of the circum-
stances, or that any resulting pollution did not cause significant
harm to public health or the environment. There are a variety of
doctrinal bases that defendants can use to make this kind of pres-
entation. 17 5 The one most relevant for present purposes is the ef-
174. See, e.g., E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING By THE BOOK (1982). Bardach and Kagan
argue that overly rigid, "by-the-book" enforcement can demoralize and impede the "trus-
teeship stratum" of professionals, technicians and managers who are responsible within the
firm for achieving compliance with environmental laws. They conclude that "the social
responsibility of regulators, in the end, must be not simply to impose controls, but to acti-
vate and draw upon the conscience and the talents of those they seek to regulate." Id. at
323. This analysis has been sharply attacked. See Abel, Risk as an Arena of Struggle, 83
MIcH. L. REv. 772 (1985), We do not mean to suggest that the Bardach and Kagan analysis
is factually correct in the field of regulation discussed in this Article. At present, we lack
sufficient data to accept or reject its applicability to citizen environmental suits. But it does
have enough plausibility to raise concerns about the potentially destructive effects of overly
rigid enforcement.
175. One legal basis for making this kind of presentation is the standing doctrine,
which defendants may use to show that the discharges in question caused only negligible
injuries to persons or to uses of the waterway. See infra text accompanying notes 242-77.
Similarly, defendants have argued (thus far without success) that courts should recognize a
de minimis defense. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. American Cyana-
mid, No. 83-2068, slip op. (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v.
National Starch & Chem. Corp., No. 84-1119 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 1985); Student Pub. Interest
Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.NJ. 1985). Defendants may as-
sert that prior government enforcement activities constitute waiver, estoppel, or laches bar-
ring private actions relating to the same discharges, but these defenses have also proved
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615
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fort to have government enforcers participate in citizen suits.
Government agencies may be brought into the private suit as
intervenors, as witnesses or as amici curiae. Their participation
may be either voluntary or coerced. 1 7  Whatever the basis from
which governmental enforcers participate, they have potentially
useful information to present to the court regarding the compli-
ance history of the facility in question. They know how and why
the violations occurred, their impact on other uses of the water-
way, the efforts of the defendant to achieve compliance, the ra-
tionale for the various enforcement actions that the agency has
taken, and the practicality of the various remedial alternatives the
court may be considering. Even if this sort of information would
not justify barring the citizen suit, it seems highly relevant to one
of the most difficult aspects of citizen suits- the imposition of
penalties.
The EPA and the delegated state agencies have generally not
F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v. C.G. Mfg., No. 84-1784, slip op. (D. Mass. Apr.
12, 1985); United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, No. 85-0489, slip op. (D. Mass.
Sept. 5, 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Anchor Thread Co., 22 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D.N.J. 1984); supra note 165. The primary jurisdiction doctrine,
which would require the court to defer to pending proceedings, has also been used by
defendants, and occasionally this argument has prevailed. Compare Montgomery Envtl. Co-
alition v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 607 F.2d 378 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (primary
jurisdiction doctrine bars injunction against polluting authorities while permit renewal is
pending) with Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479
(D.N.J. 1985) and Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D.
Conn. 1985) (primary jurisdiction argument rejected). A related argument was made in
Maryland Waste Coalition v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Md. 1985), where the
defendant argued that the federal court should defer to a pending state court proceeding
under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
This argument was rejected because the defendant had failed to show beyond "any sub-
stantial doubt" that the state proceeding would provide a complete and prompt resolution
of the issues.
176. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp.
1479, 1484 (D.N.J. 1985) (the EPA and a state agency not indispensable parties); Nunam
Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska, 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984) (the EPA not an indispensable
party to private enforcement action); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 831
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (state environmental agency not an indispensable party because plaintiff
had no cause of action against it).
In 1984, the Chemical Manufacturers' Association wrote a letter to the EPA, requesting
the agency to make available for testimony in Clean Water Act citizen suits the personnel
who had participated in drafting the permits, so that industry could show that there had
been informal understandings that some types of violations would not be penalized. Letter
from David F. Zoll, Vice President and General Counsel, Chemical Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, to Jack Ravan, Assistant Administrator for Water, USEPA (June 18, 1984).
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taken a very active part in private enforcement litigation, and the
courts usually have not compelled them to do so. There are sev-
eral reasons for agency reluctance to intervene, the most pressing
being the lack of resources which keeps agencies from initiating
their own actions against violators in the first place.1" Diverting
agency engineers, scientists and lawyers to private enforcement
actions takes them away from working on the cases that the
agency considers higher priority. The agency may also lose some
control in such cases, as its officials are put in the position of en-
dorsing remedies that they had little responsibility for devising.
This risks not only bad precedents, but also political attacks for
accepting inadequate settlements or decrees.
If it is impracticable for enforcement agencies to participate
routinely in citizen suits, then the primary avenue for communi-
cating enforcement policy and compliance history to courts and
litigants is some form of codification. Since codification generally
grows out of the agencies' own management needs and practices,
it is necessary to review briefly some of the ways in which the EPA
attempts to manage enforcement.
C. EPA's Managerial Initiatives for Coordination
In considering the relationship between public and private
enforcement of environmental laws, it is important to recognize
that the EPA would have a difficult problem of coordination even
if the citizen suit provisions had never been enacted. The struc-
ture of the statutes it administers, and the organizational setting
in which the agency operates, make it difficult for the EPA to
achieve consistency in its enforcement activities. The Clean Water
and Clean Air Acts, like most of the federal environmental stat-
utes, incorporate a system of "cooperative federalism" under
which the EPA and the states share the responsibility for achiev-
ing compliance with regulatory requirements.178 While they share
177. The resource problem is particularly difficult in the current wave of citizen suits
since the bulk of private enforcement litigation is concentrated in a few heavily industrial-
ized parts of the country. Thus, the burden of responding to citizen suits would fall dispro-
portionately on three or four of the EPA's regional offices.
178. The enforcement structure of the Clean Water Act is described as follows in
United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 740 (D. Del. 1981):
The enforcement provision of the Act sets up a . . . system, giving pri-
mary responsibility to the state with an approved NPDES [discharge permit]
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the same general goals as the EPA, the state programs may have
different types of personnel, different philosophies of enforce-
ment and different political pressures. 1' Thus, even though the
EPA may possess the formal legal power both to override particu-
lar enforcement decisions and to revoke the delegations of state
enforcement authority, the practical need to keep the states func-
tioning as effective enforcement partners can force the EPA to
tolerate some departures from federal enforcement policy. 180
Apart from this need to accommodate state enforcement
agencies, the EPA has a difficult time setting and communicating
its own enforcement policy. The agency has become a large and
complex bureaucracy. Within EPA headquarters, program offices
like Air and Water sometimes have different ideas about proper
enforcement policy from the Office of Enforcement and Compli-
ance Monitoring or the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation.
The agency's ten regional offices, staffed by officials who deal with
system but reposing significant authority in EPA.. . to step in itself in appro-
priate situations.. . .[A]s an initial matter, a state must have enforcement au-
thority commensurate with that given EPA by the Act before a state NPDES
program may be approved. Thus, enforcement by the states in the first instance
is expected. Likewise, whenever the Administrator finds that any person is in
violation of a condition or limitation contained in a NPDES permit, he is first
required to notify the violator and the state, thus providing an opportunity for
either voluntary compliance or state enforcement in the first instance ...
However, if "beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's notification the
State has not commenced appropriate enforcement action" . . . , the Adminis-
trator is required to assume enforcement responsibility himself and either issue
a compliance order or bring suit in a United States District Court. . . . [T]he
Administrator may bring a suit himself in federal court even though the state
has already filed an enforcement action in state court if the Administrator be-
lieves that the state is not prosecuting that action "expeditiously and
vigorously."
(Emphasis in original). The court also observed, "the tensions inherent in a federal system
are recreated, if not exacerbated by the Act, which ofttimes fails to create clear boundaries
for the respective authorities of the federal government, the states, and the people." Id. at
736.
179. For a description of differing state enforcement styles within a single region of
one state, see Goldstein & Ford, The Management of Air Quality: Legal Structures and Official
Behavior, 21 BUFFALO L. Rv. 1 (1972).
180. In recent years, as state responsibility for enforcement of federal environmental
standards has increased, federal grant support to run state programs has diminished. In
these circumstances, there is concern that some states may become more willing to have
their delegations of enforcement authority revoked, and let the EPA take over that respon-
sibility. See generally Stanfield, Ruckelshaus Casts EPA as 'Gorilla' in States' Enforcement Closet,
NAT'L J., May 26, 1984, at 1034.
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different sets of actors and problems on a daily basis, may also
have a very different approach to enforcement from their Wash-
ington counterparts. Though they are formally subject to supervi-
sion and direction from headquarters, the regional offices have
traditionally enjoyed substantial autonomy.
In practice, these problems of coordination within and across
levels of government have several implications for the integration
of citizen suits into existing systems of enforcement. First, it is im-
portant to remember that coordination within government is far
from perfect, and that consistency is often more a goal than a re-
ality. Therefore, any observed difficulties that private enforcers
have in coordinating their activities should not be compared with
hypothetically perfect government coordination. In practice, the
private enforcers, when compared to their government counter-
parts, have some advantages and disadvantages in developing co-
herent policy. A second implication is that the presence of private
enforcers gives the EPA's management efforts to achieve internal
consistency a more pubic dimension than they would otherwise
have. Parties engaged in private enforcement litigation have a
powerful incentive to uncover all the relevant facts about agency
enforcement policy and, wherever applicable, to use the agency's
policy in support of their own positions. In this respect, citizen
suits are an additional pressure for the agency to engage in dia-
logue with its constituencies over enforcement policy and to cod-
ify clearly established enforcement practices. Finally, the EPA's
experience in trying to provide enforcement guidance and to
monitor performance indicates that the broad concept of "en-
forcement policy" needs to be broken down into its constituent
parts. When examined closely, regulatory enforcement policy is
comprised of many decisions and practices. The practicability and
desirability of codifying these practices into policy seem likely to
differ sharply from one area to another.
Some of the difficulties of codifying enforcement policy are
perhaps best illustrated by examining one concerted effort that
the EPA has made to achieve consistency in enforcement: the con-
cept of "significant noncompliance" under the Clean Water Act.
By the mid-1970's, when the EPA had completed the initial
task of issuing discharge permits as required by the 1972 amend-
ments, the agency began to turn its attention to the task of achiev-
ing compliance with those permits. As one internal document put
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it: "With this shift in emphasis has come the increased awareness
that the program will be effective only to the extent that EPA and
the States are able to identify instances of non-compliance and
take appropriate and timely actions with uniformity and consis-
tency." 18' Several management tools were used to achieve this
goal. The Enforcement Management System Guide set forth general
principles that the EPA regional offices and delegated states
should follow in order to set priorities and achieve consistent, ef-
fective abatement of violations.18 2 The guide incorporated techni-
cal review criteria that instructed clerical personnel when to refer
dischargers' monitoring reports to professional staff for enforce-
ment action.183 The guide also contained an enforcement re-
sponse guide which suggested appropriate actions to resolve dif-
ferent types of violations. Minor reporting deficiencies, if they
were "isolated or infrequent," might be handled through a warn-
ing letter. If such deficiencies continued, however, an administra-
tive order would be sought.8 4 At about the same time, the EPA
began developing a computerized permit compliance system that
would receive and generate reports on noncomplying dischargers.
Throughout these efforts to regularize and formalize its man-
agement of the enforcement process, the EPA was careful to em-
phasize that its objective was to utilize limited resources effectively
and rationalize management, and not to set substantive policy that
would define some violations as serious and others as trivial. 85 At
the next stage of management initiative, however, the line became
181. USEPA Office of Water Enforcement, Enforcement Management System Guide
(undated; App. 1 indicates issue date of 11-75) (available in NPDES Noncompliance and
Program Reporting, EPA Docket No. WH-2763-3, item 4 (1984)) [hereinafter cited as
EMS Guide].
182. EMS Guide, supra note 181.
183. EMS Guide, supra note 181, at appendix.
184. Id.
185. The introduction to the Technical Review Criteria noted:
The Technical Review Criteria serve as a screening device to assure that
limited professional resources concentrate on the most significant violations.
These criteria are to be used by nonprofessional compliance analysts in the ini-
tial screening of Discharge Monitoring Reports and other reports on the quality
of NPDES dischargers. Screening based upon the Technical Review Criteria
does not establish which deviations from the effluent limitations are violations of
the permit or of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act-all such deviations,
unless specifically authorized elsewhere in the permit, are violations. Nor do the
criteria excuse relatively minor violations.
Id. (Emphasis in original).
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blurred, and the agency lost some credibility as a result.
In the early 1980's, the EPA began to develop the concept of
"significant noncompliance" as a tool for setting priorities and
measuring the performance of field-level management. Concep-
tually, it was a logical outgrowth of the technical review criteria,
the enforcement response guide, and the reporting requirements
that fed into the permit compliance system computers. The idea
was to set quantitative thresholds for distinguishing serious from
less serious violations. Thus, a discharger who exceeded a permit
parameter by more than x percent, or who violated a limit more
than y times in any calendar quarter, would be flagged for special
attention on the quarterly noncompliance reports.
Although it made some sense as a management tool, signifi-,
cant noncompliance encountered a number of problems. The
phrase itself was probably an unhappy choice. It implied that vio-
lations below the action thresholds were "insignificant" and there-
fore presumably not worthy of enforcement response. Even some
of the agency staff people, who were familiar with the rationale
for significant noncompliance, had doubts that the numerical
thresholds were meaningful. Their skepticism was not decreased
by the fact that this re-definition of noncompliance seemed to in-
crease statistical measures of industry compliance without altering
polluter behavior.1 88 Further suspicions were aroused because the
significant noncompliance standard was put into use during the
stormy tenure of Anne Gorsuch Burford as EPA Administrator.
This period was marked by the public complaints of both environ-
mental groups and some of the agency's own staff that the EPA
had become soft on polluters. Finally, the EPA's Inspector Gen-
eral fed the suspicion of significant noncompliance by formally
reprimanding the agency for failing to publish the standard in the
186. For example, one person interviewed in this study who was an EPA staff member
at the time significant noncompliance was used as a performance measure remarked:
[There was] this silly-ass policy that says you have to be a certain percentage
over your permit limit before we consider you in violation. That doesn't mean
you're in compliance, it just means you haven't gotten over an administrative
hurdle.. . . It's long and complicated and it has to do with how many months
out of another certain number of months-there's a forty percent figure and a
twenty percent figure and a zero percent figure for certain months. By the time
you get through it, you don't know what the hell you've got. All I know is that





After this inauspicious beginning, the EPA published a pro-
posed rule on quarterly noncompliance reporting that incorpo-
rated a modified version of the significant noncompliance stan-
dard, but carefully omitted any mention of that term. 8 This
time, the notice explicitly pointed out that "the proposal effects
[sic] only reporting requirements. The proposal has no impact
upon what is considered a violation, or on whether or what kind
of enforcement action will be taken in a given case."18 9 As several
commenters pointed out,190 however, this statement was not quite
true, due to the presence of citizen enforcers. The groups bring-
ing private enforcement actions have used the quarterly noncom-
pliance reports to flag the most serious violators for closer scru-
tiny. Consequently, the EPA's reporting requirements greatly
affect the chances that a noncomplying firm may find itself the
target of a private enforcement action.
Even before the reporting rule became final in August
1985,191 the EPA had adopted its definition as part of a more de-
tailed policy guidance to delegated states and regional offices. In
June 1984, the EPA issued its Policy Framework for State/Federal
Enforcement Agreements, which included as one of its primary crite-
ria a requirement for "timely and appropriate enforcement re-
sponse" to violations.192 The policy statement noted resource
problems both within the EPA and the states, but directed that
"at a minimum, the focus should be on the greatest problems, i.e.,
the significant non-compliers." ' 9 3 The Assistant Administrator for
187. See, e.g., Inspector General Finds Water Policy Officially Sanctions Noncompliance, In-
side EPA, March 16, 1984 at 3:
The [EPA Inspector General's] report ... reveals that EPA's water enforce-
ment personnel have been abiding by an unofficial policy of reporting only "sig-
nificant noncompliance," a policy initiated by former water chief Eric Eidsness
in February 1982 but which has never been translated into formal regulations.
... [Tihe IG report nevertheless asserts that using the unofficial definition of
"significant noncompliance" violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
188. 49 Fed. Reg. 29,720 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)).
189. Id. at 29,722.
190. See 50 Fed. Reg. 34,648, 34,649 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 123.45).
191. 50 Fed. Reg. 34,648 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 123.45).
192. USEPA, Policy Framework for State/EPA Enforcement "Agreements" 11-12
(undated; transmitted with cover memorandum from Alvin L. Aim, Deputy Administrator,
USEPA, to Assistant Administrators, Regional Administrators, etc.) (June 26, 1984) (availa-
ble in the Charles B. Sears Law Library, State University of New York at Buffalo).
193. Id. at 13.
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Water followed up with a directive making clear that "any non-
compliance required to be reported in the [quarterly noncompli-
ance report] . . .is considered 'significant noncompliance'. .. 194
and should receive highest priority." 5 By a rather circuitous
route, then, the EPA's significant noncompliance regulations had
become a key component not only of the agency's attempts to
manage its own staff and oversee the delegated states, but also of
the attempts by both public and private enforcers to establish liti-
gation priorities. Given the relatively modest levels of resources
currently available to enforcement agencies and to the groups
bringing citizen suits, it seems likely that most low-priority viola-
tors will entirely escape sanction.1 96
Over time, the approach to codification of enforcement policy
used for the significant noncompliance rule may become more
common. There are a number of incentives pushing the EPA and
other federal agencies in that direction. Internally, large-scale reg-
ulatory programs like the Clean Water Act must have some for-
mal standards and performance measures. These programs en-
compass thousands or even hundreds of thousands of individual
sources throughout the country, and they rely on decentralized
systems of regional offices and state agencies to take initial en-
forcement action. Norms and expectations must be communicated
to field-level enforcers, and measures of productivity must flow
back to headquarters so that performance can be monitored. This
arrangement is likely to work best when enforcement policies and
priorities are clearly and explicitly stated. Hence, the demands of
good management can exert a powerful pull toward rationaliza-
tion of enforcement policy.
In recent years, this trend has been strengthened by the
194. USEPA, National Guidance for Oversight of NPDES Programs FY 1985, at 3 n.1
(undated; transmitted with cover memorandum from Jack E. Ravan, Assistant Administra-
tor for Water, USEPA, to Regional Administrators) (July 6, 1984) (available in the Charles
B. Sears Law Library, State University of New York at Buffalo).
195. Id. at 3 (noting that "rapid response to instances of significant noncompliance,
especially by major dischargers" shares top priority with updating and renewing expired
permits).
196. Unless a violator exceeds the significant noncompliance thresholds, neither gov-
ernmental nor private enforcers would be very likely to bring a court action. However, this
is not to say that "nonsignificant" violations by a significant noncomplier would not be
included in a complaint, once a decision was made to bring a penalty action. The general
practice among both public and private enforcers seems to be to plead all available viola-
tions in court papers, and bargain down from there.
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politicizing of enforcement at the EPA and other agencies. Basic
conflicts over the preferred strategies for enforcing environmen-
tal laws have made enforcement issues highly visible and poten-
tially damaging to the agency. Today, enforcement officials can
expect to have congressional committees, the General Accounting
Office, and a variety of media representatives and constituency
groups routinely monitoring their enforcement activities. One
way to survive this close scrutiny is to have a defensible set of en-
forcement standards and priorities, which may be used to justify
particular actions-or inactions.
Since agency rules or policy statements are likely to gain
more judicial deference than ad hoc justifications for particular
decisions, the courts also exert some pressure for codification of
enforcement policy. With the spreading of citizen suits, judicial
reaction has become a more prominent factor because the agency
does not control the litigation where its policy comes into question
and, indeed, where it may not even be a participant. As a result,
ambiguities or omissions in agency enforcement policy may be re-
solved by courts and litigants who have no real understanding of
what their particular interpretation may do to the agency's pro-
gram. Here, also, the agency's advance codification may help to
protect agency autonomy by forestalling destructive or unin-
formed judicial decisions.
A related advantage is that codification of enforcement policy
can guide the activities of private enforcers and help coordinate
them with the government's efforts. To be sure, private enforcers
may not be legally bound by government enforcement policies. 91
In practice, however, the major groups bringing the actions have
generally followed the EPA's enforcement guidelines. The signifi-
cant noncompliers identified on the EPA's quarterly noncompli-
197. The EPA, in its preamble to the final noncompliance reporting regulations, Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations: Noncompliance and Program
Reporting, supra note 191, at 34,649, recites that "this regulation in no way codifies en-
forcement policy. That policy remains under EPA discretion ...." The Justice Depart-
ment's Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resources, commenting on a
draft Administrative Conference recommendation encouraging the EPA to provide more
public access to enforcement policy, remarked: "I do not believe that the public, which
includes members of the regulated community, should have an active role in setting en-
forcement policies. Second, members of the public may not necessarily be authorized to
rely on many policies, such as policies relating to [calculation] . . . of penalties, in private
enforcement actions .... " Letter from F. Henry Habicht II to Loren A. Smith, Chair-
man, Administrative Conference of the United States, at 1-2 (April 26, 1985).
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ance reports have been the primary targets of private enforce-
ment, and plaintiffs have generally purported to apply the EPA's
penalty policy when calculating proposed fines (though admittedly
with very different results). The more detailed and accessible
agency policy articulations become, the more likely it is that pri-
vate enforcement activity will remain consistent with public en-
forcement activity.
The need for consistency may become greater in the fuiture
because, to date, the private enforcement effort has been carried
out by a relatively small group of private attorneys who have es-
tablished a network of communication and cooperation. They also
have had the luxury of choosing a few of the most frequent or
most serious violators in most of the regions where they have
been operating.'91 If citizen suits become an established field of
litigation, however, and a larger and more diverse group of law-
yers begins to look at less egregious violations, the inconsistency
problems could become significant. The Administrative Confer-
ence took note of this possibility by recommending that the EPA
give high priority to articulating its enforcement policies in three
areas: selecting cases for enforcement, calculating penalties and
settling contested cases.1"
Whatever the impetus to codify, once enforcement policy has
been articulated, it will eventually become a matter of public rec-
ord. Since the policy will be subject to public scrutiny and criti-
cism when it is ultimately disclosed, there may be advantages to
getting public input before it is issued in final form. Public partici-
pation offers the advantages of uncovering technical problems in
proposed standards before they are implemented and, perhaps
more importantly, of improving the dialogue between the agency
and its constituency groups. The significant noncompliance
rulemaking probably contributed to a better understanding of
198. One representative of a plaintiff group described the selection of enforcement
targets as a consensus process:
[I]t didn't pay to be argumentative. [If] someone raised an objection, you just
dropped [the case], and took a different one. [W]e never really sat down and
came up with criteria for cases. . . . [T]here had to be a lot of violations, and
they had to be continuing to the present. [Those are] by and large the very
broad criteria we use.
Some plaintiff organizations have begun to codify selection criteria and provide guidance
for less experienced plaintiffs.
199. Recommendation 85-3, supra note 10.
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agency enforcement policy among regulated firms and environ-
mental groups. Furthermore, some technical changes in the draft
rule were made in response to public comments. The notice-and-
comment procedure does take longer to complete, and the rules
or policies that have gone through this process are more resistant
to change than those issued unilaterally. 200 At this point in the
history of environmental regulation, however, stability and consis-
tency are more important ingredients of sound enforcement pol-
icy than are flexibility and individualization. Pollution control
technologies generally require substantial time and money to put
into place, and they demand continuing effort to operate and
maintain. Sudden changes or inconsistencies in enforcement pol-
icy may undercut expectations among the regulated and thereby
undermine voluntary compliance.
The EPA has begun to codify major portions of its enforce-
ment policy, particularly in the areas of case selection, penalty as-
sessment and settlement criteria. There are substantial incentives
for the agency to continue this process. According to some of the
EPA's internal evaluations, codification seems to make a complex
system of shared enforcement responsibility function more
smoothly. 20 1 Nevertheless, it is important to note that broad areas
of discretion still remain. Individualized judgments still need to be
made regarding factors like the legal and factual strength of a
particular case, its potential significance as precedent, and the ex-
tent to which a violator deserves harsh punishment because of in-
200. One lawyer who has represented defendants in citizen suits commented on the
draft Administrative Conference recommendations:
Articulation of enforcement policy is generally a laudable goal. The policy it-
self, however, is one which, as a practical matter, will be in constant flux in
response to public interest and the political process. Therefore, while articula-
tion is useful and desirable, it can never be expected to constitute long-term
guidance on the subject.
This probably overstates the case, both historically and prospectively. As noted previously,
the EPA has attempted to codify enforcement policy in several areas, with some success. See
supra text accompanying notes 178-99. It is doubtful that this process has gone as far as it
can or should go. This is not to say that all areas of enforcement policy are amenable to
codification, or that policy codifications will ever achieve such stability as to "constitute
long-term guidance" in any absolute sense. But stability is a relative term, and it seems
desirable to try to achieve some moderation in the sharp swings of enforcement policy that
have characterized the EPA in recent years.
201. See, e.g. USEPA, Consolidated Evaluation of the Implementation of State/EPA
Enforcement Agreements (Dec. 1985) (available in the Charles B. Sears Law Library, State
University of New York at Buffalo).
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tent, past failures to comply and the like. Even where the agency
has codified its criteria, the application of established standards
may confer considerable discretion on field-level officials. Finally,
the EPA has important discretion to exercise at the level of fram-
ing definitions of compliance and establishing reporting require-
ments to capture evidence of violations. As described in the fol-
lowing Section, this discretion gives the EPA a large measure of
effective control over the role that private enforcers can play in a
particular regulatory program.
D. Information as a Means of Controlling Enforcement Policy
Litigation is fundamentally a process of gathering, present-
ing and evaluating information. Easy access to accurate informa-
tion is a prerequisite to bringing successful citizen suits. One of
the primary reasons that most of the private enforcement activity
has centered on the Clean Water Act is the system of monitoring,
self-reporting and data processing developed under that statute.
The statute creates a self-monitoring system by requiring
each discharger to obtain a permit and by providing sanctions for
failure to submit periodic compliance reports.0 2 While monitor-
ing for toxic pollutants may be difficult, the "conventional pollu-
tant" parameters, such as biological oxygen demand or pH, can
be monitored routinely and inexpensively. This allows the permit-
ting agency to reasonably require dischargers to report monthly
or weekly average discharges of these pollutants, in addition to
reporting maximum daily discharges. The agency's computerized
permit compliance system collects information from the permit-
tees' periodic discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) and compares
it to their permit limits. This makes it possible to generate the
quarterly noncompliance reports (QNCRs) identifying significant
violators. As previously noted, these QNCRs are widely used both
for internal program evaluation by the EPA and for case selection
by many of the citizen suit plaintiffs.
For most of the plaintiff organizations, scanning the QNCRs
to identify persistent permit violators is only the first step in case
202. 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982), gives the Administrator of the EPA broad authority to
require that regulated entities keep records and file reports. It also provides that these
records will generally be available to the public. Recordkeeping violations can result in
administrative orders, civil penalties, or criminal sanctions under 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982).
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screening. To develop a full understanding of the violations, and
to document them for possible courtroom use, it is necessary to
get into the detailed paper records. This usually means spending
an extended period of time in the state agency or the EPA re-
gional office tracking down and working with the appropriate
files. This is commonly regarded as grubby, tedious work-a far
cry from the fancy computer systems at EPA headquarters in
Washington. As one plaintiff's lawyer stated:
[Y]ou have to go look at the permit file; there may be a separate ad-
ministrative compliance file; there could be a separate enforcement file.
There's sometimes four and five files in five or six different buildings, and
people are hanging on to them, and have them on their desks for a variety
of reasons, or they don't want to show [them to] you because they think it's
confidential, even though it's not. And it's a hassle.. . . It eats your time,
you're really spinning your wheels, and usually you're under the gun to who-
ever is paying the toll for this to produce results as quickly as possible.
Plaintiff groups and their counsel have developed a variety of
methods for completing this initial investigative phase. Methods
range from having lawyers do most of the work to training rela-
tively inexpensive personnel such as college students to do the de-
tailed file reading under expert supervision. However it is accom-
plished, file review is still likely to be a slow and rather expensive
process; $15,000 would probably be a very conservative estimate
of the minimum cost of mounting a modest file review campaign
in a large state.
In some of the delegated states, where the primary files are
kept by state agencies rather than the EPA, record keeping prac-
tices can be rather slipshod. 0 3 One plaintiffs' lawyer noted the
"huge gaps" that had been found in the records of one delegated
state: "There will be months, periods of time, where you won't
know whether there is a violation or not." Another recounted the
misfortune of trying to review the permit files in a different state
when the agency was in the process of reorganizing its record-
keeping system:
[T]he attempt was to decentralize decision making in the agency back to the
field offices. And part of the decentralization was putting the files on trucks
and sending them out to the eight or nine regional offices, and we have had
203. If the gap in the record is a result of the discharger's failure to file a required
report, this failure may be charged as a separate offense in a citizen suit. See Sierra Club v.
Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985).
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it happen just in the last two months three or four times where you literally
can't find a file. [Headquarters] claims it has been shipped off to [a regional]
office; [the region] claims they never got it, or they haven't opened that box
yet.. . . So what we did after our QNCR review and our first cut was, I had
a summer legal intern . . . [go] to the regional offices and to [headquarters]
to review files in both places.
Sloppy agency record keeping can increase the cost of researching
a citizen suit and perhaps also cause the plaintiff organizations to
bring some bad cases.
Because data systems play such a key role in preparing pen-
alty cases, the EPA still retains a substantial measure of practical
control over private enforcement through its regulations on moni-
toring, record keeping, and reporting, as well as through its qual-
ity control over record keeping.204 At one extreme, the agency
could, by its inaction or tacit approval of sloppiness, let the record
keeping systems degenerate to the point where plaintiffs would be
unable to identify violators or generate prima facie cases from of-
ficial records. This is reportedly the situation in some of the
newer programs, such as that under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA),0 5 where record keeping systems are
under development and have not yet reached the level of sophisti-
cation and reliability achieved in the Water program.'0 As a re-
sult, groups contemplating citizen suits against noncomplying
toxic dumpsites face formidable practical and technical obstacles,
and few private enforcement cases have been brought under
RCRA.
204. There is some indication in the legislative history of the Clean Water Act that
Congress intended this discretion to be exercised in support of citizen enforcers. For exam-
ple, the Senate Report on the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
notes: "The information and other disclosure obligations required throughout the bill are
important to the operation of this [citizen suit] provision. The Administrator would have a
special duty to make meaningful information on discharging sources available to the public
on a timely basis." S. REIP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3746.
205. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, §§ 6901-6987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1984 & 1986 Supp.).
206. For example, in a recent self-evaluation of the agency's Hazardous Waste Data
Management System, an EPA study team observed:
The RCRA enforcement data management system has many problems. These
include confusion over data element definition and coding conventions and
problems within Regions with data entry. In addition, few states use the system
and, therefore, have little stake in data quality.
USEPA, supra note 201, at 48.
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At the other extreme, the EPA could mount a major effort to
upgrade monitoring, reporting and record keeping systems in all
of the media programs that have citizen suit provisions. This
would greatly facilitate private enforcement. According to Profes-
sor John Coffee, something similar to this has happened in the
field of securities law enforcement, where the SEC is willing to
accept very low, or "painless" settlements in its consent decrees
because entry of the decree operates as a "signal to the plaintiff's
bar that an attractive [class action damages] case is available.
20 7
More generally, Professor Coffee argues that "it often may be
more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection (an
area where they have the comparative advantage because of their
superior investigative resources) and leave the actual litigation of
the case to private enforcers, who are frequently more exper-
ienced in litigation tactics." 208
The EPA's handling of information systems has fallen some-
where between these two extremes. The agency has generally
made most of the relevant information in its files readily available
upon request. It has also attempted to upgrade its own informa-
tion systems. Nevertheless, most of the emphasis seems to be on
building improved management tools to oversee and measure ag-
gregate performance, rather than on designing systems to facili-
tate the selection and proof of individual cases. If the EPA is seri-
ous about cooperating with citizen group plaintiffs, it could make
major gains in private enforcement by upgrading monitoring and
reporting systems in programs like RCRA.2 °9 It might also make
some modest improvements in Clean Water Act enforcement
through further refinement of information systems, particularly in
the area of quality control over state recordkeeping. One appar-
ent obstacle to this refinement is the Office of Management and
Budget's (OMB) reputedly stringent review of reporting require-
ments under the Paperwork Reduction Act. In undertaking such
reviews, the OMB should at least be alert to the possibility that
better reporting may make it possible to achieve a given level of
207. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 225 n.21 (1983).
208. Id. at 224-25.
209. For a general discussion of the technical and resource limitations on environmen-
tal monitoring, see Stanfield, No One Knows for Sure if Pollution Control Programs are Really
Working, NAT'L J., Mar. 23, 1985, at 643.
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enforcement at significantly lower cost to the federal treasury, if
private enforcers are able to take over part of the workload.21 0
Beyond case selection and development of evidence, citizen
suit plaintiffs rely on agency records to assure that there will not
be a protracted factual trial about whether violations actually oc-
curred. Ideally, the plaintiffs hope to win summary judgment on
issues of liability and proceed quickly to issues of penalty and
other remedies. A number of cases have thus far unfolded in this
fashion. Defendants, however, have begun trying to open up the
question of whether the monitoring data in the DMRs are accu-
rate. This is tactically rather awkward, because it requires defend-
ants to attack the reliability of their own test data (which are sub-
mitted to the agency in the normal course of business subject to a
corporate officer's certificate of accuracy). 211 A defense lawyer ex-
plained the basis for this line of attack as follows:
One situation is this: you have a company which just plain screwed up-they
tested the wrong thing, they used the wrong methodology, whatever ...
[T]hose reports, true as they were at the time they put them in, reflect noth-
ing ... ; they're just mistaken. . . . The other situation is this: You have
accuracy levels for various analytical techniques. For example, you have
"one" . . . as your limit in your permit. And the analytical test you must
employ-and that's specified in your permit, you don't have any choice
about this, . . . you must employ this particular analytical method using a
particular type of instrument-says that the accuracy for testing that param-
eter at the level is plus or minus point two. If you get a reading of one, or if
one is your limit, there is still an argument, I believe, that anything that falls
210. The Administrative Conference recommended that the EPA and the Office of
Management and Budget take into account the potential relevance of private enforcement
when deciding upon data collection proposals. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,366 (1985) (to be codified
at 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-3).
211. Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.22(d) (1985), a corporate officer submitting a DMR is
required to sign the following statement:
I certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments were pre-
pared under the direction or supervision in accordance with a system designed
to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and evaluate the information
submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person or persons who manage the sys-
tem, or those persons directly responsible for gathering the information, the
information submitted is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true, accu-
rate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submit-
ting false information, including the possibility of fine and imprisonment for
knowing violation.
The regulations were recently liberalized to permit a larger number of corporate officers
to be the designated signatories of DMRs. See 49 Fed. Reg. 38,035-36 (1984) (codified at
40 C.F.R. § 122.22(b)(2) (1985)).
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between point eight and one point two, because of the accuracy of the un-
derlying equipment, is still equivalent to one.
So far the courts have not accepted this argument,212 but it seems
likely that defense lawyers will keep raising it.
This seemingly arcane technical question of monitoring accu-
racy has significant practical implications for the use of citizen
suits-at least for groups employing private lawyers to bring
them. One of the most attractive features of Clean Water Act
suits has been the high likelihood-indeed, the virtual cer-
tainty-of winning on the merits if the courts treat the DMRs as
admissions by the defendants. As one experienced plaintiffs' law-
yer put it:
The minute you say that you can lose a very substantial amount of cases on
the merits after putting in very substantial resources, obviously the desire of
more private lawyers like myself to take those kinds of risks changes enor-
mously. . . . [I]f you win fifty percent of your cases, eighty dollars an hour is
not worth a damn.
If the defendants succeed in opening up the validity of the DMRs
to trial on the merits, this will most likely mean protracted hear-
ings with extensive testimony from statisticians, engineers and
other expensive experts. 13 Even with the prospect of fee and cost
recovery if plaintiffs ultimately prevail, it seems clear that the
greater the time and "front money" investment, the longer the
delay before recovering; and the increased risk will deter some
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers from bringing the actions. There
will also be comparable problems for the EPA and the state en-
forcement programs. Clearly, the data reliability issue is one that
the EPA needs to keep in sight as it drafts permits for previously
unregulated pollutants and develops monitoring and reporting re-
quirements for other media programs. As a separate enforcement
issue, the agency should also be alert to the possibility that the
private enforcers' growing use of DMRs is creating incentives for
noncomplying dischargers to overlook filing requirements and
even to "fudge" the data.
212. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F.
Supp. 1394 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott Inc.,
579 F. Supp. 1528, 1538.
213. See generally Kropp & Flannery, Guilty or Not Guilty-Only Your Statistician Knows
for Sure, ENrTL F., Apr. 1984, at 23.
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VI. REMEDIES AND INCENTIVES
Ultimately, the purpose of the citizen suit provisions is to
change behavior by changing incentives: the incentives of dis-
chargers to comply with their permits, the incentives of private
parties to bring actions against noncomplying dischargers and
nonenforcing agencies, and the incentives of agencies to enforce
the environmental laws more effectively. At least from the dis-
charger's point of view, the most potent incentive is the remedy
imposed by a court or agreed to in settlement talks. Remedies
have also proved to be the most serious sticking point in the pro-
gress of cases brought under the Clean Water Act and in the
evolution of workable ongoing relationships between plaintiff and
defendant organizations.
As noted above, the remediaJ provisions of the Clean Water
Act differ from those in most of the other statutes administered
by the EPA. Under the remedial provisions of the Clean Water
Act, private enforcers can seek money penalties as well as injunc-
tive relief from violators, while most citizen suit statutes allow
only injunctions in private enforcement suits. Additionally, the
agency lacks authority under the Clean Water Act to impose any
administrative sanctions on a party violating a permit or a statu-
tory duty. The statutory maximum penalty is $10,000 per day of
violation,214 and either the EPA or the citizen suit plaintiff
can-and sometimes does-ask the courts to impose penalties
based upon the theoretical maximum calculation of number of
days in violation times $10,000. There are very few legal con-
straints on penalty calculations. One of the few cases discussing
Clean Water Act penalty assessments, United States v. Detrex Chemi-
cal Industries,'" held that a discharger could not be fined more
than $10,000 for any given day, regardless of the number of per-
mit limitations violated during that day. However, major permit
violations involve chronic problems rather than one-shot failures.
Courts have generally interpreted statutes of limitations as giving
private enforcers the right to include violations occurring within
214. 33 U.S.C. § 1320(d) (1982).
215. 393 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Ohio 1975). This maximum daily penalty limit from the
Detrex Chemical decision was applied to a private enforcement action in Gwaltney of Smith-
field. See infra text accompanying note 232. Since the district court in Gwaltney of Smithfield
assessed a $1.3 million penalty, it is clear that the Detrex formulation will not serve to keep
penalties low in a major pollution case.
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the five-year limitations period allowed for government enforce-
ment.2 16 As a result, it is relatively easy for citizen suit plaintiffs to
total up maximum fines running well into the six or seven figure
range.
With few legal constraints, the dispute between dischargers
and private enforcers has centered on the EPA's administrative
practice in calculating civil penalties under the Clean Water Act.
The agency has promulgated some general guidelines for penalty
calculations, first in 1980 and then in revised form in 1984.217
Both the EPA and the leading citizen suit plaintiff organizations
purport to be applying this policy, but the figures they generate
from it are markedly different. The citizen groups' damage
figures reportedly run ten to one hundred times higher than the
amounts the EPA customarily receives in settled cases .21 As might
be expected, this discrepancy has generated considerable resent-
ment and opposition from citizen suit defendants. One defense
216. The Clean Water Act does not have a special statute of limitations applicable to
penalty actions. Dischargers generally argue that the federal courts should apply an analo-
gous state statute to citizen suits, which may have a limitations period as short as two years.
To date, the federal courts generally have not followed that approach. They have split
over the issue of what limitations provision to apply. District courts in Maryland and New
York have applied the five-year federal statute of limitations applicable to government civil
penalties, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982). Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel, 608 F.
Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985);
Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enter., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). The New Jersey
district court, on the other hand, has ruled that no statute of limitations applies, since
application of the federal statute would put private enforcers in an inferior position to
their government counterparts as a result of the 60-day waiting period. Student Pub. Inter-
est Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group v. American Cyanamid, No. 83-2068, slip op. (D.N.J. Nov.
6, 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474
(D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. National Starch & Chem., No. 84-
1119, slip op. (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Tenneco
Polymers, 602 F. Supp. 1394 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Anchor Thread Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D.N.J. 1984).
217. Environmental Protection Agency Civil Penalty Policy for Major Source Viola-
tors of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, ENV'T REP. (BNA) 41:1101 Uuly 8,
1980) [hereinafter cited as "1980 Penalty Policy"]; Environmental Protection Agency Civil
Penalty Policy of 1984, ENV'T REP'. (BNA) 41:2991 (Feb. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
"1984 Penalty Policy"].
218. When settlement negotiations fail and a case goes to court, however, the 1984
Penalty Policy, supra note 217, indicates that the agency "will request the statutory maxi-
mum penalty in the filed complaint. And, as proceedings warrant, the EPA will continue to
pursue a penalty no less than that supported by the applicable program policy." Id. at
2991.
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lawyer who had handled several private enforcement cases de-
scribed client reactions in the following terms:
[S]ometimes that number [of total penalties and accrued fees and costs]
is astronomical; and that alone ... says, "Why bother to talk? We can liti-
gate an awful lot for the kind of money those people want. And there's a
chance we might win." . . . [A]gencies have generally taken the position
"Let's get the problem taken care of. You've been naughty, but put the
technology in.. . . [A]nd we're going to get you [with a penalty] as well, just
to let you know we're serious." And they may go anywhere from five hun-
dred dollars to ten thousand; it's not likely to be anything in the range of
even five figures, [let alone] six figures. The focus of the agency is to clean
up the problem. And they'll even suspend part of the penalty to give you an
additional incentive to comply with a compliance schedule .... [T]o some
degree [the companies] have no problem with this philosophically. They re-
alize they've got to comply; at least the ones we've dealt with have not been
bad guys. They may have been screwed up, they may have been taken by a
vendor, they've got all sorts of problems, but they're not intentionally flout-
ing the environmental laws.. . . And this [penalty calculation by private en-
forcers], which is just a cash register approach, even though plaintiffs don't
intend to end up [in a final negotiated settlement] where they start out, ...
they start out so terribly, unrealistically high that the defendants just say,
"Why talk?"
While the spokespersons for plaintiff organizations would take
sharp issue with the "cash register" characterization and the im-
plication that their penalty demands are unreasonable, many
would agree that the discrepancy between the EPA's and the pri-
vate enforcers' penalty calculations is currently the primary deter-
rent to settlement. 219 To understand how such widely divergent
results are being produced from the same documents, it is neces-
sary to take a closer look at the EPA's penalty policy.
The 1984 penalty policy, like its predecessor, draws heavily
on the concept of "economic law enforcement" that became wide-
spread in the 1970's. This concept holds that penalties should be
219. For example, one plaintiffs' attorney made the following remarks in an interview:
For some [defendants] they are right, they have been done in by us-in a
sense. They say to themselves, "We go to the [agency] people that enforce this
law, we talk to them. We have a relationship, they say we're doing good. Then
all of a sudden you guys out of nowhere come in here and ask for $500,000
from us. What is this about? We operate in good faith. We've been trying, we
spend a lot of money." . . . So some of them-I'd say close to half-won't
settle if I said to them $5,000. They would say, "I don't care, that's outrageous,
you're holding us up and I'm not going to do it." But the other half, I think I
can get settlement on half quite easily with low numbers. And that I'm worried
about.
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calculated with a view toward depriving the violator of any finan-
cial gains s/he might have realized from noncompliance. 220 Thus,
the official penalty calculus begins with two primary factors: an
economic benefit component and a gravity component. These
components are to be calculated separately, added together and
then adjusted to reflect a variety of considerations relating to the
blameworthiness of the violator and the strength of the agency's
case.
The economic benefit component is to include the estimated
benefits to defendants from delayed costs (such as purchasing
treatment equipment), avoided costs (such as operating and main-
tenance expenditures that would have been incurred if the treat-
ment system had been installed at the proper time) and competi-
tive advantage.2 21  Even if this amount could be perfectly
calculated, however, a fine that simply removed economic benefits
would put the violator in the same position as if s/he had origi-
nally complied. To deter violations, additional sanctions must be
added; hence, the penalty policy adds a gravity component. This
component reflects such factors as the actual or potential harm to
the environment from the violation, the importance of the vio-
lated provision to the statutory scheme, the amount needed to
achieve an appropriate impact and other program-specific
factors.222
The sum of the economic benefit and the gravity compo-
nents, called the "preliminary deterrence amount," is then ad-
justed to account for other factors such as the discharger's
willfullness or negligence, its degree of cooperation or recalci-
trance with enforcers, its ability to pay, its history of noncompli-
ance, and the strength of the agency's case.223 To promote settle-
ment, the EPA is willing to reduce the gravity component if the
220. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
221. 1984 Penalty Policy, supra note 217, at 2996-98.
222. Id. at 2999.
223. Id. at 2999-3002. The policy generally provides that such adjustments are not to
exceed the amount of the gravity component, and further sets percentage limits for partic-
ular types of adjustments and levels of justification. E.g., id. at 3000, 3001. It seeks to limit
settlements for less than the economic benefit to cases where the benefit is an insignificant
amount, or is overridden by compelling concerns, or is unlikely to be obtained due to liti-
gation practicalities. Id. at 2998. If the gravity component reduces rather than increases
the preliminary deterrence amount, the violator must clearly demonstrate that it is entitled
to the reduction.
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violator promptly began corrective measures before litigation.224
The agency may also accept additional environmental cleanup in
lieu of a portion of the penalty.225 On the other hand, the EPA is
prepared to raise the gravity component if the defendant delays
compliance during settlement negotiations.
Application of the penalty policy is at least as much art as sci-
ence. Even the relatively precise terms of the calculus, such as eco-
nomic benefit, may be elusive. The capital cost of a treatment sys-
tem that should have been purchased five years ago may be
possible to reconstruct with some precision, but how much would
it have cost the company to operate and maintain that system? Are
there current, reliable data available on average operation and
maintenance costs in this industry and the amount of variance
across firms? Should one assume that this firm would have aver-
age, high, or low operation and maintenance costs? How would
the installation of the treatment system have affected production
and tax liabilities? What interest rate, if any, should be applied to
determine the net present value of the funds made available by
virtue of noncompliance? The EPA has developed "rule of
thumb" methods for estimating these values, and more guidance
is promised in the near future.226 For the current wave of citizen
suits that are already in litigation, however, there is ample room
for disagreement.227 A former agency staff attorney now involved
224. Id. at 3000.
225. Id. at 2993.
226. For example, the 1984 Penalty Policy states:
[E]xperience indicates that it is possible to estimate the benefit of delayed com-
pliance through the use of a simple formula. Specifically, the economic benefit
of delayed compliance may be estimated at: five percent per year of the delayed
one-time capital costs for the period from the date the violation began until the
date compliance was or is expected to be achieved. This will be referred to as
the "rule of thumb for delayed compliance" method. Each program may adopt
its own "rule of thumb" if appropriate.
Id. at 2996. Since the prime interest rate has been well over five percent for many years,
the question naturally arises why the five percent figure should be applied in place of mar-
ket interest rates. The penalty policy does not address this issue. It is possible that the five
percent is a net figure taking account of inflation, tax treatment, and so on. The EPA
guidance for penalty calculations under the Clean Air Act, 40 C.F.R. §66 (1984), provides
a detailed analysis of these kinds of issues, and the agency's 1984 Penalty Policy, supra note
217, promises more "program-specific" guidance in other areas like the Water program.
227. It should also be noted that much of the information concerning economic bene-
fit will be more readily available to defendants than to agencies or private plaintiffs. Since
defendants can be expected to come forward with this information only in situations when
it would lower the amount that the enforcer would otherwise demand, the long-term effect
927
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in citizen suits remarked:
It was very common for the case engineer to pre-decide how severe a pen-
alty he wanted to see in a particular case and then raise [or] lower the capital
and 0 & M costs to obtain the desired result, without having to debate the
gravity of the harm or other factors. I personally have seen penalty calcula-
tions be reduced by 50% or more in this manner.
The scope of discretion, and thus the chance for differences
of opinion, is much greater in other parts of the penalty calculus.
The gravity component of the preliminary deterrence amount,
for example, includes the risk of or actual harm resulting from
the violation. The penalty policy seeks to give content to that con-
cept by specifying some subsidiary factors that go into the harm
assessment, including the amount of pollutant the duration of vio-
lation, the toxicity of pollutant and the sensitivity of the environ-
ment where the discharge took place. 228 However, most of these
factors have very little, if any, precise content. The duration-of-
violation guidance, for example, simply says: "In most circum-
stances, the longer a violation continues uncorrected, the greater
is the risk of harm."22 9 A few citizen suit plaintiffs have filled
these gaps with more detailed guidance of their own.230
Through these discretionary gaps in the penalty policy, users
are able to inject their own enforcement philosophies. The citizen
suit plaintiffs, in accord with their predominant emphasis on the
importance of deterrence, generally interpret the penalty policy
to achieve that goal. The state agencies and the regulated firms
assume a much smaller role for deterrence in practice. The EPA
has shifted its official position on the role of deterrence, especially
during the Gorsuch-Burford Administration. Its current pro-
nouncements, like the 1984 penalty policy, give considerable em-
phasis to the importance of deterring violations. The EPA's actual
behavior in seeking and obtaining penalties, however, has fallen
may be to bias the benefit calculus downward.
228. 1984 Penalty Policy, supra note 217, at 2999.
229. Id.
230. One law firm handling several private enforcement cases has developed a penalty
calculation matrix to generate precise, consistent dollar measures of environmental harm.
In this matrix, violations of daily maximum pH or temperature parameters are assessed at
$10 per day, conventional pollutants like BOD and COD at $50 per day, and toxics or
heavy metals at $100 per day. Standard factors are used to increase these amounts if the
discharge is two, three, or more times the permit limit, and a parallel calculus is provided
when the relevant permit limit is based on average rather than daily maximum discharges.
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much closer to the behavior of state agencies than to the behavior
of citizen suit plaintiffs. To use the behavioral terms previously
mentioned, these agencies appear to be acting on the assumption
that most of the violators are either good citizens who need a bit
more time and persuasion to clean up their effluents, or that they
are organizationally incompetent firms that need the carrots of
advice and assistance rather than the sticks of civil penalties to get
into compliance. The plaintiffs, by contrast, tend to assume that
beneath every professed incompetent or good citizen lurks an
amoral calculator, its eyes firmly fixed on the bottom line. One
experienced environmental lawyer reflected this difference when
describing negotiations with noncomplying firms in some of the
recent citizen suits:
They say, "In 1979, we did this, in 1980 we did that, in 1981 we did
this." And I [say] to them, "Look, if you were losing money you wouldn't be
operating at this level. What you're doing, I know, you are kind of trying.
But failing doesn't hurt, [does] it? It didn't hurt a bit to fail."
From the plaintiffs' perspective, then, the primary objective of the
penalty policy should be to make pollution abatement failures
hurt enough to force widespread compliance.
With the limited data currently available, it is not possible to
make an indisputable empirical case for either of these views of
environmental compliance. Past efforts by the public-sector en-
forcers of the Clean Water Act seem to have left a substantial
amount of noncompliance uncorrected. It does not necessarily fol-
low, however, that a strict deterrence-oriented penal enforcement
strategy would have produced much better results. There are
strong theoretical and practical reasons why cooperative strategies
can be preferable to strict deterrence. 31 At the same time, total
231. For example, Professor John Scholz has developed sophisticated game theory
models of regulatory enforcement. He argues that the best approach is a "tit-for-tat" strat-
egy in which the agency cooperates with firms that demonstrate a willingness to comply
voluntarily, but comes down hard on firms that abuse the agency's trust. Scholz, Coopera-
tion, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 179 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Scholz I]; Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6
LAW & PoL'y 385 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Scholz II]. At the risk of oversimplifying
Professor Scholz's complex analysis, we note several assumptions which affect the applica-
bility of the game theory analysis to particular areas like Clean Water Act enforcement:
that the system of rules applicable to the area in question will be significantly over and
underinclusive, that it is possible for the actors to identify these aspects of the rules, that
the parties to the compliance transaction are locked into a long-term relationship and have
the capacity to make life miserable for one another, and that it is possible to make reliable
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reliance on voluntarism is an open invitation to procrastination,
manipulation and backsliding. A mixed enforcement strategy
combining elements of cooperation and coercion is needed. The'
trick is to know how much carrot and how much stick is likely to
work in a particular context. The appropriate proportion of these
components is likely to vary from one polluter to another and
from one regulatory area to another; this proportion may also
shift over time. Considerable additional research would be needed
to make confident judgments about the ideal mix of toughness
and reasonableness in enforcement of the Clean Water Act and
other statutes containing citizen suit provisions.
Apart from the ultimate efficacy of enforcement strategies,
the different interpretations of the penalty policy by the EPA and
the private enforcers have some unfortunate consequences. The
actual and perceived fairness of the enforcement system will suffer
if the size of the penalty imposed varies by an order of magnitude
depending on whether a private or public enforcer reaches the
courthouse first. Such a discrepancy also invites a variety of un-
seemly tactics, if not outright collusion, because enforcement
targets may see substantial advantages in being sued by a particu- °
lar enforcer. Violators may ask sympathetic agency personnel to
impose token money penalties or lenient consent orders upon
them in order to forestall private penalty actions. They could also
borrow a page from the environmental organizations' book and
try to find a friendly local plaintiff willing to bring a relatively
toothless private enforcement action. They could then argue that
subsequent actions relating to the same violations are barred by
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
There are two related ways in which this gap could be closed
and an authoritative interpretation of environmental penalty pol-
icy developed. As contested citizen suits are resolved in the courts,
the federal judiciary will inevitably have to give more detailed
content to the generalities of the EPA's penalty policy. If the first
reported decision to reach the penalty stage is any indication, de-
fendants may find themselves facing much stiffer penalties in pri-
vate actions than the EPA or the state agencies ever assessed for
comparable violations. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of
distinctions between good actors and bad actors. Most of these assumptions are debatable
in the EPA context.
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Smithfield, Ltd.,22 the district court applied the EPA's penalty pol-
icy to produce a $1.3 million penalty for longstanding violations
of a Clean Water Act permit. Less than five percent of this
amount represented the supposed economic benefit to the defend-
ant from delayed compliance. Most of the total reflected the
court's assessment of the environmental harm and the need for
deterrence. The Gwaltney of Smithfield decision is currently on ap-
peal, and it may ultimatley turn out to have been an aberration.
In the long run, however, one effect of private enforcement litiga-
tion may be to shift the penalty horizon sharply upward for both
public and private enforcers. As the total amounts and standards
for calculating penalties become more clearly established, more
settlements will probably be negotiated in private enforcement
cases.
Litigation is a relatively slow and uncertain way to refine the
penalty calculus. The easier route toward greater consistency in
penalty policy is the EPA's elaboration of its guidance for calculat-
ing penalties and settling cases. The process of better defining
penalty standards gained momentum under the Ruckelshaus Ad-
ministration and is apparently continuing under the agency's cur-
rent leadership. Following and refining the Clean Air Act's pen-
alty model, the current penalty policies for individual regulatory
programs like Air and Water will reportedly provide more de-
tailed information about how and why the various elements are to
be estimated, give more rules of thumb for generating ballpark
figures quickly and create new computer programs to perform the
whole operation automatically when the appropriate figures are
fed in. The agency has also announced plans to incorporate infor-
mation from all judicial enforcement actions into a computerized
data base. Settlement policy for government litigation is being
codified, especially in the hazardous waste field.2"' By rapidly de-
veloping these systems and making explanatory information easily
available, the EPA can go a long way toward improving the fair-
ness and consistency of penalties for violations of the environmen-
tal laws.
The appropriate amount of penalties for violations is not the
232. 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985).
233. See, e.g., Macbeth, Settling with the Government, 1 NAT. REsouncas & ENV'T 9
(1985); Mays, EPA's Superfund Settlement Policy, ENVI. F., Feb. 1985, at 6.
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only factor creating friction between plaintiffs and defendants in
the current wave of Clean Water Act citizen suits. There is also an
ongoing debate about where the money paid in penalties should
go. As the legislative history indicates, the drafters of the Clean
Water Act's citizen suit provision contemplated that any penalties
recovered after final decision in a private enforcement action
would go to the federal treasury.2 34 Apparently, there was little
thought before the current wave of suits about what would hap-
pen when a controversy was settled rather than decided by the
court. Such settlement agreements are usually incorporated into
judicial decrees to insure enforceability and to protect the parties.
However, courts traditionally give settling parties considerable lat-
itude to work out the precise terms of their agreements.
As several of the early private enforcement cases neared set-
tlement, the possibility of creating "environmental funds" sur-
faced.23 5 These funds would include sums of money equivalent to
agreed-upon penalties, but instead of being paid into the U.S.
Treasury, the money would be used to fund conservation-related
work in the area where the violations took place. This option
could have advantages for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
On the defense side, a local investment in the environment could
partially offset the negative publicity typically associated with a
penalty suit. It might also improve the general quality of life for
the firm's employees-the potential users of amenities (like boat
ramps or waterfront parks) purchased with environmental funds.
Moreover, payments might be tax deductible. 238 For the plaintiff
groups, the prospect of investing the money in environmental res-
234. The Senate Report states: "It should be noted that any penalties imposed would
be deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not be recovered by the complainant." S. REP.
No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1972 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3668,
3745.
235. It is not clear exactly where, or at whose instance, the possibility of creating the
funds first arose. Some of the early plaintiff groups, who had obtained foundation funding
to conduct investigative work for the initial private enforcement cases, had hoped to "re-
cycle" some cost recovery awards for use in future case investigations. This does not mean
that they necessarily suggested the funds to defendants as a way of financing further cases.
Some of the plaintiffs' representatives interviewed in this study recalled that in their cases
the suggestion had.originally come from the defense side.
236. The tax status of payments made in settlement of citizen suits seems debatable.
According to interviews, two law firms representing defendants reached opposite conclu-
sions as to whether the payments could be deducted from the firm's tax returns. Appar-
ently nobody has sought a ruling from the IRS on this question.
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toration or improvement is usually preferable to having it disap-
pear into the federal treasury, where it would almost surely be
diverted to different uses. These groups could also receive public
relations benefits from the funds by insisting upon recognition in
press releases, placards, and other acknowledgments.
It is difficult to discover what has been happening in practice
with the environmental funds since there is no centralized, au-
thoritative source of data about settlements in citizen suits. Repre-
sentatives from the regulated community have collected and made
available some information about the disposition of settlement
awards. Their tabulations indicate that settlements have been split
among the federal treasury, state environmental and natural re-
source agencies, plaintiff organizations, and various charitable,
educational, or public service entities that have some interest in
environmental issues.237 It is even less clear what environmental
benefits are being realized from the funds. There is no question,
however, that plaintiffs' acceptance of the funds has both in-
creased the hostility among the defense bar to citizen suits and
given some credibility to the assertion that the plaintiffs are mere
bounty hunters motivated by the prospect of lucrative cash
payoffs. 288 For this reason alone, the environmental funds may
eventually prove counterproductive.
The final, major incentive created by the citizen suit provi-
237. According to data collected by industry sources, during the period from January
1983 to May 1985, 29 controversies produced settlements containing lump-sum payment
provisions totalling just under one million dollars. Public-sector entities received slightly
less than half of this amount, with the U.S. Treasury receiving about 22% of the total
($218,900) and state or local agencies getting another 20% ($201,950). Of the $555,600
that went to private recipients, the largest share ($337,900) was given to the Open Space
Institute, a foundation with ties to several of the plaintiff organizations. Twenty-one of the
29 settlement agreements had special monitoring requirements, and many also had negoti-
ated penalty provisions for future permit violations.
238. E.g., Guida, Dramatic Growth in Citizen Suits Under the Federal Clean Water Act,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 3, 1984, at 24:
[E]nvironmental groups are negotiating settlements with dischargers on the
basis that the discharger make a "public interest" contribution to an environ-
mental organization other than the one threatening suit.
The organizations threatening suit do not accept contributions themselves,
apparently to avoid the appearance of blackmail. However, some people see
little difference between coercion benefiting a third party and coercion benefit-
ing the organization threatening suit.
In any case, a third-party contribution settlement serves as a useful fundrais-
ing effort for environmental causes in general.
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sion is the opportunity for plaintiffs to recover costs and attor-
neys' fees. This cost-recovery provision was included in the Clean
Water Act's citizen suit section because of the drafters' belief that
"in bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens would
be performing a public service. "239 In the terminology of contem-
porary economics, pollution abatement can be considered at least
partly a collective good. Therefore, normal litigation incen-
tives-including the "American rule" prohibiting fee recovery
from the losing party24 0 -will probably generate less private litiga-
tion to protect the resource than a social cost-benefit calculus
would find desirable.
While the theoretical case for fee awards is straightforward, it
is difficult to assess the practical operation of this cost-recovery
provision at the present time. In the current wave of enforcement
cases, very few have progressed far enough to produce a fee
award. On the positive side, there is no indication from the judi-
cial decisions that plaintiffs are bringing frivolous cases; their bat-
ting average thus far seems remarkably high. The real test of the
fee incentives, however, will come after a body of precedent ac-
cumulates which resolves the dischargers' primary defenses. As
discussed above, the risk of losing is a crucial element to the pri-
vate law firms that are bringing citizen suits. Delay between the
lawyer's investment and the ultimate fee recovery is also an im-
portant consideration; office and personal expenses continue to
accumulate, even if the cash flow from citizen suits does not. At
present, these downside risks seem to be limiting the number of
private firms willing to take on citizen suits and the number of
cases those. firms are able to handle. The technical nature of the
field is also a barrier to entry. Gaining a working mastery of a
complex regulatory program like the Clean Water Act, along with
239. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3747. This section of the report also states: "Concern was expressed that
some lawyers would use section 505 to bring frivolous and harassing actions. The commit-
tee has added a key element in providing that the courts may award costs of litigation...
to defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing." Id.
240. See generally Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983); Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). According to the Sierra Club case, there are
approximately 150 federal statutes that permit fee-shifting similar to the environmental
citizen suit provisions. Although that case involved a different kind of suit, it did make
clear that statutes like the Clean Water Act which permit fee awards in "appropriate" cases
do not authorize the courts to award fees to parties who are wholly unsuccessful.
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a related knowledge of monitoring and treatment technologies,
agency recordkeeping practices, and all of the other details that
go into successful representation in citizen suits, requires consider-
able time and effort.
If the plaintiffs continue to prevail over motions to dismiss
and defenses on the merits, both risk and delay should decrease
markedly and citizen suit cases should become correspondingly
more attractive.241 If this happens, the plaintiffs' success may have
a perverse effect: less expert lawyers and clients who are less con-
strained by an ideological commitment to protect the environ-
ment may be attracted to the field. Abuses may result. For the
present, however, it seems clear that a small cluster of active
plaintiffs' lawyers are making, at some risk, considerable personal
and organizational investments. Any problems with the system
seem more attributable to the citizen suit device itself than to the
incentives currently offered to plaintiffs and their lawyers.
VII. STANDING AND THE LEGITIMACY OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The question of incentives touches upon what is probably
the most fundamental issue in assessing the role of citizen suits:
whether private enforcement will ultimately come to be regarded
as a legitimate means of securing compliance with regulatory laws.
Regulatory compliance is not only a question of the power of legal
and monetary incentives, but also a matter of the acceptability of
the ways in which that power is exercised. The legitimacy issue
lies behind many of the claims and defenses asserted by the citizen
suit defendants as they seek to convince the courts that private
plaintiffs are intruding into a complex situation and upsetting the
241. Even if this happens, there may still be an incentive gap for one important cate-
gory of cases: the big, factually complex, and sharply contested case against a major pol-
luter who is willing to fight everything to the last breath. The difficulty is that everybody
has a disincentive to bring this kind of case. Agency personnel, who are probably under
pressure to make some kind of quota or "bean count" of case referrals, often tend to stay
away from the messy cases that will create a lot of work for them with no corresponding
personal benefits. Staff attorneys for environmental organizations typically have over-
crowded agendas, and will weigh the opportunity cost of such a case very carefully. They
may also be concerned about the organization's won-lost record, and be reluctant to take
on risky cases. Private attorneys have an incentive to gravitate to the low-risk, quick-turno-
ver cases that will generate a steady stream of fee income. Some plaintiffs' lawyers have
talked about a cooperative system in which participating firms take on a mix of easy and
hard cases; but it is not clear whether this goal can be realized.
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network of reasonable expectations, understandings and commit-
ments that have evolved to give practical content to broad legal
requirements. Doctrinally, the legitimacy question is most directly
raised by challenges to the plaintiffs' standing and the related
claim that private enforcement is an unwarranted delegation of
executive power.
A. Standing, Delegation and Separation of Powers
The legislative history of the Clean Water Act, the statute
under which most of the standing claims have been litigated, sug-
gests that the Congress intended to incorporate the liberalized law
of standing developed by the Supreme Court in the early 1970's.
The Conference Committee Report 242 indicates that the conferees
changed the definition of "citizens" who are entitled to bring suit
so that the statute would track the Supreme Court's then-recent
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton.243 The Act defined the citizen
plaintiff as "a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected. 244 This meant that injuries to recrea-
tional and aesthetic interests, in addition to direct economic inju-
ries, would be sufficient grounds for establishing standing.
245
Despite this clear indication that Congress wished to expand
private enforcers' standing to include nontraditional kinds of inju-
ries, there has been a considerable amount of litigation over
standing in the current wave of citizen suits. Part of the motiva-
tion for this focus on standing has been tactical, in the sense that
differing interpretations of the standing requirements impose dif-
ferent factual burdens on the parties bringing suit. If plaintiffs
have to produce affidavits from affected members, make those
members available for depositions, and brief and argue standing
on a motion to dismiss, the costs of getting to the merits of a case
242. S. CONt. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 146, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3776, 3823.
243. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
244. Clean Water Act § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982).
245. The latter inference is suggested by comparing the relatively precise Clean Water
Act standing language with section 304 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the only other citi-
zen suit provision in effect in 1972 when the Clean Water Act citizen suit was enacted.
Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982), simply provided that "any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf," thereby leaving the courts considerable lati-
tude to give some content to the constitutional and prudential requirements of standing.
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rise significantly.24 Several defense arguments could, if accepted,
impose this kind of factual burden on the plaintiffs. Defendants
generally try to push the standing requirement of injury-in-fact to
approximate the kind of showing of individualized harm and cau-
sation that is demanded in private damage actions such as nui-
sance. For example, if a waterway is being polluted by multiple
dischargers, defendants may assert that plaintiffs have not been
uniquely harmed by defendants' discharges. Granting the re-
quested relief will not then redress the plaintiffs' claimed injury.247
In addition, when the litigation is being managed and perhaps ini-
tiated by a national environmental organization, defendants may
invoke the standing doctrine in an attempt to show that the plain-
tiff organizations generate cases in the citizen suit campaign with-
out adequate membership control. One defendant argued that
"the concept of a representational suit is not so attenuated as to
permit a large organization and its private attorneys to comb the
nation in search of causes, commence lawsuits as they elect, and
then scramble to find some affiliated person to endorse the action
after-the-fact."248
Nevertheless, the courts usually have not required the plain-
tiff organizations to go beyond standardized allegations that their
members live or recreate near the affected waterway. 49 While the
246. Investing scarce lawyer time and out-of-pocket expense money in establishing the
organization's standing can be especially frustrating when plaintiff's law firm is depending
upon an eventual award of attorneys' fees to cover these expenses. One lawyer handling
several citizen suits remarked:
[W]e got a judge this morning who said they can depose all of the nine people
we submitted affidavits for. I think that's a horrible waste of time and resources
.... Theoretically you're entitled to it in the sense that you have a right to say
the guy who submitted the affidavit doesn't really swim in that river. . . . But
... think about it for a moment. Is it very likely that we have nine affidavits
from people who say that they canoe on the river, when they don't canoe on
the river? I mean, what are the chances of a lawyer breaking down a witness on
a fact like that? Lawyers have got it in their minds that you don't accept affida-
vits, . . . you take depositions. There's a style of litigation that says that's what
you're supposed to do.
247. E.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F. Supp.
1394, 1397 (D.N.J. 1985).
248. Sierra Club v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 585 F. Supp. 842, 852 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
249. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985);
Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474 (D.N.J. 1985);
Friends of the Earth v. Facet Ent., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Nunam Kitlutsisti v.
Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984); Student Pub. Interest Research
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courts have required that plaintiffs identify specific members who
claim to be injured by the defendants' discharges,2 50 affidavits
from only a few members of a large organization has been found
to be sufficient.25' The courts have also declined defendants' invi-
tations to push citizen suit standing in the direction of personal
injury suits. They have refused to demand a showing that a partic-
ular discharge from a defendant's plant prevented the plaintiffis
members from using the lake or stream on the ground that such a
restrictive interpretation would limit citizen suits to huge dis-
charges or small waterways, thereby violating the congressional in-
tent.252 Similarly, courts have held that total redressability of the
harm is not a prerequisite to standing; instead, it is sufficient if a
decision for the plaintiff would produce a public benefit.253 The
Group v. Anchor Thread Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D.N.J. 1984); Sierra Club v.
C.G. Mfg., No. 84-1784-Z, slip op. (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Con-
sol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
250. In several cases, the Sierra Club tried to establish what might be called a "zip
code theory" of standing. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola, No. 84-827-Civ-7-15, slip op.
(M.D. Fla., Oct. 10, 1984) (a private enforcement action against a citrus processing plant in
Florida in which the Sierra Club alleged that it "has 9,627 members in the State of Florida
and one member in United States Postal Service Zip Code 33823 in which the violations
complained of herein have occurred."). This type of standing claim has been uniformly
rejected, not only in the Coca-Cola case but also in others where the Sierra Club has tried
variations on the zip code theory. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862
(W.D.N.Y.), ajf'd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff claimed that 2,200 of its members
resided within a 70-mile radius of the plant, that one member lived in the town where the
plant was located and that it was burdensome for this one member to be subjected to inter-
rogatories and depositions). Id. at 864 n.3. The court rejected these generalized allega-
tions. Plaintiffs' standing may not be defeated if government enforcers "overfile" the citi-
zen group's lawsuit, or seek to enter it. United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, No.
85-0489-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 1985). In one unusual case, a corporation claiming
esthetic damage rather than economic injury was denied standing in the lawyers' fees stage
of a private enforcement action. Citizen's Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc.
v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
251. In a few instances, plaintiff organizations have sought protective orders or other-
wise attempted to prevent public disclosure of the identities of allegedly injured members.
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984) (first amendment associa-
tional privacy claim regarding members' identities waived); Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985) (protective order granted); Chesa-
peake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(injured members need not be identified).
252. E.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F. Supp.
1394 (D.N.J. 1985).
253. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. American Cyanamid, No. 83-2068, slip
op. (D.N.J., Nov. 6, 1985).
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deterrent effect of a penalty can constitute such a benefit.M With
standards such as these, issues of standing issues are becoming
rather routine formalities that plaintiffs can easily meet if they are
careful to conform their allegations to the accepted formulae.
Treating standing as a mere technicality, however, would miss
a major part of what some defendants are trying to accomplish by
invoking the standing doctrine. Since standing focuses on harm to
the plaintiffs' interest, it provides a useful doctrinal vehicle for
suggesting to the court that the discharges in question actually
caused little or no harm to the recreational uses of the resource,
even though the pollution may have technically violated the per-
mit. Standing may thus open the door for defendants to raise the
question of whether it is legitimate for the courts in particular or
the government in general to be interfering with the dischargers'
activities at all. More fundamentally, the standing doctrine ques-
tions whether the government's regulatory power can be legiti-
mately invoked by private parties.
Challenges to the legitimacy of imposing sanctions for trivial
violations may be based on the assumption that beneficial eco-
nomic activity ought not be subject to legal sanction unless it un-
reasonably interferes with other legitimate interests. Professor
William Rodgers suggests that this assumption has a long history
in the American law governing the use of natural resources:
[I]ndustrial interests traditionally have viewed "pollution" as a "relative
thing." In the words of one industry spokesman: "Pollution is the discharge
of material that unreasonably impairs the quality of water for maximum
beneficial use in the overall public interest." According to the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers, "This definition of pollution hinges on the word
'unreasonable.' Economic, sociological, and political factors will inevitably
influence any attempt to agree upon an interpretation." 55
In Professor Rodgers' opinion, this relativist view of pollution has
several implications for the enforcement process: most notably,
that enforcers have the burden of showing unreasonable harm,
and that "enforcement is a particularly local concern because the
unique characteristics of the receiving water, the economics of the
discharging plant, and even the prevailing political tolerance level,
254. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp.
1190 (D.N.J. 1985).
255. Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water
Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 782 (1971).
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are crucial to any decisions to compel treatment or process
change.25'8 From this perspective, decisions to enforce legal re-
quirements strictly against trivial violations would have questiona-
ble legitimacy, regardless of who was doing the enforcing. Even if
the law speaks in the absolute language of fixed numerical limits
and strict liability, there is still an expectation that it will be "rea-
sonably" enforced.
When private enforcers enter the picture, this expectation of
reasonable enforcement may be defeated. These self-appointed
guardians of the environment (from the dischargers' perspective),
can disrupt the existing legal structures of authority and accounta-
bility that are based on the division between public and private
law. While wrongs to individuals are properly within the domain
of private liability, wrongs to the general public are properly
brought only by public officials. In this view, the phrase "private
attorney general" is not just an oxymoron; it is virtually a logical
impossibility.
This bipolar view is probably articulated most clearly in Stu-
dent Public Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., where defend-
ants sought to raise the legitimacy issue both in a standing motion
and in an unusual claim that the Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision was an unconstitutional delegation of executive
power.257 The company's brief on the delegation issue asserted
that the plaintiffs had claimed "sovereign equivalence" in assum-
ing "the unique and awesome civil penalty enforcement power,"
and had used this power in a manner far different from the power
wielded by the responsible federal and state agencies. "[T]he en-
tire rationale of plaintiffs' suit appears to be bottomed on a pun-
ishment theory rather than a compensatory theory of injuries ac-
tually suffered by plaintiffs. ' 258 In the terms used by social
scientists, the plaintiffs, who should in theory be limited to private
remedies, were in fact converting an established public compli-
256. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479
(D.N.J. 1985).
257. Id. at 783.
258. Brief of Defendant at 5, 8, 25, Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Mon-
santo Co., 600 F. Supp. at 1479 (motion for summary judgment based on unconstitutional-
ity of § 505 Clean Water Act Civil Penalty Citizen Suit Provision). The brief argued both a
violation of separation of powers and an unconstitutional delegation, but the basic issues
addressed in the two theories were very similar.
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ance system into a penal system.259 Monsanto argued that this was
an unconstitutional arrogation of power by the plaintiff organiza-
tions. Some commentators have raised similar concerns, though
not in the same constitutional terms. Joseph Guida has suggested
that the citizen suit plaintiffs can be viewed as a "shadow govern-
ment" whose exercise of enforcement powers is "inimical to fun-
damental notions of representative government and the oaths of
office taken by" agency officials.26 0
The plaintiff organizations naturally take a much different
view of the citizen suit mechanism, as have the courts for the most
part.26' Many of the environmental group representatives2 2 be-
lieve that the Clean Water Act permits them-indeed, was
designed to permit them-to stand in the shoes of government
and sue as enforcers vindicating a general public interest in envi-
ronmental protection, rather than to act simply as spokespersons
for the individual interests of specific members who may be
harmed by particular discharges. 6 In this view, the private attor-
259. E.g., K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL
DEFINITION OF POLLUTION 4 (1984) (emphasis in original):
A penal style is accusatory and adversarial. Here enforcement is reflective: a
matter of determining what harm was done, of detecting the lawbreaker and
fixing the appropriate sanction. . . . If [a violation and a violator can be de-
tected], then the breach deserves punishment. In a compliance strategy, on the
other hand, the style is conciliatory and relies upon bargaining to attain con-
formity.. . . If prevention of future misconduct occurs, it does so as a result of
negotiation rather than . . . deterrence. . .. A standard which has not been
attained in a compliance system needs remedy.
260. Guida, Dramatic Growth in Citizen Suits Under the Federal Clean Water Act, National
L.J., Dec. 3, 1984, at 26, col.i.
261. E.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott Inc.,
579 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.N.J. 1984): "[P]ublic participation in enforcement actions pro-
motes the goals of the Act, as well as administrative efficiency. Responsible citizen groups,
concerned with the quality of our environment, and willing to contribute to its betterment,
perform a public service in their efforts to enforce the Clean Water Act."
262. As previously mentioned, the various plaintiff organizations in the current wave
of citizen suits are not all in agreement on matters of policy and strategy. For example, one
of the organizations contacted in this study tends to stay relatively close to the dispute
resolution model. It will not bring a case unless there are complaints from members who
reside near the discharge and demonstrate interference with usage of the resource. The
paper record of permit violations is not enough. A number of other organizations begin
with a paper record of violations, culled from the files of the EPA or the responsible state
agency, and then contact local members or a friendly local group to see whether they are
interested in becoming parties to an action.
263. In the delegation dispute in Monsanto Co., the plaintiffs argued not only that their
enforcement actions were in fact consistent with the EPA's expressed enforcement policy,
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ney general concept evolved over a period of decades and won
general acceptance by the 1970's as a result of the widespread
perception that effective public participation was necessary to
overcome the resource shortages, institutional constraints, and
risks of capture that made the administrative agencies chronically
timid enforcers.264
These debates over the legitimacy of private enforcement are
also relevant to the standing doctrine, especially since recent Su-
preme Court decisions have begun to address standing issues in
terms of the separation of powers among the branches of the fed-
eral government. This approach was stated most clearly in Allen v.
Wright,265 where the majority observed that "the law of Article III
standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers. '26 The Court also noted, however, that "the constitu-
tional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts con-
cededly not susceptible of precise definition, ' 267 and so the rela-
tionship between private enforcement devices like the citizen suit
and separation of powers remains somewhat obscure.
The primary concern expressed by the Court in Allen v.
Wright was the fear that weakening the standing doctrine's injury-
but also that "Congress did not want EPA's prosecutorial discretion to be conclusive. It
deliberately established a dual enforcement scheme which would place a check on EPA's
discretion." Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Based on Unconstitutionality of Section 505 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act at
23. In one case, the NRDC and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater argued more explicitly
that they were standing in the shoes of the government. The company they were pursuing
in a penalty action filed for bankruptcy, and the environmental organizations responded
that they came within a statute exempting suits by governmental units from the bankruptcy
law's stay of legal actions against the debtor. The court disagreed, holding that "both the
statute and the legislative history demonstrate that the term 'governmental unit' in the
bankruptcy code refers exclusively to actual government groups and not to organizations
acting in a governmental capacity." In re Revere Copper and Brass Inc., 32 Bankr. 725,
727 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
264. The gap between these two philosophies of regulatory enforcement echoes a re-
cent observation by Professor John Coffee in a related context:
[I]t may well be a recurring characteristic of our legal culture that formal
changes accepted on a doctrinal level are still frequently resisted and partially
nullified on the less visible level where operation decisions are routinely made.
. . .[O]ur society's actual acceptance of the private attorney general may be
more tentative and incomplete than it first appears.
Coffee, supra note 207, at 238.
265. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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in-fact requirement might lead to adjudication of abstract contro-
versies in which the plaintiffs would have no real connection to or
stake in the particular issues being litigated. This concern seems
not to apply to citizen suit standing as interpreted by the lower
courts. Plaintiffs are being required to plead and prove harm to
property, recreational or aesthetic interests in the particular wa-
terway where the discharge is occurring. Moreover, the behavior
standard applied to the defendant has been quite clearly specified
in the public permit writing process. As a result, the factual issues
being litigated on the merits are generally very concrete and spe-
cific. Citizen suit standing seems in this respect to fulfill one of the
primary functions of the injury-in-fact requirement described in
the Court's 1982 opinion in the Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State: that the issues be
presented "in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." '26 Beyond
this rather amorphous principle, the recent Supreme Court stand-
ing cases provide little guidance on the functional aspects of the
separation of powers that might be implicated by citizen suits.2 69
268. 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). One situation in which the court may not have "a
realistic appreciation of the consequences" of its decision in a citizen suit is when the gov-
ernment declines to become a party, and has not articulated a policy on a matter of deci-
sional significance. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77. While this is theoretically a
significant problem, it has not yet emerged as a serious practical problem. It is possible that
the EPA's efforts to codify enforcement policy, together with selective intervention in cases
of precedential significance, will provide adequate protection against uninformed judicial
decisions during the transitional period when many unresolved issues relating to the citizen
suit provisions are being litigated. To some degree, the Valley Forge formulation quoted in
the text can be criticized on the ground that a focus on particular facts relating to the
parties will not be "conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action." The parties to the litigation may be atypical of the larger universe of actors poten-
tially affected by the court's decision. See D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977). Thus, in decisions affecting implementation of a regulatory statute, what may be
most needed are general "legislative" facts relating to the anticipated programmatic conse-
quences of alternative decisions.
269. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472, notes two other functional justifications for a con-
stitutional injury-in-fact requirement. First, the requirement "reflects a due regard for the
autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order," because
it limits the power to invoke the judicial process to those who have suffered actual injury.
Id. at 473. However, the Court makes clear that noneconomic injuries like those asserted
by plaintiffs in citizen suits adequately serve this purpose. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972), is cited with approval, and the majority later states explicitly: "[W]e do not
retreat from our earlier holdings that standing may be predicated on noneconomic injury,"
Id. at 486. See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). Second,
the Court notes that "[t]he exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between
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Apart from case law, there is a superficial appeal in the notion
that law enforcement-the duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed"-is inherently an executive function that
should not be usurped by courts and private litigants.27 0 This posi-
tion was developed by Judge Scalia in a law review article analyz-
ing the role of the standing doctrine in preserving separation of
powers. 27 1 According to Judge Scalia, courts exist solely to redress
unique, individualized, "nonmajoritarian" harms. Majoritarian
harms-those which fall upon a broad sector of the popu-
lace-are properly the concern of the political branches. Constitu-
tional notions of separation of powers impliedly "limit the power
of Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal rights.121 If
it is true, as the defense commonly argues, that plaintiffs have
only a trivial interest in the abatement of any particular pollution
source, then private enforcement of pollution control laws pre-
sumably would raise these problems.
There are several difficulties with this analysis as applied to
citizen suits. First, and most obviously, the domain of unique,
nonmajoritarian, redressable harm is not a tightly bounded cate-
gory that exists in the world apart from legal definitions of injury.
This is evident in the analogous field of nuisance law, where the
boundary between "public" and "private" nuisance actions
against polluters has been highly variable from state to state and
over time.27 Thus, when validly enacted legislation says that boat-
the coequal arms of the national government," Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473. It also states,
however, that this "effect is . . . most vivid when a federal court declares unconstitutional
an act of the Legislative or Executive branch." Id. Arguably, private enforcement would be
less disruptive of interbranch relationships than either a declaration of unconstitutionality
or an invalidation of a major policy decision of the other branches. As noted in the text,
however, there are other ways to analyze the relationships among the branches.
270. See, e.g., Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 669-70 (1985):
The suggestion [that judicial review of agency inaction would usurp executive
functions] is based on the understanding that enforcement activity is entrusted
to the executive, not to the courts, and that judicial involvement-in the form
of a decree compelling prosecution-would violate the separation of powers.
While this basic understanding is correct, the conclusion does not follow. The
"take care" clause is a duty, not a license; it imposes an obligation on the Presi-
dent to enforce duly enacted laws.
271. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881 (1983).
272. Id. at 886.
273. The general rule at common law is that a plaintiff cannot bring an action against
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ers or fishermen are sufficiently injured by pollution to invoke the
judicial machinery, there may be no principled basis for courts to
devise more stringent standing criteria to reject that determina-
tion. Second, to the extent that losses of environmental amenity
are regarded as majoritarian harms, there may be collective goods
problems that prevent the political system from providing optimal
quantities.274 If so, then the individualized enforcement incentives
built into the citizen suit can serve as a corrective to the free rider
problems inherent in collective goods. Most fundamentally, how-
ever, it is not clear what results the separation of powers doctrine
requires in the field of regulatory enforcement.
According to Judge Scalia, separation of powers concerns are
raised by a liberalized law of standing. This is because a lowering
of the standing barrier can inject the courts into the province of
administrators in two ways: it can affect the time at which certain
issues are presented to the courts and it can interfere with the
power of administrators to modify or nullify regulatory laws by
failing to enforce them.Th Of these two grounds for noninterfer-
a "public nuisance" that affects the community generally unless s/he can show special dam-
ages distinguishing her or his harm from the harm to the public at large. See, e.g., Wein-
stein v. Lake Pearl Park, 347 Mass. 91, 196 N.E. 2d 638 (1964). However, special damages
adequate to support a private action need not be harm to a traditional property interest; it
could, for example, be loss of income to a commercial fisherman when water pollution
interfered with her or his right (held in common with the general public) to catch fish in
state waters. See, e.g., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538
(1943); Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Or. 654,
87 P.2d 195 (1939). In addition, some states have abolished the distinction by legislation,
and have permitted individuals to sue for abatement of a public nuisance. See, e.g., Florida
ex rel. Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So.2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See infra text
accompanying note 291.
274. The basic collective goods problem is described as follows in M. OisEsN, THE
LoGIc OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 48 (1977):
[T]here are . . . three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups
from furthering their own interests. First, the larger the group, the smaller the
fraction of the total group benefit any person acting in the group interest re-
ceives, and the less adequate the reward for any group-oriented action, and the
farther the group falls short of getting an optimal supply of the collective good
Second,. . . the larger the group the smaller the likelihood of oligopolis-
tic interaction [among subsets of group members] that might help obtain the
good. Third, the larger the number of members in the group the greater the
organization costs, and thus the higher the hurdle that must be jumped before
any of the collective good at all can be obtained.
275.
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests are affected,
"important legislative purposes, Heralded in the halls of Congress, [can be] lost
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ence, the latter is clearly the more important and the more di-
rectly threatened by private enforcement. Traditionally, separa-
tion of powers arguments have been made for the opposite
position-that is, that allowing administrators to repeal statutes by
disuse violates the constitutional allocation of powers and
responsibilities:
"The doctrine of separation of powers ... stands in the way of holding that
a legislative enactment which complies with constitutional requirements can
be rendered ineffective by non-use or obsolescence or repealed by failure of
those entrusted with its administration to enforce it." In short, the rejection
of desuetude is only superficially a limitation on thejudiciary. Its essence is a
limitation on the executive.
2 76
In this view, private enforcement could serve to correct a separa-
tion of powers deficiency by overriding bureaucratic defiance and
carrying out the will of the political branches as authoritatively
expressed in legislation.2 "
If the separation of powers consequences of private regula-
tory enforcement are indeterminate as a matter of constitutional
doctrine, then the key question becomes an empirical one: What
will private regulatory enforcement do to the structures of con-
trol, accountability and legitimacy that have evolved to govern the
modern regulatory state? At present, there are no definitive an-
swers to this question; but both the historical record and some
current developments in the field of environmental protection
suggest that private enforcement has a strong claim to legitimacy.
B. Common Informers and Private Attorneys General: Citizen Suits in
Historical Perspective
While the citizen suit appears to be a new technique for en-
forcing regulatory statutes, the concept of shared public and pri-
or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy?" Of course it
does-and a good thing, too. When no peculiar harm to particular individuals
or minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or
misdirected. . .. The ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of
the prime engines of social change, and the prohibition against such careless-
ness is (believe it or not) profoundly conservative.
Scalia, supra note 271, at 897 (emphasis in original).
276. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 83 (1976) (quoting J. SUTHERLAND, IA STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 23.25, at 267 (4th ed. 1972)).
277. Sunstein, supra note 270, at 670.
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vate responsibility for enforcement can be traced back at least 600
years in Anglo-American law. In 1388, Richard II and the English
Parliament 2 8 enacted a water pollution statute designed to deal
with a serious public health risk.27  The problem, as described in
the statute, was "that so much Dung and Filth of the Garbage and
Intrails as well as of Beasts killed, as of other corruptions, be cast
and put in Ditches, Rivers, and other Waters, . . . that the air
there is greatly corrupt and infect, and many Maladies and other
intolerable Diseases do daily happen." Like many modern pollu-
tion control statutes, this one provided both for the cleanup of
past pollution before a set deadline and for the prevention of fu-
ture pollution. It also provided for a dual system of enforcement:
either public officials or others who "feel [themselves] grieved" or
who "will complain" could bring enforcement actions. The pen-
alty for unremedied past violations was set by the legislature,
whereas the remedy for future violations was left to the considera-
278. During this period, control over the initiation and specification of legislation was
shifting from the Crown to the Parliament. Therefore, it is probably impossible to deter-
mine just where the proposal for this statute came from, although we can be confident that
Parliament, at the very least, approved it. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 435-40 (4th ed. 1936).
279. The Statute of 12 Rich. II, ch. 13 (1388), reads in relevant part as follows:
For that so much Dung and Filth of the Garbage and Intrails as well as of
Beasts killed, as of other Corruptions, be cast and put in Ditches, Rivers, and
other Waters, . . . that the Air there is greatly corrupt and infect, and many
Maladies and other intolerable Diseases do daily happen, . . to the great An-
noyance, Damage and Peril of the Inhabitants, Dwellers, Repairers, and Travel-
lers . . . ; (2) . . . all they which do cast and lay all such Annoyances . . . in
• . . Waters . . . shall cause them utterly to be removed, avoided, and carried
away [before the next Feast of St. Michael] . . . every one upon Pain to lose
and to forfeit to our Lord the King [twenty livre] . .. (3). . . the Mayors and
Bailiffs. . . shall compel the same to be done upon like Pain. (4) And if any feel
himself grieved, that it be not done in the Manner aforesaid, and will there-
upon complain him to the Chancellor after the said Feast of St. Michael, he
shall have a Writ to make him of whom he will complain come into the Chan-
cery, there to shew why the said penalty should not be levied of him, and if he
cannot excuse himself, the said penalty shall be levied of him. (5) . . . none of
what Condition soever he be, [shall] cause to be cast or thrown from henceforth
any such Annoyance . . . into the . . . waters . . ; (6) and if any do, he shall
be called by Writ before the Chancellor, at his Suit that will complain; and if he
be found guilty, he shall be punished after the discretion of the Chancellor.
2 STATUTES AT LARGE 382 (0. Rufhead ed. 1763). For the most part, this translation of the
Statutes at Large is simply a reprinting of the translation current at the time. Since the
statute is not to be analyzed in detail here, it is unnecessary to go into the potentially
complicated problems of verifying the meanings of particular provisions and detailing the
duties or prerogatives created by them.
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ble discretion of the chancellor. 80
In several respects, the 1388 water pollution act was a logical
outgrowth of a legal system based on very different assumptions
from modern American legal culture. Distinctions between statu-
tory and common law, and between public and private law, held
little significance in the post-conquest English legal system. Like
other early statutes, the 1388 water pollution act came to be con-
sidered part of the common law28' and was incorporated into the
law of public nuisance.282 Eventually it became conventional wis-
dom that only public authorities could bring actions against public
nuisances.2 83 At the time of its enactment, however, the 1388 law
was part of an undifferentiated body of authoritative rules
2 4
whose breach might result in multiple remedies at the instance of
different parties. For example, a rule-violating deed could give
280. This statute did not explicitly establish financial incentives for private enforcers,
but other statutes enacted at the same time did. A 1331 statute, for example, allocated one-
fourth of any fines imposed on stallholders selling goods after the close of a fair to "every
Man that will sue for our Lord the King". Statute made at Westminster In the Fifth Year
of the Reign of K. Edward the Third After the Conquest, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331).
281. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 417 (2d ed. 1981):
Such changes as came about in the criminal law were made from the outside.
The most important method was the direct one of legislation .... To lawyers
in the fourteenth century a statute was not something external to the law: it was
an internal alteration, and it lived in its context so that its application was
neither mechanical nor unalterable.
282. E.g., McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L.
REV. 27, 35 (1948).
283. Private plaintiffs could bring actions only for private nuisances, which were de-
fined as infringements on their rights in the use and enjoyment of land. Prosser, for exam-
ple, offers the following:
A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land.
The remedy for it lies in the hands of the individual whose rights have been
disturbed. A public or common nuisance, on the other hand, is a species of
catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the
community at large, which may include anything from the obstruction of a
highway to a public gaming-house or indecent exposure. As in the case of other
crimes, the normal remedy is in the hands of the state.
W. PROSSER & W. KRroN, LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).
284. Glanville, writing in the twelfth century, noted that legal pleadings were of two
kinds-civil and criminal. But as Milsom observes, "his distinction is not ours. Civil pleas
are those concerning land and the old personal actions; and all wrongs are criminal, pre-
sumably because there is offense to the community as well as to the victim." S. MILsoM,
supra note 281, at 285. By the "old personal actions," Milsom refers to claims of the mid-
dle ages known as debt, detinue, covenant, and account. Id. at 244. Another way of under-
standing the distinction between civil and criminal pleas is in terms of the "demand for a
right," as opposed to the "complaint of a wrong." Id. at 243.
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rise to legal action by a representative of the public authority as
well as by a private individual. 8 5 As a practical matter, what was
often different about the two actions was the remedy sought. Pub-
lic authorities were generally more interested in punishing and de-
terring wrongful behavior; private plaintiffs were generally more
interested in getting compensation for the injuries they had suf-
fered and in preventing future injuries.""8 At the same time, pub-
lic authorities often were quite interested in collecting the reve-
nues they expected from the imposition of fines for wrongful acts,
and private plaintiffs often were motivated primarily by the desire
to punish wrongful behavior.
It is important to understand that a singular definition of
wrongful behavior gave rise to various possible legal actions. Most
of the different actions were distinguished by what type of remedy
was sought, by whom sought it, and by whom had authority to
provide it. Only over time did English and American legal doc-
trine attempt to establish a systematic distinction between public
and private actions based on ostensibly separate domains of public
and private rights.
287
It is impossible here to meaningfully summarize the complex
285. Indeed, even attempting to distinguish between "private individuals" and "pubic
authorities" during the era is artificial. Both "privateness" and "publicness" were embed-
ded in the roles of individuals based on their positions (property rights) in the feudal ten-
ure system. Merryman puts the point nicely:
In a truly feudal system the distinction between public and private law fails to
make sense. Property and office are indistinguishable; tenure of land deter-
mines both "public" and "private" rights and duties. Depending on one's prem-
ises he could today characterize all feudal law either as private law or as public
law, but there was no occasion for such speculation at the time.
Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law, 17 J. PuB.
L. 2, 7 (1968).
286. 2 W. HoLDswoRTI, supra note 278, at 453 (a private person had to show a griev-
ance personal to him, but a king could sue for general harm).
287. We are not suggesting that the distinction between public and private actions
ever became as strong or as consciously fundamental in English and American law as in
Continental European law. Nonetheless, it became a critical force in the nineteenth cen-
tury, as courts tried to sort actions into private (contracts, torts, property, commercial law)
and public (constitutional, criminal, and administrative law) categories. To a certain extent,
no doubt, the effort was pragmatic; courts wanted to limit the number of actions available
in response to any given infraction. Such a separation became increasingly necessary with
the emergence of strong, centralized states. To a significant extent, the effort was also
political and ideological. The explicit goal of many nineteenth century judges was to create
spheres of private activity in which market forces would be able to operate free from state
interference. For a short argument quite similar to ours, see Horwitz, The History of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1982).
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process by which the writ system of legal actions changed from
the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, 288 but several key
points can be noted. First, the authoritative rules that comprise
law came from a variety of sources. In addition to statutes, there
were two other major sources of authoritative rules. The first, in
the early centuries after the Norman Conquest, were very local
and now are all but forgotten. They included the county, the hun-
dred,"8 9 and the manor.29 0 The division of jurisdiction among
them is lost to us. It is clear, however, that in the early times after
the Conquest these local bodies would have settled local disputes
and determined local policy regarding such matters as pollution
control and natural resource use. Typically, their decisions were
based on established customs, which varied by locale. Since these
courts generally were quite close to local residents, it would have
been common for those residents to bring actions in the local
courts to enforce the applicable community rules.
The king's courts gradually supplanted the local courts and
produced the writ system and most of what we now call the com-
mon law. Like the local courts, these courts probably viewed their
role as merely defining and enforcing established norms and cus-
toms. Nevertheless, they had much larger effects. First, they
pressed toward the establishment of a single set of legal norms
governing the entire realm. Second, in responding to new
problems over time, they gradually created a body of rules that
went far beyond the system they inherited. The 1388 statute
quoted above, for example, eventually was absorbed into the
much larger body of nuisance law, which was capable of encom-
passing an almost unlimited array of annoyances and requested
remedies. Private prosecutions for acts that would eventually be
defined as public nuisances seem to have been common, in signifi-
cant part because many such acts would also interfere with various
interests in the use and enjoyment of property. Gradually, com-
mon law judges sought to impose certain unifying constraints on
288. For useful summaries of the history of writs for remedying the nuisance-like
problems we have referred to, see McRae, supra note 282, and Winfield, Nuisance as Tort, 4
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 189 (1931). See also F. MArrLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION (1908).
289. The hundreds were institutionalized meetings of important landholders in subdi-
visions of counties. They were generally served by bailiffs, and the right to hold hundreds
meetings was often held in a proprietary fashion we would think of as a form of private
property. S. MiUsoM, supra note 281, at 15-16.
290. Id. at 21-22.
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this developing body of law, such as the distinction between public
and private nuisances.291
A second key point is that an equally diverse array of reme-
dies and enforcement mechanisms was available for application to
rule-violating behavior. A given infraction might be punished by
imprisonment, a fine, an injunction (generally backed by the
threat of imprisonment or fine) or damages. There might also be
a variety of reasons for prosecuting an offense. Public officials
might wish to put down perceived threats to their effective rule,
placate their superiors or obtain part of the reward for convicting
291. It appears that this distinction, quoted from W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note
283, was only laboriously built up over the passage of centuries. We have already noted
that there was no meaningful distinction between crime and tort in the early centuries
after the Conquest. To the degree that "private" plaintiffs were excluded from certain
kinds of nuisance actions, the basis seems to have been that the crown or the lord "owned"
them, and not that it was inappropriate for a private plaintiff to bring such an action as a
matter of policy. Glanville, for example, maintained that "[w]henever a nuisance is commit-
ted affecting the King's highway, or a city, the suit concerning it belongs to the King's
Crown." McRae, supra note 282, at 36. Conversely, a landholder had an action when the
nuisance interfered with his rights to use and enjoyment of land.
The unifying principle, if there was one, was that rights of action should be allocated
according to whose rights and prerogatives were interfered with in the feudal tenure sys-
tem. This formalist impulse, of course, was frequently confronted with the reality that a
given wrong interfered with more than one type of feudal right. In the early years actions
might be brought by a variety of actors. As the law attempted to systematize actions, how-
ever, it also attempted to limit the available set of actions. The courts eventually retreated
from the enterprise, in significant degree, by propounding a proto-realist analysis that a
public nuisance might also give rise to an action in an individual who had suffered "special
damages". The earliest suggestion of this proposition appears to have occurred in 1411,
Statute made at Westminster In the Thirteenth Year of the Reign of K. Henry IV, 13 Hen.
IV, ch. 3 (1411). But it was clearly stated in a much discussed dictum by Judge Fitzherbert
in 1536:
If one makes a ditch across the highway, and I come riding in my way by night,
and I and my horse are thrown into the ditch, so that I suffer great damage
* * * in this case I shall have an action against him who made the ditch across
the way, because I am more damaged by this than any other.
Y.B. 27 Hy. VIII. Mich. pl. 10 (1536), quoted in, VIII 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 278, at
424. The courts had tremendous difficulty coming to any remotely coherent definition of
special damages. See the rather tortured discussion in W. PRossER & W. KEETON, LAW OF
TORTS § 88, at 586-91 (5th ed. 1984). The important point is that the courts have long
permitted private rights of action even in cases they have declared to be public nuisances
(i.e., crimes), and where no such right is statutorily granted. On the other hand, it has been
extremely difficult to predict when such private rights would be permitted, and they were
more often than not denied. Overall, then, while the courts, in response to rapid urbaniza-
tion and industrialization, declared an ever growing list of activities to be public nuisances,
they curbed the import of those declarations by generally-but not always-limiting ac-
tions to public officials.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
an offender. Private plaintiffs might wish to receive compensation
for past injuries, obtain injunctions against possible future inju-
ries, punish an offender for violating a common code or garner a
portion of the fines offenders would be required to pay. All of
these incentives appear to have been common during most of the
history of the common law.
Although private enforcement seems to have been common
through the nineteenth century, the general understanding of its
role seems to have changed over time. In the first few centuries
after the Conquest, it appears that private enforcement was com-
mon because there was no well developed conceptual distinction
between public and private functions. Any violation of community
rules was the business of the entire community and all its mem-
bers. We might even speculate that authorities encouraged com-
munity members to participate in prosecuting wrongs because
they knew it increased members' investment in and commitment
to the existing order. Participation would thus increase their own
sense of obligation to comply with the rules. By the same token,
such a commitment to the existing order might often have been
sufficient incentive to promote and legitimate considerable private
enforcement.
By the dawn of the industrial revolution, the basis of private
enforcement appears to have shifted considerably. In the mid-
eighteenth century, the view was widespread in England that the
country was suffering from an epidemic of crime, largely perpe-
trated by the growing urban lower class.29 2 At that time, the coun-
try still had no substantial police force, either centralized or lo-
cal.293 The response to this problem took several forms. First,
more severe penalties for many offenses were widely advocated
and frequently enacted.294 Second, many new offenses were cre-
ated, especially for petty crimes like vagrancy, drinking, and the
like. 95 Third, there were major efforts to deter crime by greatly
increasing the incentives for private enforcement. In cases of par-
ticularly heinous crimes, government agencies would often adver-
tise rewards for capture or conviction of their perpetrators.
292. See generally 2 L. RADZINOWIcZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 1-29 (1956).
293. Hay, supra note 11.
294. 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 292.
295. Id. at 8-14.
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Wealthy parties would regularly do the same when they had been
the victims of crime, indeed, failure to do so "was likely to be
interpreted as an offer of impunity to the offenders. ' 298 In addi-
tion, numerous new common informers statutes were passed pro-
viding that parties aiding in the apprehension and conviction of
violators would share in the fines collected as a result. In sum,
while the diagnosis of the problem remained basically moralistic,
the proposed solutions became increasingly utilitarian: the legal
system sought to increase the costs of crime by increasing the pen-
alties and to enlist the citizenry in the enforcement process by
making private prosecution lucrative. 9 ' In practice, however, this
theory was to confront a variety of problems.
In the heyday of the English common informer's actions, they
were available for a wide variety of offenses. Private actions could
be brought to penalize violators of price and quality regulations
for consumer goods (such as merchants "selling salt above the as-
size price," or bakers offering bread made with unwholesome
materials); to enforce regimes of occupational licensing and taxa-
tion (including a "pawnbroker trading without a license, or keep-
ing more than one shop under a single license" and a person
"practis[ing] as an apothecary without the necessary certificate");
and to punish "Offenses leading to Corruption of Morals" (such as
a publican allowing "gaming in his house by journeymen,
labourers, servants, or apprentices" or a "person found guilty of
having opened, without license, disorderly houses, or gardens for
296. Id. at 112.
297. Interestingly, liberals and reformers of the eighteenth century also sought to use
incentives to encourage collective responsibility for enforcement. The collectivity, generally
through the hundred, might be held responsible to pay damages to the executors of any
person killed while trying to arrest an offender, and sometimes to those whose property
had been damaged by rioters. Id. at 163-65. In 1766, Edmund Burke proposed that the
hundreds be required to indemnify parties injured by thefts from shipwrecks within their
jurisdiction. Moreover, there was serious discussion about compelling parishes to pay re-
wards to those who solved and prosecuted crimes committed in their areas, as well as to
individuals who prevented crimes. Id. at 166. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
however, with Sir Robert Peel's reforms and the rise of a professional police force, the idea
of creating incentives to force collective responsibility had largely fallen into disuse.
Another form of reward which should be noted is that individuals were often exempted
from various onerous community offices for successfully apprehending and convicting cer-
tain types of offenders Id. at 158-63.
Finally, there was a incentive-based analogue to our modern action forcing provisions.
Constables were encouraged toward more vigorous enforcement by various fines-many
statutorily set-for failure to perform their duties. Id. at 162.
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music and dancing or for entertainment in, or within twenty miles
of London").29
Several features of these statutes made them vulnerable to
abuse and resistance. The offenses themselves were largely vic-
timless crimes, if indeed they could properly be regarded as
crimes at all. The overt class bias and paternalism in these in-
former's statutes also seemed calculated to inspire resentment
among those who were being regulated. Occasionally, the "regula-
tory backlash" was immediate and unmistakable.29 9 More com-
monly, however, the effect of the excessive enforcement of these
petty laws was a growing disrespect for the laws themselves and
widespread contempt for those who enforced them. "In the end,"
as Professor Radzinowicz notes, "this long-continued distaste
caused the very name of common informer to be regarded as a
term of abuse,"300 and the actions were eventually abolished.
The early history of the common informer's action indicates
that private enforcement can undermine rather than reinforce the
purposes of the relevant statutes, particularly if those purposes are
not widely shared by the affected populace. Moreover, even when
the underlying law serves a widely accepted public purpose, the
incentives created to induce private enforcers to bring suit may
exceed the bounds of the society's tolerance for enforcement.
When this happens, the enforcers may come to be regarded not as
legitimate spokespersons for the public interest, but rather as
" 'unprincipled pettifoggers' whose office [is] a nuisance and 'an
instrument of individual extortion, caprice and tyranny.' 301
While English history suggests that private regulatory en-
forcement can lead to abuses and backlash, the American experi-
ence indicates that this is not an inevitable result. As the Supreme
Court pointed out during the early decades of this century, qui
298. Id. at 139-46; see also Kurland & Waters, Public Prosecutions in England, 1854-79:
An Essay in English Legislative History, 1959 DUKE L.J. 493.
299. E.g., 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 292, at 147:
In 1736 a statute was passed which aimed at securing what almost amounted to
the prohibition of all alcoholic liquors, at a time when drinking was particularly
rife. This was an opportunity of which the informers could not fail to take ad-
vantage. They rushed to assist in the enforcement of this drastic law, and their
infamous achievements became notorious. . . .In 1738 the legislature felt it
necessary to extend to common informers penal protection against the rage of
the populace.
300. Id. at 155.
301. Id. at 139.
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tam actions providing private enforcers with a share of criminal
fines "have been in existence . . .in this country ever since the
foundation of our government"302 and "have not been without
defense by the courts."30 3 Similarly, private prosecution of crimi-
nal cases, without the financial incentive of the qui tam bounty,
was traditionally a common feature of American public law. As
late as 1955, a law review survey found that the practice was still
extensively used:
In thirty jurisdictions, appellate courts have decided that privately em-
ployed attorneys may assist the public prosecutor, while only three have said
that they may not. Moreover, sixty-two percent of 151 public prosecutors
from forty-five states who responded to a questionnaire on prosecution pro-
cedures stated that they permit privately hired attorneys to assist in criminal
proceedings. Most states find authority for permitting private prosecution in
the inherent power of the court to administer justice .... No restrictions
have been placed on the crimes private attorneys may assist in
prosecuting.3"
In jurisdictions where private prosecutions were permitted, courts
sometimes took responsibility for coordinating public and private
efforts, and assuring "that a public prosecution for a criminal of-
fense does not degenerate into a private persecution [or] . .. the
gratification of private malice. 3 0 5 One method of doing so was to
require that the private prosecutor remain under the control and
supervision of the responsible public official.308
302. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
303. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943).
304. Note, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65
YALE L.J. 209, 218-19 (1955-56). For a more recent but less useful analysis of this topic, see
Comment, Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C.L. REv. 1171 (1972) (dis-
cussing State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E. 2d 1 (1972)).
305. Thalheim v. State, 38 Fla. 169, 170, 20 So. 938, 938 (1896).
306. In Thalheim, 38 Fla. at 183, 20 So. at 942, the court reasoned:
A public prosecution must be conducted by the proper official representative of
the State, and must not under any circumstances be under the entire manage-
ment and control of private parties and their attorneys. It is proper, however,
for the State Attorney, when there is no express statutory prohibition, to ob-
tain, with the consent of the court, the assistance of other counsel, and other
members of the bar are not incompetent to be engaged for such assistance and
taking part in the trial by reason of being retained and compensated by the
prosecuting witness, the party injured by the crime, or other private interests.
When such assistants are employed in the case, the State Attorney should al-
ways remain present at the trial.
Accord, Oglesby v. State, 83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922). Some states interpreted statutes
granting powers to public prosecutors as denying a role to private parties in criminal mat-
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As private prosecutions gave way to the monopoly of public
prosecutorial bureaucracies, concern for the accountability of
public prosecutors began to grow. The decision not to prosecute,
which may have occasioned relatively little concern when private
parties were free to take the initiative, now posed both a systemic
problem and a problem of individual justice. Decisions to drop a
case or to bargain it down to a lesser charge might be the product
of "corruption, political ambition, or insufficiency of funds or per-
sonnel"307 and not the result of a considered judgment of the so-
cial threat posed by the offender and the offense. Enforcement
could thus fall below the level needed to maintain deterrence and
respect for the law. Unconstrained discretion to refrain from
prosecution also created a risk of injustice to particular individu-
als. As Kenneth Culp Davis pointedly asked in Discretionary Justice:
If [the prosecutor] finds that A and B are equally guilty of felony and equally
deserving of prosecution, why should he be permitted to prosecute B for
felony but to let A off with a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor, unless he has a
rational and legal basis for his choice, stated on an open record?. . .Why
should he have a complete power to decide that one statute. . . shall not be
enforced at all, [and] that another statute will be fully enforced .. .Fo8
Defenders of broad prosecutorial discretion were generally unable
to provide a convincing answer to these questions.
In short, experience has shown that both an extensive system
ters. For example, in Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 104 (1875), the court construed such
a statute to mean
that the legislature do not consider it proper to allow the course of the prose-
cuting officer during the trial to be exposed to the influence of the interests or
passions of private prosecutors. His position is one involving a [d]uty of imparti-
ality not altogether unlike that of the judge himself.
Other courts thought that this characterization understated the adversary role of the pros-
ecuting attorney. In Thalheim, 38 Fla. at 186, 20 So. at 943, the court rebutted the imparti-
ality argument in the following terms:
The public interests demand that a prosecution should be conducted with en-
ergy and skill. While the prosecuting officer should see that no unfair advantage
is taken of the accused, yet he is not a judicial officer. Those who are required
to exercise judicial functions in the case are the judge and the jury. The public
prosecutor is necessarily a partisan in the case. If he were compelled to proceed
with the same circumspection as the judge and the jury, there would be an end
to the conviction of criminals. Zeal in the prosecution of criminal cases is there-
fore to be commended, and not condemned ..... And if such zeal in the court
room, on the trial, does not result in error, what conceivable difference can it
make whether such assistant was employed by the public, or by private persons?
307. Note, supra note 304, at 210.
308. Davis, supra note 151, at 189.
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of private prosecution and a public monopoly in criminal enforce-
ment are susceptible to abuse. What is needed is the appropriate
mix of public and private enforcement that will fit the particular
time and its social needs, together with adequate systems of ac-
countability to prevent abuse.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although solutions to many problems still need to be worked
out, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that private en-
forcement, modeled on the citizen suit provisions of federal envi-
ronmental laws, will prove to be a useful device for achieving
compliance with regulatory laws. Whether that promise will be
fully realized depends in part upon the development of appropri-
ate legal doctrines and management practices. More fundamen-
tally, however, the success or failure of private enforcement ap-
pears to be a function of the relationships and attitudes among the
principal actors.
Despite the fact that private enforcement has eroded adminis-
trative control over the enforcement process, the agencies still re-
tain a dominant position in defining and implementing enforce-
ment policy. At least at the federal level, the growth of private
enforcement is acting as a competitive spur to government enforc-
ers, prodding them to improve their management tools for mea-
suring, securing, and overseeing compliance. This increased em-
phasis on compliance might well have evolved even without the
consistent pressure of private enforcers. Several of the major envi-
ronmental laws have been on the books for more than a decade,
and a shift from policymaking to policing seems a natural part of
the life cycle of regulatory statutes. Still, there is no doubt that
private enforcement helped to keep compliance issues high on the
agendas of top agency officials and gave additional urgency to
their attempts to abate the most serious violations.
While citizen suits are prodding the EPA and the state agen-
cies to reassert their control over environmental enforcement, it
seems unlikely that the government can wholly recapture its en-
forcement monopoly. In the short run, compliance rates are not
likely to rise to such high levels that private enforcement becomes
unnecessary, or unattractive to plaintiff organizations. The sweep
of environmental regulation is too broad, the resources available
to the agencies for enforcement too modest, and the difficulties of
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the regulated industries too severe to predict dramatic increases
in the compliance rates. Barring a legislative movement to repeal
citizen suit provisions, which has not yet materialized, private en-
forcement will probably continue to be a significant force in envi-
ronmental regulation.
This private enforcement power is tempered by the fact that
the agencies will retain the initiative in responding to private en-
forcers. By deciding how regulations will define compliance, what
kinds of monitoring and reporting will be required, how compli-
ance information will be gathered and disseminated, and what
levels of noncompliance will be considered significant, the EPA
and the state agencies will effectively determine what role private
enforcement can play in particular regulatory programs. Thus far,
agencies have not given much attention to private enforcement
when making these decisions, although their attempts to improve
their management capabilities have generally benefitted private
plaintiffs. These conditions could change in the future, especially
if agency officials conclude that private enforcement is counter-
productive or unduly disruptive of their own activities and
priorities.
The groups bringing the private enforcement actions must be
concerned not only about the agencies' response to them, but also
about three other potential problems. Most immediate is the need
to continue the string of court victories in order to make private
enforcement a legal and economic success. A few adverse prece-
dents could significantly increase the delay and riskiness of fee re-
covery and limit private enforcement to a pro bono activity. If
plaintiff organizations can manage to avoid defeat, they may then
have to deal with the opposite problem-success. Private enforce-
ment may become too attractive to litigants who lack the skills to
prosecute complex cases, or who have the wrong motivation for
bringing suit. As victory in private enforcement cases becomes
easier, the quality control problem will likely become more severe.
Energies may then have to be shifted from the actual bringing of
cases into the developing of educational programs and guidelines
for case selection, settlement and penalty calculation. Plaintiff or-
ganizations have begun to do this to a limited extent, but so far
their efforts have been small-scale and informal.
The third question affecting the long-term success of private
enforcers is whether they will be able to convert courtroom victo-
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ries into actual environmental gains. This is partly a resource
problem. Tightening the screws on compliance will bring in-
creased pressure to bear on other parts of the regulatory system,
where there are typically no fee recovery provisions to support
legal representation. Thus, if private enforcement makes it clear
that Clean Water Act permits will be strictly enforced, dischargers
can be expected to redouble their efforts to weaken permit limits,
expand the availability of variances and acceptable excuses for
permit violations, and liberalize the effluent guidelines governing
permit writing. All of these efforts can easily involve lengthy, ex-
pensive administrative proceedings and judicial review. The plain-
tiff organizations have participated sporadically in these other
stages of the regulatory process, but it seems clear that they pres-
ently lack the capacity for a sustained, comprehensive presence at
all of the key decision-making stages.
Beyond the resource questions, however, is the more funda-
mental issue of whether private enforcement will be grudgingly
accepted or bitterly resisted by the regulated industries and their
representatives. Plainly, there is considerable resentment within
the regulatory community at having the "rules of the game"
changed and at having established relationships and understand-
ings undermined by private enforcement campaigns. There is also
widespread skepticism about both the motivations of private en-
forcers and their legitimacy as surrogates for government. These
attitudes could harden into unremitting legal and political opposi-
tion to private enforcement-indeed, to all regulatory enforce-
ment-or they could dissipate over time as private enforcers gain
acceptance as regular participants in the enforcement process.
The direction of development seems to depend less on the inher-
ent characteristics of the citizen suit than on the nature and qual-
ity of the relationships that evolve among the major parties.
In the model of regulatory behavior applied here, the quality
of the ongoing relationships existing among participants in a re-
gime of social control will greatly influence, if not determine, the
efficacy of that regime. Thus, the effectiveness of traditional eco-
nomic regulation has always depended on the relationship be-
tween the regulatory agency and the regulated industry. The fa-
miliar "capture" theory holds that an overly cooperative
regulatory agency can easily become subservient to the demands
of the regulated industry. When this happens, a standard remedy
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is to replace the agency's leadership with more independent, less
sympathetic administrators who will meet any resistance from the
regulated industry with sheer coercive power. The analysis as-
sumes that the agency will then be able to fulfill its protective
mission.
The American regulatory experience suggests that effective
regulation is rarely so simple. Rather, the relationships between
the regulators and their constituencies are inherently complicated
because administrators must achieve ongoing cooperation in the
face of divergent interests. Regulatees often have the means to
frustrate regulators' ends by adopting tactics such as information
withholding, subtle resistance to implementation, perverse re-
sponses to regulatory orders, or political counterattacks. Similarly,
the regulators have the capacity to inflict substantial expense and
aggravation on the regulated, or at least on those firms considered
"bad apples." As a result, the regulator/regulatee relationship is
often characterized by a substantial degree of mutual depen-
dency.309 In this context, the parties will have choices about how
to define their relationship. Although such choices will to some
degree reflect the peculiarities of the situation, they will also re-
flect the three general factors that this article has focused upon:
the material interests of the parties, the perceived legitimacy of
the regulatory endeavor and the history of the relationships
among the parties. Robert Axelrod and others have hypothesized
that when the regulatory framework is taken as given, and when
regulator and regulatee have both an interest in each other's sur-
vival and the long-term ability to punish or reward each other for
past behavior, cooperative relationships are likely to emerge.3 10
What is new about private enforcement is the large role the
private enforcers are attempting to play in the compliance pro-
cess. Although the citizen suit provisions were originally responses
to perceived problems of capture and favoritism in the traditional
model of regulation, some scholars have recently argued that they
309. Commentators from a variety of perspectives have made broadly similar argu-
ments on this point. See, e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109-14 (1982) (con-
cluding, inter alia, that agency information needs in the standard-setting and enforcement
processes frequently make the agencies dependent on the industry).
310. See generally R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) for an exposi-
tion of this position. For its application to enforcement problems, see Kagen & Scholz,
supra note 148.
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are likely to create more problems than they solve. Professor
Richard Stewart, for example, suggests that expanded third party
rights like the citizen suit are likely to be disfunctional for several
reasons: (1) environmental groups increase regulatory transactions
costs; (2) they are single-issue interests, and therefore may ignore
or discount competing values; (3) they are often most effective in
garnering resources from an adversarial posture; and (4) the envi-
ronmental regulatory agencies themselves may reinforce these
tendencies because they have little responsibility for the industries
they regulate.""' We have not seen much evidence to confirm Pro-
fessor Stewart's thesis in our research and are not persuaded that
he captures the key problems as a matter of theory.
Assessments of the impacts of third-party interventions like
private enforcement depend heavily upon the observer's belief
about the substantive desirability of the regulatory program and
upon the program's compliance history. If one believes that third-
party participation will disrupt the status quo, it then becomes
necessary to ask whether that status quo is good or bad, and how
and why it developed the way it did. In the case of environmental
compliance, the argument that giving increased leverage to single-
issue constituency groups might tilt agency policy unduly toward
protectionist values implies that the existing system reflects a de-
sirable-or at least acceptable-social equilibrium. However, the
recent political history of EPA enforcement suggests that the vol-
untary compliance strategy of the 1980's was generally perceived
as an unacceptable tilt in the other direction, and that there is a
social demand for enhanced compliance and enforcement. In such
a situation, opportunities for third party intervention might be
better viewed as corrective devices to help keep the agency from
straying too far outside the bounds of political consensus.
A second theoretical problem is that interest-analysis models
like the one used by Professor Stewart, which seek to identify ex-
ternal, objective interests that drive or influence participants' be-
havior, can be faulted for defining interest too narrowly. Short-
term interests may conflict with long-term goals; perceived inter-
ests may vary from "real" interests; and perceptions of interest
may be shaped by forces, such as status desires and social relation-
311. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regu-
lation, 1985 Wis. L. Rav. 655.
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ships, that are not easily translated into economic incentives. A
complete theory of ongoing relationships in the regulatory arena
would have to take into account these broader dimensions of the
concept of interest. More specifically, Richard Axelrod's work
suggests that environmental groups are likely to seek cooperative
relationships to the degree that (1) they have-or perceive that
they have-long term interests in the regulatory arena; and (2)
the other players can punish or reward them for their past behav-
ior-and vice-versa. On the other hand, their role is likely to be
disfunctional if they frequently operate as 'gypsies" -that is,
players who flit in and out of the game with no long term interests
in it.
Our research thus far suggests that environmental groups
often have, perceive and act upon long-term personal and institu-
tional interests in the environmental policy arena, and that these
interests impose definite constraints on their behavior. Most of
the organizations sponsoring private enforcement suits also have
other major involvements in environmental regulation. These or-
ganizations constantly participate in all kinds of formal proceed-
ings and informal negotiations. Crucial to their success in these
undertakings is what they and the other parties often call "credi-
bility." Credibility means being tough (carrying through on
threats and promises), being competent (understanding the issues,
having access to the decision makers), and being reasonable (com-
promising where appropriate, looking for areas of common
ground). If an environmental group-or other party-loses its
credibility, it becomes less effectual, and less able to pursue its in-
terests effectively.
What seems crucial is that most of the parties in the regula-
tory arena have ongoing relationships with each other, and that
those relationships are not mere reflections-or vectors-of their
external interests. Rather, these relationships also are constitutive;
they help both to determine the nature of regulatory policy and
to define the content of the various interests. 1 2 The ongoing rela-
tionships help define the content of interests, first, because envi-
ronmental regulation is necessarily an exercise in the management
312. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Meidinger, The Culture of Regu-
latory Politics (paper presented at Law & Society Association Meetings, Chicago, II., May
30, 1986).
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of massive uncertainty. What is desirable for any interest, particu-
larly in light of the demands of other interests, is often unclear
until substantial discussions have occurred. Second, interests are
defined because the parties often come from common back-
grounds in schooling, disciplinary traditions and work experience,
and they generally work with each other on a regular basis. As a
result, they seek both to win each other's respect and to mold
each other's understandings of the issues. They act, in other
words, not only to further their interests, but also to improve and
consolidate their relationships with each other. Both their long-
term interests and the quality of their work lives depend, in part,
on those relationships.
In essence, then, the regulatory arena has many of the attrib-
utes of any other human community. Its members pursue their
own interests within that community. But at the same time, their
perceptions of those interests are partly shaped by the community.
Most importantly, they spend much time in the community not
merely attempting to advance their interests, but to define the
very rules under which the community should operate-in this
case, to implement their visions of the good regulatory system. To
be sure, such visions will be oriented by interests, and their inter-
ests will impose constraints on acceptable outcomes. To under-
stand the general operation of citizen suit provisions in the regula-
tory system, however, we must understand these community-like
attributes and their constitutive role in environmental regulation.
When we view the citizen suit statutes as effectuating the pri-
vate enforcer's membership in the regulatory community, they be-
come both easier to understand and harder to discount. On the
one hand, it is not surprising that the environmental groups
should want to seize the initiative in enforcing regulatory rules.
Like the community members in fourteenth century England,
they may feel they have an ownership interest in those rules. On
the other hand, the added participation surely complicates rela-
tions within the community and may make it somewhat harder to
work out and implement rules. This leads analysts like Professor
Stewart to ponder whether citizen suits are a desirable addition.
On the whole, we see no workable alternative. The addition
of environmental groups to the regulatory community helps to
make the regulatory community more congruent with the struc-
ture of the larger political community of which it is the adminis-
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trative arm and it eases the transfer of values and information be-
tween the smaller and larger units. The presence of
environmental interests provides an important corrective, not
only for problems such as agency capture, but also for unduly nar-
row decisions that can result when an agency has too few conduits
to its political environment.3 13 Because it is virtually impossible for
legislatures to determine pollution policy in any detail, large and
direct delegations of authority are probably a necessary and desir-
able fact of life in modern policy arenas like environmental regu-
lation. 14 The active participation of environmental organizations
in the formulation and implementation of environmental policy
can help to keep policy from getting too far out of kilter with the
broader political environment. Such participation will also legiti-
mate policy where legislative directives are unclear or where ad-
ministration appears overly subject to political swings. To be sure,
making private enforcement successful requires coping with the
problems of coordination, incentives and legitimacy detailed
above. Both the empirical and theoretical cases against private en-
forcement, however, are much weaker than those for it. The im-
portant scholarly task is to determine how those problems are in
fact being handled and how they might be better handled. Such
problems will necessarily be confronted in the day to day opera-
tions of the regulatory community and in the relationships that its
parties continue to develop with each other. More abstract specu-
lation on the functioning or desirability of citizen suits will get us
nowhere. We need to understand the operation of the policy com-
munity in much greater detail than we presently do if any signifi-
cant advances are to be made in the design of the regulatory insti-
tution known as the citizen suit.
313. See, e.g., Boyer, "Too Many Layers-Not Enough Practical People": The Policy-Mak.
ing Discretion of the Federal Trade Commission, 5 LAw & PoL'Y Q. 9 (1983).
314. Mashaw, Prodelegation, 1 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
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